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N AT O  E X PA N S I O N  H A S  G O N E  FA R  E N O U G H 
Western nations should negotiate a new security architecture for eastern Europe 
to stabilize the region and reduce the risks of war with Russia. This new security 
approach would revolve around permanent neutrality for Finland and Sweden; 
Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus; Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan; and finally 
Cyprus plus Serbia, as well as possibly several other Balkan states. These countries 
could still join economic and political groups as desired. Russia would have to 
settle “frozen” and “simmering” conflicts as part of the arrangement. Discussion 
on the new framework should begin within NATO, followed by deliberation with the 
neutral countries themselves, and then formal negotiations with Russia. 
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“Mike O’Hanlon’s book addresses one of the most consequential security issues 
of our day––the increasing hostility between the United States and Russia. 
Indeed, if we do not address it successfully, we may very well blunder into a 
military conflict with Russia, one that could all too easily escalate into a nuclear 
conflict that would threaten our very civilization. And he argues, correctly 
I believe, that the conflict over what Russia calls the “near abroad” is one 
fundamental cause of that hostility. He proposes a concrete step to lower the 
tensions that continue to stoke that hostility; basically setting up those nations 
as neutral nations, not aligned with either Russia or the West; and in particular, 
excluded from NATO membership. This is a controversial proposal, and one 
with real drawbacks for the nations involved. But the problem has eluded 
other solutions, and the consequences of not solving it could be catastrophic. 
O’Hanlon makes a thoughtful and well-argued case for his proposal and it 
deserves serious consideration.”      
—W I L L I A M  J .  P E R R Y, 19th U.S. Secretary of Defense
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T H E  M A R S H A L L  P A P E R  S E R I E S
 After World War II, Brookings scholars played an instru-
mental role in helping the United States craft a concept of 
international order and build a set of supporting institu-
tions, including what became known as the Marshall Plan, 
in honor of Secretary of State George C. Marshall who spear-
headed the effort. Now, a generation  later, the Brookings 
Foreign Policy program has evoked that vital historical junc-
ture by launching The Marshall Papers, a new book series 
and part of the Order from Chaos proj ect.  These short books 
 will provide accessible research on critical international 
questions designed to stimulate debate about how the United 
States and  others should act to promote an international 
order that continues to foster peace, prosperity, and justice.
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S hould the North Atlantic Treaty Organ ization continue to expand? An alliance of just twelve countries when it was 
created in 1949, NATO grew to sixteen members by the end 
of the Cold War, and has added another thirteen countries 
since then. This extremely successful security organ ization 
protected Eu rope in the Cold War, came to Amer i ca’s 
 defense  after the 9/11 attacks, and then deployed a major 
mission to Af ghan i stan that continues to this day, among 
numerous other achievements. It has also helped new mem-
ber states avoid conflict with each other, as with Greece and 
Turkey during much of the Cold War, and then consolidate 
demo cratic rule and civilian control of the armed forces 
during the period of post– Cold War expansion. It has also 
become a controversial organ ization in recent de cades, with 
Rus sia increasingly objecting to its eastward growth.  Great 
controversy and uncertainty now exist over  whether it should 
someday expand to include not just the Baltic states, which 
Introduction and Synopsis
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joined in 2004, but other post- Soviet republics, as well, notably 
Ukraine and Georgia.
This history sets the context for an extremely impor tant 
issue in U.S. foreign policy  today. If the Trump administration 
is serious about its worthy goal of improving U.S. relations 
with Rus sia, how exactly can it do so?  After all, Mr. Trump’s 
two immediate pre de ces sors had similar hopes for a better 
rapport with Putin; both failed. President Trump himself is 
already using far tougher words  toward Rus sia than he did 
as a candidate, and his national security team is generally 
hawkish  toward the Putin regime in Moscow. Rus sia’s med-
dling in Amer i ca’s 2016 elections further mars the situation.
Vladimir Putin and many of  those around him are hard- 
edged autocrats, and  there  will likely be no easy way to put 
U.S.- Russian relations fully back on track as long as they are 
in power. But it may be pos si ble to reduce the risks of rivalry 
and war by focusing on what may be, in Putin’s mind, the 
fundamental cause of the prob lem: NATO expansion. We do 
not owe the Rus sian strongman any apologies for the enlarge-
ment of the twenty- nine- member North Atlantic Treaty 
Organ ization to date. Nor should we abandon demo cratic 
friends like Ukraine and Georgia to Rus sian domination. 
However,  there is likely a better way to help them than the 
current U.S.- led approach.
At pres ent, we have, arguably, created the worst of all 
worlds. At its 2008 summit, NATO promised eventual mem-
bership to Ukraine and Georgia, but it did so without offer-
ing any specificity as to when or how that might happen. For 
now,  these two countries, as well as other eastern Eu ro pean 
neutral states, get no protection from NATO. Knowing of 
our eventual interest in bringing  these nations into an alli-
ance that he sees as adversarial, Vladimir Putin has  every 
incentive to keep them weak and unstable so they  will not 
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become eligible for NATO membership. Ukrainian presi-
dent Petro Poroshenko has been considering a domestic ref-
erendum on pos si ble NATO membership; this further fuels 
the flames. We have inadvertently built a type of NATO- 
membership doomsday machine that raises the likelihood 
of conflict in Eu rope.
It is time that Western nations seek to negotiate a new 
security architecture for  those neutral countries in Eastern 
Eu rope  today. The core concept would be one of permanent 
neutrality—at least in the formal sense of ruling out mem-
bership in a mutual- defense alliance, most notably NATO. 
The countries in question collectively make a broken-up arc 
from Eu rope’s far north to its south— Finland and Sweden; 
Ukraine and Moldova and Belarus; Georgia and Armenia 
and Azerbaijan; and fi nally Cyprus plus Serbia, as well as 
possibly other Balkan states. The discussion pro cess should 
begin within NATO, and then include the neutral countries 
themselves; formal negotiations could then take place with 
Rus sia.
The new security architecture would require that Rus sia, 
like NATO, commit to help uphold the security of Ukraine, 
Georgia, Moldova, and other states in the region. Rus sia 
would have to withdraw its troops from  those countries in a 
verifiable manner;  after that occurred, corresponding sanc-
tions would be lifted. The neutral countries would retain 
their rights to participate in multilateral security operations 
on a scale comparable to what has been the case in the past, 
even  those operations that might be led by NATO. They 
could think of themselves and describe themselves as West-
ern states (or anything  else, for that  matter). They would 
have complete sovereignty and self- determination in  every 
sense of the word. But NATO would decide not to invite them 
into the alliance as members; ideally, they would endorse 
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and promote this concept themselves as a more practical way 
to ensure their security than the current situation or any 
other plausible alternative.
Ideally, this architecture might be codified in treaty form 
and ratified by key legislative bodies, including, in the case 
of the United States, the U.S. Senate. It should be couched as 
of indefinite duration. If, someday, the world  were to evolve 
to where a new security order also including Rus sia  were 
pos si ble, or if Rus sian politics and strategic culture evolved 
to the point where Moscow no longer objected, NATO (or 
a  new organ ization) might expand further, but only  after 
mutual agreement had been reached.
It is worth underscoring that the new security order would 
guarantee neutral states the right to choose their own form 
of government, po liti cal leadership, diplomatic relations, and 
economic associations. Notably, Rus sia would acknowledge 
the prerogative of  those not yet in the Eu ro pean Union (EU) 
to join the EU (except for its security- related pledges), 
should that someday be of interest to them as well as current 
EU members.
To be sure, the concept of neutrality has not always 
worked out so well historically, as with the fates of Belgium 
and Holland in the world wars. In other cases, however, such 
as Switzerland and Austria, it has helped ensure the sover-
eignty of the neutral nations while also contributing to a more 
stable security environment in bordering regions.
NATO must not be weakened  under the new paradigm. 
It has been, and remains, a remarkable organ ization. It did 
much to protect the security of demo cratic states and to pre-
serve peace in Eu rope during the Cold War. It then success-
fully changed into a mechanism for stabilizing the post– Cold 
War Eu ro pean order thereafter, including in places such as 
Bosnia and, more recently, even distant Af ghan i stan. It also 
01-3257-0 int.indd   4 6/21/17   11:06 PM
 B E Y O N D  N A T O  5
helped several former Warsaw Pact states and the Baltic states 
solidify their transition to post- communist polities.
NATO has worked hard on its relationship with Rus sia 
since the Cold War. It agreed not to station significant foreign 
combat forces on the territory of any of its members admit-
ted since the Cold War ended. It also created mechanisms 
such as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the Partner-
ship for Peace program, and the NATO- Russia Council to 
reach out in collegial and collaborative ways to Rus sia and 
other former members of the Warsaw Pact.
Yet this is an American, and Western, perspective. Rus-
sians in general do not share it.  Whether most truly see 
NATO as a physical threat is a question, but many do see it as 
an insult— a psychologically and po liti cally imposing former 
 enemy that has approached right up to their border. Rus sia’s 
declining population and weak economy when contrasted 
with  those of NATO states— roughly a $1.5 trillion GDP and 
less than 150 million  people, versus a combined NATO total 
of $40 trillion with 900 million  people— contribute further to 
Rus sia’s negative view of NATO. This critical attitude is found 
not only among Rus sia’s current president and older former 
Soviet apparatchiks, as well as Mikhail Gorbachev, the  father 
of glasnost and perestroika, but even among many younger 
reformers. Putin’s sky- high popularity at home, partly a 
result of his crackdown on critics and competitors, is, none-
theless, also an indication of how strong anti- NATO senti-
ments have become in Rus sia.
While pursuing a new security architecture for the neu-
tral states of Eastern Eu rope, NATO should stay strong and 
resolute in defense of existing members. The alliance is now 
stationing a total of some 5,000 troops— a modest force, more 
of a tripwire than a forward defense—in the Baltic states and 
Poland. Mr. Trump should signal his intention of sustaining 
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Amer i ca’s so- called Eu ro pean Reassurance Initiative even as 
he seeks to negotiate the new security system.
 There is no guarantee, of course, that President Putin  will 
prove interested in this idea. Putin may feel he is in an ad-
vantageous position to continue to try to weaken NATO, and 
the EU more generally, by stoking vari ous conflicts, promot-
ing and supporting extremist leaders in Western Eu rope, fo-
menting dissent in American politics, and generally keeping 
the major demo cratic powers guessing as to what  will happen 
next. He may further conclude that the sanctions imposed on 
Rus sia over the Crimea and Donbas aggressions in Ukraine 
 will weaken or dissipate, without any Rus sian action being 
necessary, as po liti cal forces and leaders change in the West. 
Putin may also welcome an ongoing standoff with the West 
for the additional excuses it provides him for his strongman 
be hav ior at home and his aggressiveness abroad.
The outcome of any effort to create a new security architec-
ture is, therefore of course, uncertain but it should be at-
tempted, nonetheless. Western leaders should pursue this path 
confidently and unapologetically, and not portray it as an 
admission of previous wrongdoing. If Rus sia refuses to nego-
tiate in good faith, or fails to live up to any deal it might ini-
tially support,  little  will be lost and options for a toughening 
of  future policy against Rus sia  will remain. Indeed, a range of 
such responses should be developed in advance, including the 
possibility of expediting consideration of NATO membership 
for neutral states that are subsequently coerced or attacked by 
Rus sia. The hope, of course, is to avoid that. The current stra-
tegic situation involving most of the world’s  great economies 
and several of its nuclear- weapons states in Eu rope is quite 
dangerous, and it  will not become less dangerous if simply 
left on autopi lot.
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It is hard to believe, but a quarter  century  after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States and Rus sia again became 
adversaries. They remain in such a state  today. They may not 
be military enemies, but their respective military establish­
ments now focus largely on each other in modernizing their 
weapons and devising force posture plans. Some Rus sians 
talk openly of already being at war with the United States; 
a former deputy supreme allied commander in Eu rope re­
cently wrote a novel about a war pitting NATO against Rus­
sia that he intended as a clarion call about something that 
 really could happen. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff in the United States, General Joseph Dunford, testified 
to Congress in the summer of 2015 that Rus sia could be 
Amer i ca’s most dangerous security worry in the world. 
Dunford subsequently placed Rus sia among his top con­
cerns when devising his “4 + 1” threat framework— with 
Rus sia listed along with North  Korea, Iran, China, and 
ISIS/Salafism/violent extremism as the priority concerns 
C H A P T E R   1
How We Got  Here
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of the Department of Defense. President Donald Trump’s 
early aspirations to put the U.S.­ Russia relationship on friend­
lier footing already appeared to be dashed by the spring 
of 2017. Rus sian attacks on Ukraine, a country whose sov­
ereignty the United States as well as Rus sia and the United 
 Kingdom pledged to help guarantee in the 1994 Budapest 
Memorandum, have destabilized Eu rope.
Rus sian cyber transgressions against Estonia, and pro­
vocative military maneuvers near the territories or military 
assets of vari ous NATO nations, have further underscored 
that direct military confrontation pitting the United States 
and allies against the Rus sian Federation is far from incon­
ceivable. Indeed, Rus sian aircraft maneuvers near NATO ter­
ritory or military assets produced up to a doubling in the 
frequency of NATO fighter “scrambles” designed to intercept 
the offending aircraft in 2016; serious prob lems persist  today.1 
A Rus sian concept of “escalate to de­ escalate”— purportedly 
an effective war­ winning strategy for any  future conflict 
against the West— has again raised the prominence of nuclear 
weapons, and veiled nuclear threats, in the Russia­ NATO 
relationship.2
How did we get  here? And what can we do about it? This 
short book begins with the first question, the main subject 
of this chapter, but focuses its main analytical thrust on the 
second question. Without claiming that the dramatic de­
terioration in the U.S.­ Russian relationship has any single 
cause, or that any one change in policy can right it, I none­
theless propose a new security architecture for the currently 
in de pen dent states of eastern Europe– Finland and Sweden, 
George and Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, as well as Cyprus and Serbia (and perhaps other 
currently neutral Balkan countries, as well). I believe this 
security construct could significantly defuse the acute crisis 
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and dangers in the U.S.­ Russian relationship  today. A negoti­
ated agreement should be pursued between NATO nations, 
Rus sia, and the neutral countries  after intensive consultations 
between NATO states and the neutral states. The goal would 
be to create a permanently nonaligned zone in eastern Eu­
rope while guaranteeing the full diplomatic and economic 
sovereignty and territorial security of  these same countries.
 Because the Trump administration, the intended electoral 
beneficiary of Rus sian meddling in the 2016 American presi­
dential election, could be the lead player on proposing this 
new framework, it is especially impor tant to explain why it 
would not be a concession to Rus sia or its strongman presi­
dent. In fact, it would not be a gift to Rus sia at all.3 The 
security architecture would place stringent demands on 
Rus sia to keep its hands off the neutral countries and insist it 
reach fair agreements on existing territorial disputes (other­
wise, sanctions could not be lifted and the overall architecture 
could not be implemented). It would be explic itly under­
stood, and stated, that any subsequent violation of  these and 
other terms could end the entire accord and revive the pos­
sibility that some of the countries at issue would join NATO. 
 Those who might be quick to criticize my proposal should 
ask if they can  really defend the status quo. As of  today, 
NATO has promised Ukraine and Georgia  future member­
ship without offering any timetable to that membership or 
any interim protection— a perfect formula to stoke Rus sian 
meddling in  those countries and, undoubtedly, an incentive 
to Moscow to perpetuate the ongoing Russia­ Ukraine war. 
Current policy has failed by leaving NATO half pregnant 
with membership for Ukraine and Georgia, and Rus sia in­
censed over the situation. What ever the merits of NATO ex­
pansion may have been to date— and, as  later discussed,  there 
 were respectable arguments in its  favor (even if not completely 
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convincing ones)— the proj ect has run its course. Indeed, it 
has become counterproductive.
T H E  H E A D Y  D AY S  O F  T H E  E A R LY  19 9 0 s ,  A N D  A N T E C E D E N T S  
O F  P R O B  L E M S  T O  C O M E
The warming in U.S.­ Russia relations that culminated in very 
positive American relationships with Mikhail Gorbachev 
and Boris Yeltsin in the late 1980s and 1990s took some time 
to develop. From glasnost and perestroika, to the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, to the iconic image of Yeltsin facing down So­
viet tanks in the summer of 1991 as the USSR collapsed, the 
pro cess took more than half a de cade. By the time Bill 
Clinton was elected president in the United States, however, 
it was pos si ble to believe that U.S.­ Russia relations  after the 
Cold War could be headed to almost as happy a place as 
U.S.­ Germany and U.S.­ Japan relationships  after World 
War II.
Prob lems began to develop fairly early on, however. By 
1994, adding insult to the injury of the Soviet Union’s own 
demise, the Warsaw Treaty Organ ization had also collapsed; 
meanwhile, NATO was still  going strong. East Eu ro pean 
countries  were approaching Brussels about establishing new 
security arrangements, and then in January 1994, the NATO 
alliance created the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. Its 
declared purpose was to facilitate military and po liti cal coop­
eration between NATO and former members of the defunct 
Warsaw Pact. However, it did not take long for many Rus­
sians, including key reformers like Anatoly Sobchak and 
Andrei Kokoshin, to begin to view PfP suspiciously as a path­
way to NATO expansion for  these countries.4
As the 1990s unfolded, officials in the Clinton adminis­
tration felt pressure to reach out to countries like Poland, 
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but they also wanted to support Yeltsin and avoid creating 
excessive po liti cal prob lems for him at home. They  were 
often told by the reformers around Yeltsin that NATO en­
largement would create serious difficulties for the Yeltsin 
team from Rus sian nationalists and Communists, and dam­
age the Kremlin’s efforts to pursue a pro­ Western foreign 
policy. Yeltsin himself coined the expression that NATO ex­
pansion might augur in “a cold peace.”5
 There  were reasonable arguments being voiced in the 
United States to carry out NATO expansion just the same. 
Some came from diasporas of countries that had been incor­
porated into the communist world and Warsaw Pact largely 
against their  will and that saw it as only fitting and proper that 
they be allowed, in effect, to rejoin the West once the Cold 
War was over.  There  were additional voices in  favor of using 
NATO to help  these former Warsaw Pact states strengthen 
their young democracies and civilian control of their militar­
ies. And  there  were  those with a long view of history who 
worried about a return to an aggressive Rus sia in the  future, 
irrespective of what policies  were followed by the West in the 
meantime. According to this view, Rus sia’s temporary weak­
ness presented an opportunity that should not be missed.6 
Already by February 1995, in fact, the Clinton administration 
had announced its national security strategy of “engagement 
and enlargement,” in which it underscored that it had “initi­
ated a pro cess that  will lead to NATO’s expansion.”7
Thus in the mid­1990s the Clinton administration 
pushed ahead with enlargement while also seeking to mit­
igate Moscow’s negative reactions. That proved a difficult 
task. For many Rus sians, if NATO was still a military alli­
ance and a mechanism for ensuring collective defense, it must 
be directed against some country— and the Rus sian Federa­
tion was the obvious target.
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Yeltsin won reelection in 1996. From that point forward, 
the Clinton administration felt less need to hold back. Po­
land, Hungary, and the Czech Republic  were soon put on 
paths to join NATO and became alliance members in 1999. 
At the same time, Washington and Moscow tried to keep 
their own relationship moving forward. Notably, in Paris on 
May 27, 1997, Yeltsin signed the NATO­ Russia Founding 
Act on Mutual Relations. The Founding Act set out the basic 
po liti cal framework for Rus sia and the alliance to work to­
gether, but the forces pushing the two countries apart  were 
rapidly becoming stronger than  those holding them together. 
Subsequent events included the August 1998 Rus sian finan­
cial collapse, the Kosovo war in the spring of 1999, and Rus sia’s 
renewed war in Chechnya in the summer of 1999.8
K O S O V O
In 1999 NATO went to war for the first time in its history in 
response to Yugo slav military atrocities against ethnic Al­
banian civilians in Kosovo, which was still part of both Ser­
bia and Yugo slavia.9 The war came only two weeks  after the 
alliance had admitted Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Re­
public. NATO did not secure authority from the United Na­
tions to intervene; NATO warplanes bombed Serbian forces 
in the field and, increasingly, Belgrade. NATO forces, with 
American troops in the lead, then moved into Kosovo to 
secure the territory.
NATO’s intervention shook the Rus sian establishment.10 
As Vladimir Putin put it in his March 18, 2014, speech fif­
teen years  later, no one in Rus sia could believe that NATO 
had attacked Yugo slavia: “It was hard to believe, even seeing 
it with my own eyes, that at the end of the twentieth  century, 
one of Eu rope’s capitals, Belgrade, was  under missile attack 
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for several weeks, and then came the real [military] interven­
tion.”11 Moscow could do  little about what happened, and 
Rus sian leaders took the intervention almost personally, 
given their longstanding ties to Serbia and their sense of close 
kinship with fellow Orthodox Christians  there.12
NATO justified its operation, of course, as a response to 
 human suffering at the hands of the very same Slobodan 
Milosevic who had torn apart Bosnia earlier in the de cade. 
However, in Moscow, Rus sian officials interpreted the inter­
vention as a means of expanding NATO’s influence in the 
Balkans, not as an effort to deal with a humanitarian crisis.13
In June, at the end of the bombing campaign, Rus sian 
forces engaged in a tense standoff with NATO troops in 
Kosovo. This came as the Clinton administration tried to 
persuade Rus sia to take part in the Kosovo peacekeeping 
force (KFOR). Moscow had agreed to a similar arrangement 
a  couple of years earlier in Bosnia; Rus sian troops  were 
still serving  there. But this case proved diff er ent.  After the 
intervention which, as noted, occurred with NATO but not 
UN approval, Rus sia resisted the idea of its forces working for 
NATO. Moscow also demanded a decisionmaking role in 
KFOR, and U.S. military commanders  were concerned that 
Rus sia might attempt to create a “Rus sian sector” in Kosovo.14 
While  these vari ous  matters  were being discussed in Mos­
cow, Washington, Brussels, and elsewhere, Rus sian general 
Leonid Ivashov sent a Rus sian troop contingent from Bosnia 
to Kosovo, where it secured the main airport in Kosovo’s capi­
tal of Pristina. However, Rus sian forces  were isolated and soon 
 running low on food,  water, and fuel. New NATO member 
Hungary, along with NATO aspirants Bulgaria and Romania, 
refused access to their airspace for Rus sian planes seeking to 
conduct resupply runs. At the same point, supreme allied 
commander in Eu rope General Wesley Clark ordered the 
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NATO commander in Kosovo, British general Michael Jack­
son, to send in NATO forces to block the runways at the air­
port. Jackson refused, telling Clark, “Sir, I’m not starting 
World War III for you.”15 The British did seal off the roads 
leading to the airport, but they also provided the beleaguered 
Rus sian troops with food and  water.16 The result was not a 
direct conflict between Rus sia and NATO, thankfully. But it 
was another humiliation for Moscow.
During this same period Vladimir Putin was gaining 
greater power within Rus sia. Putin had been the head of the 
Federal Security Ser vice; in 1999 he was promoted to chair 
the Rus sian Security Council and gained a key role in 
managing Rus sia’s relationships with NATO and the United 
States. The Kosovo war then occurred and became a defin­
ing moment in Putin’s  career, one that influenced him 
deeply.17 Within months, he was Rus sia’s acting president.
O F  C O U N T E R T E R R O R I S M ,  C O L O R  R E V O L U T I O N S ,  
A N D  N A T O  E X PA N S I O N
For a period of time around the turn of the  century and early 
in the 2000s, it seemed that counterterrorism might unite 
Moscow and Washington in common cause.  After all, the two 
countries had been cooperating on nuclear security through 
vari ous global nonproliferation efforts as well as the Nunn­ 
Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, so it seemed 
natu ral to think they could work together when a new threat 
presented itself.
In November 1999 Putin, then prime minister, wrote a 
New York Times op­ed asking the American public for sup­
port for Rus sia’s second intervention in Chechnya, which 
had begun a few months before. He defined the fight as a 
strug gle against terrorism that Americans should understand. 
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 After September 11, 2001, the terrorist strikes on U.S. soil rein­
forced Putin’s view that Amer i ca and Rus sia should be united 
in purpose. Then­ President Putin immediately reached out to 
President George W. Bush to express his sympathy and offer 
his assistance.18 Indeed, shortly before the 9/11 attacks, Putin 
had called Bush to warn him about a terrorist threat that Rus­
sian intelligence had identified.19 Putin expected Washington 
would see linkages between al Qaeda in Af ghan i stan and ter­
rorists in Chechnya. He also believed he could help the United 
States.20 He expected American sympathy and support for his 
wars against terrorism, especially in light of the terrible terror­
ist attacks against Rus sians that began around 1995 and con­
tinued into the first de cade of the 2000s and beyond.21
That did not happen. Chechnya remained a major subject 
of contention between Rus sia and the United States.  There 
was to be no co ali tion.22 The United States saw Rus sia’s situ­
ation as entirely diff er ent from its own. The al Qaeda threat 
justified a global war on terrorism; Amer i ca and its allies 
 were  under direct and unprovoked assault. By contrast, the 
Chechnya situation, in Washington’s eyes, was an inter­
nal conflict. The terrorist acts that emanated from the North 
Caucasus  were directed only against Rus sian targets. Most 
Americans felt Rus sia had largely brought its prob lems upon 
itself  because of the brutal way it fought the Chechnya 
campaigns.23
 After the 9/11 attacks, Putin was befuddled by Amer i ca. 
He even blamed himself for not having been sufficiently em­
phatic in his warnings and his efforts to fashion a unified 
front against the extremist threat.24 As time went on, how­
ever, he blamed the United States more and more— for being 
overly assertive in Rus sia’s backyard and the  Middle East, 
yet at the same time inept in how it wielded power. Iraq and 
Af ghan i stan and Libya went badly, demonstrating Ameri­
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can incompetence in his eyes. Yet Putin also ascribed al­
most super­ human powers to Washington for its purported 
roles in the Rose, Orange, Tulip, and Maydan revolutions 
(in Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004–05, Kyrgyzstan in 
2005, and Ukraine again in 2013–14, respectively), as well as 
with the domestic opposition to his own attempt to regain 
the Rus sian presidency in 2012.  There was apparent contra­
diction in  these contrasting interpretations of Amer i ca’s sup­
posed omnipotence mixed with sheer fecklessness, but  there 
was prob ably a good deal of sincerity in both aspects of 
Putin’s somewhat oxymoronic view of the United States.
Shortly  after the 9/11 attacks, in December 2001, Wash­
ington announced it was pulling out of the 1972 Anti­ Ballistic 
Missile (ABM) Treaty and would move ahead with creating a 
new missile defense system to  counter threats from countries 
like Iraq or North  Korea or Iran— the so­ called rogue states 
or “axis of evil.” Putin’s initial response was relatively muted, 
perhaps  because the 9/11 attacks  were still so recent and 
 because both the Putin and Bush presidencies  were still in 
their early, hopeful days. However, in ensuing months and 
years, many of the old Rus sian fears about Ronald Reagan’s 
Strategic Defense Initiative, his “Star Wars” program,  were 
gradually resurrected in Moscow. Putin and other Rus sian 
officials expressed growing opposition to the system. Putin 
came to believe, it would appear, that American missile de­
fense was more about diminishing Rus sia’s nuclear deterrent 
than about countering threats from small, extremist states.25
The U.S.­ led invasion of Af ghan i stan was perhaps not so 
hard for Moscow to stomach. Its eye­ for­ an­ eye character 
prob ably made sense to Putin. And the next year, Moscow 
and NATO established a new NATO­ Russia Council at the 
alliance’s Rome summit. NATO leaders saw the creation of 
this council as yet one more piece of evidence that the West 
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was bending over backward to help Rus sia, to treat it with 
re spect, and to assuage its worries about post– Cold War se­
curity in Eu rope. On top of that, Western economic help to 
Rus sia had been moderately generous since the Cold War had 
ended. Rus sia’s economic travails continued, of course, but 
they  were, from this viewpoint, the result of the inevitable 
pain of transforming a command economy into a free­ market 
system combined with some bad be hav ior by Rus sian oli­
garchs who  were exploiting their fellow citizens with robber­ 
baron­ like activities. The major NATO states  were  doing all 
they reasonably could to help, in economic and po liti cal and 
security spheres. At least, that was how the West saw it, and at 
times Putin did not seem to disagree.
Of course not all was well, and the good vibes would 
not last. That same NATO summit in May 2002 produced 
decisions leading to the second major round of alliance 
enlargement in March  2004, including Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. From 
Moscow’s perspective, the inclusion of Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania in the group was particularly galling  because they 
had been part of the Rus sian Empire and the Soviet Union.26 
The three Baltic states, along with the Czech Republic, Hun­
gary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia,  were also admitted to 
the Eu ro pean Union in May of that same year, and Bulgaria 
and Romania joined in 2007.
Moreover, the 2003 U.S.­ led intervention in Iraq con­
vinced Putin even more that the United States was looking 
for pretexts to act hegemonically, throwing its military weight 
around the Mideast region and the world. Indeed, Putin, as 
well as Rus sian intelligence, apparently believed that Iraqi 
leader Saddam Hussein was bluffing about his possession 
of chemical and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 
They stated this bluntly to U.S. officials on numerous oc­
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casions.27 As the intervention quickly went south  later in 
2003, Putin’s anger at alleged American imperiousness was 
 increasingly combined with disdain for how ineffectually 
the United States seemed to be employing its power around 
the world.
When the terrible Beslan school terrorist attack in Sep­
tember 2004 took place in Rus sia, two years  after the bloody 
Moscow Dubrovka Theater attack, Western reactions to 
Moscow’s response furthered in Putin’s mind the idea that a 
 double standard was being applied against Rus sia.28 The Or­
ange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004–05 was impor tant in 
this regard, as well. Putin was always somewhat dismissive 
of Ukraine as a truly separate and sovereign entity capable 
of genuinely in de pen dent action. Thus, he believed the mas­
sive demonstrations in Ukraine known as the Orange Revo­
lution could only have been orchestrated from the outside.29 
The Bush administration’s Freedom Agenda and American 
neo­ imperialism more generally  were the most likely cul­
prits.30 Putin did not accept the sincerity of U.S. democracy­ 
promotion efforts. He saw their roots in the Cold War and 
in Washington’s unwillingness to accept the legitimacy of 
Rus sia’s po liti cal system. And now they  were affecting a 
fairly large country that was very close to home for Rus sia.
Then  there was Georgia. The Kremlin was very concerned 
about U.S. support for the Georgian government of Mikheil 
Saakashvili as the Bush presidency progressed into its second 
term.31 The strengthening relationship between Tbilisi and 
Washington raised worries about Georgia’s eventual member­
ship in NATO. Given Georgia’s distance from Eu rope and the 
North Atlantic, it was increasingly hard for many Rus sians to 
view NATO’s interest in Georgian membership as anything 
more than imperial overstretch, and at their own country’s 
expense.32
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 T H I N G S  F A L L  A PA R T
Thus the stage was set for a confluence of events in 2007 and 
2008 that prob ably marked the decisive turning point in re­
lations between Vladimir Putin and the West in par tic u lar, 
as Clifford Gaddy and Fiona Hill have persuasively argued. 
At the February  2007 Munich Security Conference, Putin 
gave the following public remarks:
It turns out that NATO has put its frontline forces 
on our borders, and we continue to strictly fulfill the 
treaty obligations and do not react to  these actions at 
all. I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does 
not have any relation with the modernization of the 
Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Eu rope. 
On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation 
that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have 
the right to ask: against whom is this expansion 
intended?33
 There was no acknowl edgment by Putin that the United 
States and major Western Eu ro pean NATO states demon­
strated restraint by not moving combat power into perma­
nent bases in the alliance’s new eastern regions, or that 
American military energies at the time  were clearly focused 
on Iraq and Af ghan i stan, not Eu rope.
A year  later, Putin made almost identical remarks to the 
press on the sidelines of the April 2008 NATO Summit in 
Bucharest, Romania. On this occasion, building on his re­
marks in Munich, Putin returned to what he saw as the fun­
damental questions posed by NATO’s continued existence 
and seemingly inexorable expansion, even  after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. Putin stated:
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It is obvious that  today  there is no Soviet Union, no 
eastern bloc and no Warsaw Pact. So NATO exists 
to confront whom? We hear that it exists in order to 
solve  today’s prob lems and challenges. Which ones? 
What are the prob lems and challenges? . . .  I think 
that many  here in this room would agree with me that, 
in itself, the existence of the NATO bloc is not an 
effective answer to  today’s challenges and threats. But 
we recognize that it is nonetheless a  factor in  today’s 
international life, a  factor in international security, 
and that is why we cooperate with the bloc. With re­
gard to expansion, I heard  today that this expansion is 
not against Rus sia. You know, I have a  great interest in 
and love for Eu ro pean history, including German his­
tory. Bismarck was an impor tant German and Eu ro­
pean po liti cal leader. He said that in such  matters what 
is impor tant is not the intention but the capability. . . .  
We have withdrawn our troops deployed in eastern 
Eu rope, and withdrawn almost all large and heavy 
weapons from the Eu ro pean part of Rus sia. And what 
happened? A base in Romania, where we are now, one 
in Bulgaria, an American missile defense area in Poland 
and the Czech Republic. That all means moving mili­
tary infrastructure to our borders.34
In February  2008, the United States and several Eu ro­
pean states recognized Kosovo against Rus sia’s wishes. That 
reopened old wounds from 1999 and conjured up the im­
mediate possibility of Kosovo, heretofore a province of Ser­
bia, becoming a NATO member someday. Putin declared 
this “a harmful and dangerous pre ce dent” and immediately 
raised the implications of Kosovo’s in de pen dence for Geor­
gia’s secessionist republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.35 
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NATO’s Bucharest summit in April then promised Georgia 
and Ukraine eventual membership. The fact that NATO 
leaders chose not to take the technical step of offering Kiev 
and Tbilisi formal Membership Action Plans was  little 
solace.
In June  2008 Dmitry Medvedev, just inaugurated as 
Rus sian president, gave his first major foreign policy speech 
abroad. In his speech, he proposed the creation of a new 
Eu ro pean security arrangement and treaty, an idea that was 
quickly rejected by the United States and its allies.36 Even 
though it was vague, and even though in  later revisions it 
acknowledged NATO’s continued right to exist, Medvedev’s 
vision may have come too close to condemning the NATO 
alliance to obsolescence—or at least to a constrained  future 
role— for the West to accept it.37
By August 2008 Rus sia had gone to war with Georgia. 
Rus sia’s incursion was justified as a response to President 
Saakashvili’s decision to launch his own attack against sepa­
ratists in South Ossetia. Georgian shelling killed Rus sian 
peacekeepers in the South Ossetian capital Tskhin va li, pro­
voking a full­ scale Rus sian military invasion. But in a broader 
sense, it was the result of pressures that had been building in 
Rus sian minds for many years.38
The year 2009 marked the arrival of a new American 
president and Mr. Obama’s “reset” policy with Rus sia.39 The 
approach seemed to address Putin’s main demand that Rus­
sia be treated with re spect and pragmatism on major issues 
of mutual interest, but it did not succeed. The first year and 
a half of the Obama presidency produced a New START 
Treaty, a new architecture for Eu ro pean missile defense, 
further cooperation on Iran and North  Korea sanctions, 
and the opening of the Northern Distribution Network into 
Afghanistan— providing NATO with multiple new logistics 
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options that involved Rus sian territory or other former 
Soviet republics. However,  things soon deteriorated. In 
Moscow’s eyes, the perceived offenses included Amer i ca’s 
unsuccessful  handling of aspects of the Arab Spring, such as 
the NATO Libya intervention which quickly exceeded the 
scope of the UN Security Council resolution approving it, 
to  the unsteady American  handlings of unrest in Syria and 
Egypt, to the Sergei Magnitsky Act targeting Rus sian officials 
who had been complicit in the death of a Rus sian  human 
rights  lawyer.40 That tragedy and other Rus sian crackdowns 
on dissent at home led to more critical American words con­
cerning Rus sian internal politics.
A vicious cycle had developed. Putin and his inner circle, 
prob ably never true demo crats at heart,  were critiqued by 
Washington for their suppression, including through occa­
sional vio lence, of internal dissent.  These critiques enraged 
Putin, who then saw Amer i ca’s hand in any Rus sian po liti cal 
activity that did not support him (such as party­ building and 
other democracy­ promotion activities), and he clamped down 
even more forcefully. To maintain Rus sian public support for 
his short­ circuiting of proper demo cratic practices, he pointed 
to a supposedly hostile and devious West that was purport­
edly inciting Rus sians to turn against each other. The combi­
nation of disinformation and coercion worked, at least at 
home. In recent years—according to what Rus sians tell poll­
sters ( whether they feel  free in expressing their true views or 
not is another  matter)— Putin’s internal popularity has typi­
cally been 80 to 90  percent.41
In a 2017 interview with the National Interest, Rus sian 
foreign minister Sergey Lavrov pointed to a speech that Sec­
retary of State Hillary Clinton gave in December 2012 in Ire­
land in which she expressed the hope that the United States 
could slow Moscow’s efforts to “re­ Sovietize the former 
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Soviet space.” One might have thought all could agree that 
re­ Sovietization was not in anyone’s interest. Yet Lavrov ar­
gued that such words revealed malevolent and expansionist 
American intent that was manifest even before the crises of 
Crimea and Ukraine.42
On September 11, 2013, on the anniversary of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, Putin again wrote an op­ed in the New York 
Times. Putin was extremely critical of Amer i ca’s style of 
world leadership. He argued: “It is alarming that military 
intervention in internal conflicts in foreign countries has 
become commonplace for the United States. Is it in Amer­
i ca’s long­ term interest? I doubt it. Millions around the 
world increasingly see Amer i ca not as a model of democ­
racy but as relying solely on brute force, cobbling co ali­
tions together  under the slogan ‘ you’re  either with us or 
against us.’ ”43
The Ukraine crisis of 2013–14 was the nail in the cof­
fin. The precipitating events  were not about NATO mem­
bership, but Ukraine’s general westward movement and 
consideration of closer ties to the Eu ro pean Union. Yet they 
 were in a broader context in which eventual NATO mem­
bership for Ukraine was clearly on the  table, admittedly 
making it hard to disentangle the relative importance of 
the vari ous  factors in Putin’s mind. One  thing the Rus sian 
strongman did clearly believe is that the vari ous color revo­
lutions as well as this latest, the Maydan uprising,  were not 
indigenous or legitimate. Of course, he was bound not to like 
them; they had the aggregate effect of replacing pro­ Moscow 
politicians with pro­ Western regimes. Worse, Putin saw the 
hand of the West  behind all of them. He blamed Western 
involvement with new po liti cal parties and nongovernmen­
tal organ izations and other new actors in  these young coun­
tries for what tran spired. Not only was it against his own 
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interests; he saw  these developments as bad for the countries 
themselves.
By this time, Putin could invoke the failed Arab Spring 
movements in the  Middle East to reinforce his argument. The 
West, Putin argued in a March 2014 speech, tried to impose a 
set of “standards, which  were in no way suitable for  either the 
way of life, or the traditions, or the cultures of  these  peoples. 
As a result, instead of democracy and freedom— there was 
chaos and the outbreak of vio lence, a series of revolutions. The 
‘Arab Spring’ was replaced by the ‘Arab Winter.’ ”44 This speech 
helped justify, for Putin, Rus sian aggression against Ukraine 
in Crimea and in the Donbas region, in cyberspace (including 
with an attack on the electricity grid), and beyond. The West, 
of course, saw  these actions as entirely illegitimate, a threat to 
basic international order, and proof of Putin’s autocratic and 
strongman ways.45 Although they did not embark on a major 
transfer of lethal weaponry, several NATO countries, includ­
ing the United States, did assist the Ukrainian military in 
vari ous ways in response to Rus sia’s aggression, further hard­
ening  battle lines.46
The reset was dead. By the end of the Obama years, so 
 were 10,000 Ukrainians, who perished in civil war, as well 
as 300 passengers on a Malaysian jet shot down by a Rus sian 
anti­ aircraft missile.
The breakdown in relations extended to the  Middle East, 
too. While the West blamed Putin for bloody, brutal Rus sian 
tactics in Syria from 2015 onward that primarily killed mod­
erate insurgents (rather than the purported ISIS targets), Putin 
saw that war as another demonstration of the West’s naiveté 
about power politics and under­ appreciation for the impor­
tance of po liti cal stability in troubled countries.47
In short, a quarter  century  after the end of the Cold War, 
NATO and Rus sia had again effectively become adversaries.
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E C O N O M I C  A N D  M I L I T A R Y  P O W E R
Two more dimensions of the equation need to be overlaid 
with this brief review of security events and crises: trends 
in economics and trends in the related  matter of military 
spending and defense modernization.
During Yeltsin’s time in power, Rus sia’s economic power 
and the standard of living of its  people deteriorated precipi­
tously. Western observers often forget how much Gorbachev 
and Yeltsin, seen as reformers and demo crats in much of 
NATO, are generally associated with the decline of the state 
by Rus sian citizens.
Putin changed that. He presided over a stabilization of 
the Rus sian economy. To be sure, the economy remained un­
healthy in many ways, and it remained dwarfed by NATO’s 
aggregate wealth. But at least it ceased its  free fall in the 2000s, 
benefiting from, among other  things, the rise in many com­
modity prices on global markets. As Gaddy and Hill have em­
phasized, Rus sia’s capacities for action changed dramatically 
in the summer of 2006, when Moscow fi nally paid off the last 
of its international debt to the so­ called Paris Club of major 
creditor nations. Putin had also paid off Rus sia’s debt to the 
International Monetary Fund by then. Rus sia was effectively 
unchained from its financial shackles to foreign countries and 
international financial institutions. The United States and the 
West could no longer exert pressure over Rus sia using debt 
and the prospect of new loans in the way they had since the 
Cold War ended.48
The global financial crisis and  great recession of 2008 
and onward caused less damage to Rus sia than to some 
Western states, and perhaps, therefore, taught Putin and fel­
low Rus sians another strategic lesson:  there was value to a 
degree of autarky and in de pen dence. When sanctions  were 
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 Albania 3.0 12.1
 Belgium 11.4 470.0
 Bulgaria 7.1 50.4
 Canada 35.4 1,530.0
 Croatia 4.3 49.9
 Czech Republic 10.7 194.0
 Denmark 5.6 303.0
 Estonia 1.3 23.5
 France 66.8 2,490.0
 Germany 80.7 3,490.0
 Greece 10.8 196.0
 Hungary 9.9 117.0
 Iceland 0.4 19.4
 Italy 62.0 1,850.0
 Latvia 2.0 27.9
 Lithuania 2.8 42.8
 Luxembourg 0.6 61.0
 Montenegro 0.6 4.2
 Netherlands 17.0 770.0
 Norway 5.3 376.0
 Poland 38.5 467.0
 Portugal 10.8 206.0
 Romania 21.6 187.0
 Slovakia 5.5 90.3
 Slovenia 2.0 44.1
 Spain 48.6 1,250.0
 Turkey 80.3 736.0
 United Kingdom 64.4 2,650.0
 United States 324.0 18,600.0
Total 933.4 36,307.6
(continued)
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 Rus sia 142.4 1,270.0
Total 142.4 1,270.0
NEU T R A L A ND CS T O
 Armenia 3.1 10.8
 Azerbaijan 9.9 35.7
 Belarus 9.6 48.1
 Bosnia­ Herzegovina 3.9 16.5
 Cyprus 1.2 19.9
 Finland 5.5 239.0
 Georgia 4.9 14.5
 Kosovo* 1.8 6.6
 Macedonia 2.1 10.5
 Moldova 3.5 6.7
 Serbia 7.1 37.8
 Sweden 9.9 517.0
 Ukraine 44.2 87.2
Total 106.7 919.3
O T HER NEU T R A L
 Austria 8.7 387.0
 Ireland 4.9 308.0
 Malta 0.4 10.5
 Switzerland 8.2 662.0
Total 22.2 1,367.5
*Kosovo’s in de pen dence is not yet fully established.
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2017 
(New York: Routledge Press, 2017), pp. 42, 45, 90, 91, 93, 96, 98, 100, 102, 104, 
106, 108, 110, 116, 120, 123, 125, 127, 131, 135, 137, 139, 142, 144, 149, 152, 154, 
156, 158, 161, 164, 166, 170, 199, 200, 203, 205, 209, 210.
The World Fact Book, “Kosovo,” Central Intelligence Agency, March 14, 2017 
(www . cia . gov / library / publications / the ­ world ­ factbook / geos / kv . html).
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applied by the West  after the Crimea and Donbas operations 
in Ukraine, Putin may not have welcomed the punishment, 
but he, perhaps, saw a silver lining in helping ensure that 
Rus sia would be reminded to take care of itself and not 
depend on the outside world for its economic viability.
Rus sia’s economic recovery also permitted a reassertion 
of military power. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Rus sia’s armed forces had been the target of a series of largely 
ineffectual reform programs. They  were also far less well re­
sourced than NATO’s forces. However, in late 2008,  after the 
difficult war with Georgia, Rus sia launched a much more se­
rious set of reforms  under Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyu­
kov.49 The general improvement in Rus sia’s economy and 
desires for a reassertion of national power led to an expansion 
in available resources to fund the country’s armed forces and 
implement  those reforms.
The modernization agenda had several components. A 
central goal was to create higher­ performance, more mobile, 
and better­ equipped units. The military was shrunk by about 
a third, and officer ranks  were reduced by half. As with the 
U.S. military in this time period, the main unit of ground 
combat capability was reduced from the division to the bri­
gade, and remaining brigades  were more fully staffed and 
manned. Most tanks  were eliminated as well, though some 
2,000 remained out of an initial force ten times that size. 
Military education was revamped; pay was improved; pro­
fessionalism was emphasized.50
In late 2010 then­ Prime Minister Putin announced a dra­
matic weapons procurement plan to go along with this earlier 
set of reforms in personnel, force structure, and readiness. 
Ambitiously, some $700 billion was projected for weapons 
modernization over a ten­ year time frame. This plan included 
a wide range of equipment. For example, in the naval realm it 
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 Albania 0.95 115 8,000
 Belgium 0.83 3,900 29,600
 Bulgaria 1.35 678 31,300
 Canada 0.86 13,200 63,000
 Croatia 1.18 588 15,550
 Czech Republic 1.02 1,970 21,950
 Denmark 1.17 3,550 16,600
 Estonia 2.14 503 6,400
 France 1.90 47,200 202,950
 Germany 1.10 38,300 176,800
 Greece 2.37 4,640 142,950
 Hungary 0.85 996 26,500
 Iceland 0.16 31 250
 Italy 1.21 22,300 174,500
 Latvia 1.47 411 5,310
 Lithuania 1.50 642 17,030
 Luxembourg 0.36 220 900
 Montenegro 1.63 69 1,950
 Netherlands 1.19 9,190 35,410
 Norway 1.59 5,970 24,950
 Poland 1.94 9,080 99,300
 Portugal 1.06 2,180 29,600
 Romania 1.49 2,780 70,500
 Slovakia 1.09 983 15,850
 Slovenia 1.02 450 7,250
 Spain 0.98 12,200 123,200
 Turkey 1.19 8,760 355,200
 United Kingdom 1.98 52,500 152,350
 United States 3.25 604,000 1,347,300
Average/Total/Total 1.34 847,300 3,200,500
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 Rus sia 3.67 46,600 831,000
Average/Total/Total 3.67 46,600 831,000
NEU T R A L A ND CS T O
 Armenia 3.96 428 44,800
 Azerbaijan 4.03 1,440 66,950
 Belarus 1.06 509 48,000
 Bosnia­ Herzegovina 1.16 191 10,500
 Cyprus 1.79 356 12,000
 Finland 1.37 3,280 22,200
 Georgia 1.98 287 20,650
 Kosovo* NA NA NA
 Macedonia 1.02 107 8,000
 Moldova 0.44 29 5,150
 Serbia 1.34 507 28,150
 Sweden 1.13 5,830 29,750
 Ukraine 2.49 2,170 204,000
Average/Total/Total 1.80 15,100 502,100
O T HER NEU T R A L
 Austria 0.53 2,070 21,350
 Ireland 0.32 1,000 9,100
 Malta 0.55 58 1,950
 Switzerland 0.71 4,720 20,950
Average/Total/Total 0.53 7,800 53,350
*Kosovo’s in de pen dence is not yet fully established.
Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2017 
(New York: Routledge Press, 2017), pp. 42, 45, 90, 91, 93, 96, 98, 100, 102, 104, 106, 
108, 110, 116, 120, 123, 125, 127, 131, 135, 137, 139, 142, 144, 149, 152, 154, 156, 
158, 161, 164, 166, 170, 199, 200, 203, 205, 209, 210.
The World Fact Book, “Kosovo,” Central Intelligence Agency (www . cia . gov 
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included Yasen­ class nuclear attack submarines, Lada­ class 
and Kilo­ class diesel attack subs, several classes of frigates and 
corvettes, Borey­ class ballistic missile submarines, and two 
Mistral­ class amphibious vessels from France.51 Fighter air­
craft deliveries began to average about two dozen a year, in­
cluding MiG­29SMT, Su­34, and Su­35S jets.52
By 2014 annual military spending levels had reached 
the range of $80 billion, almost double the 2008 figure. The 
imposition of sanctions against Rus sia in the course of 
the Ukraine crisis, followed by the plummeting of global oil 
prices, changed this plan. But much of its thrust survived. 
And much of it had been accomplished by 2014, when the 
Rus sian military began to truly swing back into action.
C O N C L U S I O N
By 2013, as the crisis in Ukraine began to unfold, Putin’s 
worldview and his view of Amer i ca had become quite dark. 
The stage was thus set for the Maydan revolution in Ukraine, 
and for the sense in Putin’s mind that the West orchestrated 
that revolution to further weaken Moscow. The narrative was 
strengthened when, having helped negotiate a graceful de­
parture for President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014, 
the West seemed to quickly abandon the plan once his ouster 
could be achieved more quickly. The conditions  were in place 
for the unleashing of “ little green men,” and much more.
As Putin concluded in his March 18, 2014, speech,  after in­
vading and just before annexing Crimea: “Rus sia strived to 
engage in dialogue with our colleagues in the West. We con­
stantly propose[d] cooperation on  every critical question, [we] 
want[ed] to strengthen the level of trust, [we] want[ed] our re­
lations to be equal, open and honest. But we did not see recip­
rocal steps [from the West].” Limited by lack of direct contacts 
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with the United States and driven by his threat perceptions, 
Putin believed he had been rebuffed or deceived at  every turn 
by the West. His worldview, and that of many other Rus sians, 
may not be persuasive to most Western observers, but it does 
appear to be largely sincere.
Meanwhile, negative Western views of Rus sia and Putin 
have spiked considerably. Rus sia’s aggressions against Ukraine 
in 2014, which continue to this day,  were followed by its sup­
port for Syrian president Bashar al­ Assad in 2015. Rus sia’s mili­
tary assertiveness went from relatively limited and short in 
Georgia in 2008 to quick and decisive in Crimea in early 2014 
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to sustained and deadly in the Donbas region thereafter—to 
absolutely brutal in Syria, where its support for the inhumane 
tactics of Assad’s forces have deprived its intervention of 
any legitimacy whatsoever in Western eyes.
And of course Rus sian meddling in the American elec­
tions of 2016 added insult to injury. Putin saw it, perhaps, as 
repaying the  favor that U.S. democracy­promotion efforts 
had done him several years earlier. But Americans rejected 
this comparison. Even Republicans who might have sup­
ported a Trump victory could not accept Rus sian meddling 
through hacking and disinformation, or view it as somehow 
simply giving the United States its just deserts.
The advent of the Trump administration in Washington, 
thus, comes at a crucial moment in history. The odds of 
Mr. Trump being able to engineer an improvement in rela­
tions seem rather low  unless he can fundamentally recast re­
lations between the West and Rus sia that twenty­ eight years 
of post– Cold War history have done so much to undermine.
In the remaining chapters, I explore how a substantial 
change in U.S.­ Russia and NATO­ Russia relations might 
be attempted through the creation of a new security archi­
tecture. First, in chapter 2, I review briefly the basic state 
of national security and national security politics in the 
key neutral states that are the focal point of the proposal. 
In chapter 3, I make the case for a new security paradigm 
or structure for the neutral states of eastern Eu rope, and in 
chapter 4, I sketch out the main contours and characteris­
tics of such a plan.
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A ny discussion of a  future security architecture for cur-rently neutral states in eastern Eu rope should be cogni-
zant of the histories, strategic environments, and current 
po liti cal debates in  these key countries. Specialists  will 
not require this primer, but since the territory in question 
stretches all the way from the Nordic region down through 
the Balkans and into the Mediterranean, it may be worth 
summarizing the basics to establish a common foundation 
for the subsequent proposal of a new security system for the 
overall area.
The purpose  here is not to suggest that each and  every 
one of the countries at issue should be given a veto over the 
proposal. Indeed, the security architecture I propose is  simple 
and in most ways passive. It is not about creating a new 
organ ization or new obligations for any of  these presently 
neutral countries, and it would not bar them from teaming 
up with each other in vari ous combinations if they so wish. 
C H A P T E R   2
A Primer on Eu rope’s Frontier  
States  Today
03-3257-0 ch2.indd   35 6/21/17   11:09 PM
36 Michael E. O’Hanlon
Nor would it preclude them from self- identifying any way 
they wished in the  future— including as “Western” states. 
The issue  here is simply about formal security alliances in-
volving mutual- defense pacts with major Western powers, 
most notably NATO.
Regardless, American and NATO values require taking 
into account the interests and views of  these countries, which, 
ideally, would be part of the consultation and negotiation 
pro cess before NATO and Rus sia embarked on that effort. 
Certainly the case for a new security system  will be stronger 
if  those countries that would be most affected believe they 
would benefit from it and generally support—or at least 
accept— the concept. It is, thus, essential to have some feel for 
their security contexts prior to embarking on the design of a 
new paradigm or architecture. This chapter examines four 
groups of countries— Sweden and Finland; Ukraine, Georgia, 
Moldova, and Belarus; Armenia and Azerbaijan; and Cyprus 
and Serbia— plus other countries in the Balkans.
None of  these countries except Ukraine, with 45 million 
inhabitants, has a large population. Sweden has just  under 
10 million  people and Finland just over 5 million. Georgia 
has 5 million inhabitants, Belarus 10 million, and Moldova 
 under 4 million. Armenia has 3 million souls and Azerbai-
jan 10 million. Cyprus has a population just over 1 million 
and Serbia some 7 million. All told, the ten countries at issue 
have 90 million citizens, half of them in Ukraine.
In military terms, Sweden is rather impressive for a coun-
try with a small population and spends $5 billion a year on 
its armed forces. Ukraine spends roughly as much; other-
wise, only Azerbaijan cracks the $1 billion threshold, at 
about $1.7 billion annually. Only Ukraine exceeds 100,000 
uniformed personnel in its armed forces (in its case, the 
number is now at least 200,000). Several of the countries de-
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ploy a  couple hundred troops in vari ous peacekeeping mis-
sions around the world; only Georgia approaches the 1,000 
figure (which is impressive, given its small size).1  These 
countries are impor tant and valuable members of the in-
ternational community for many reasons, but it is safe to say 
that they are not strategic or military power houses. Their 
overall importance to the global order prob ably has, at least 
at pres ent, much more to do with how they affect broader 
Eu ro pean security dynamics than with their own direct mil-
itary contributions, deployments, or operations.
This is not an excuse for Rus sian domination of  these small 
states in any purported sphere of influence, no  matter that 
some Rus sians might wish to claim other wise. Indeed,  there is 
one impor tant theme that emerges from  these brief pages that 
even specialists need to take greater stock of:  these are proud, 
in de pen dent, and fully sovereign nations that deserve their 
own security, prosperity, and self- determination. Even  those 
that  were part of a Rus sian empire at some previous stage in 
history developed their own strong identities over time. More-
over,  those Rus sian “empires”  were often fluid and amorphous 
constructions, not strong nation- states of the Westphalian va-
riety. The modest sizes and geographic locations of the coun-
tries considered  here in no way compromise their inherent 
rights as complete members of the international community, 
with all the pride associated with true nations and all the pre-
rogatives associated with statehood. They are not tributary 
states of Rus sia, or appendages of the Rus sian empire, or part 
of some special Rus sian sphere of influence and interest.
F I N L A N D  A N D  S W E D E N
The Nordic countries of Finland and Sweden are crucial 
parts of any discussion about NATO’s  future, even if they 
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tend to be somewhat less in the crosshairs of the debate than 
Ukraine or Georgia.
Finland and Sweden, two remarkable, market- oriented 
democracies, are already Western countries by most defini-
tions. Their po liti cal systems, standards of living, and overall 
quality of life are akin to  those of nations in NATO and the 
Eu ro pean Union. They are in  these regards more similar to 
neutral countries like Austria or Switzerland than to most 
other neutral countries of eastern Eu rope that are the focus of 
this book. In addition, while they have modest populations— a 
bit more than 5 million for Finland and just  under 10 million 
for Sweden— they are geo graph i cally large. Finland shares a 
long border with Rus sia. Sweden does not directly make con-
tact with Rus sia, as Norway stretches around, so to speak, and 
touches the northern tip of Rus sia’s Kola Peninsula, but Swe-
den, too, is very close to Rus sia.
Finland and Sweden are the two Nordic countries not part 
of NATO  today. (Norway, Denmark, and Iceland are also 
Nordic states, all within NATO.) Both Finland and Sweden 
are members of the Eu ro pean Union, an organ ization they 
joined in 1995. This EU membership, in princi ple, gives Fin-
land and Sweden very strong security assurances from other 
member states, most of which are, of course, also in NATO. 
The absence of an American commitment and the somewhat 
murkier character of that Eu ro pean Union security pledge, 
however, prob ably make the EU membership more significant 
in diplomatic and economic realms than in security terms 
per se. (Similarly, for the Baltic states, NATO membership is 
likely a much greater source of security- related reassurance 
than EU membership.)2
Finland and Sweden are also the only two countries bor-
dering the Baltic Sea, besides Rus sia itself, that are not in 
NATO. That sea is sometimes erroneously viewed as an ex-
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tension of the Atlantic Ocean when, in fact, it is much closer 
to an inland body of  water geo graph i cally; its only access to 
outside  waters is via the narrow Danish Straits. The Baltic 
Sea’s eastern border is mostly made up of the Baltic states. 
Rus sia has a small access point near St.  Petersburg, in the 
Gulf of Finland, the easternmost arm of the Baltic Sea. The 
Baltic’s southern border consists of the Polish littoral, plus 
Rus sia’s Kaliningrad enclave. The northern borders of the 
Baltic Sea are made up of the long Finnish and Swedish coast-
lines, largely along what is called the Gulf of Bothnia, an 
extension of the Baltic in the northward direction. The Baltic 
Sea’s western border is composed of Germany and Denmark.
This brief review of geography is intended simply to 
underscore the stakes involved in the  future of Finland 
and Sweden. Historically, the waterways—as well as the 
Finnish, Swedish, and Danish islands in the Baltic Sea— 
have been strongly contested during numerous conflicts, 
including both world wars.  Today, the Baltic Fleet is one of 
Rus sia’s four main navies, with some fifty ships (and 25,000 
sailors) stationed in Kaliningrad.3 The  waters of this region 
are crucial for Rus sian commerce as well, with crude oil ex-
ports and other goods transiting through them. If one thinks 
in strictly military terms, it is a straightforward  matter to see 
that, since the Baltic region is so crucial for Eu ro pean secu-
rity, NATO operational plans could benefit greatly by having 
Sweden and Finland within the alliance.4
Historically, Sweden and Finland are joined not only by 
geographic proximity and Nordic heritage but by politics, 
too. Finland was part of Sweden  until 1809, when it was ceded 
to Rus sia, remaining part of the latter  until the Bolshevik 
Revolution. Finland then gained in de pen dence but was  later 
caught up intensively in World War II,  after first fighting 
the 1939–40 Winter War against the then– Soviet Union to 
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preserve its in de pen dence.5 Though it lost that war and some 
territory, Finland managed to retain sovereignty. It did so, 
subsequently, through the Cold War as well. The pejorative 
phrase “Finlandization” that came into vogue during the Cold 
War period wrongly implied greater Rus sian dominance over 
Finland than was ever the real ity, particularly in domestic 
policy and governance.
 Today Sweden and Finland retain much of their previous 
predisposition  toward neutrality— even as they also nurture 
strong ties with NATO nations, including the Baltic states. 
The tradition of neutrality in both countries is strong, dat-
ing back at least two centuries, and is grounded largely in 
the pragmatic desire to avoid implication in the Eu ro pean 
continent’s wars, as well as to avoid provoking Rus sia.6 Both 
countries, with their sparse populations, could face chal-
lenges in trying to fend off determined invaders, yet their 
rugged terrain, rough climates, and geographic isolation have 
generally made it pos si ble to stay out of  others’ crosshairs with 
a  little bit of prudence. Despite their commitment to neu-
trality,  there has also been a long tradition of quiet security 
cooperation with the West, which Sweden, in par tic u lar, culti-
vated during the Cold War. Intelligence sharing, among other 
 things, has been extensive.7
To be sure, recent Rus sian assertiveness and bullying 
be hav ior in the Baltic region have caused greater anxiety in 
Finland and Sweden of late. Frequent violations of airspace 
and territorial  waters, buzzing of ships by aircraft, simu-
lated bombing runs by nuclear- capable aircraft, and other 
unfriendly actions cause understandable consternation in 
Stockholm and Helsinki.8
Historically, Swedish and Finnish voices in  favor of join-
ing NATO  were relatively few and far between,9 but public 
opinion in both countries is increasingly inclined to  favor 
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consideration of a NATO membership option more than was 
ever the case before. A solid majority is still prob ably against 
it in Finland, but in Sweden recent polls have reflected an 
evenly divided populace on the issue.10 Indeed, the possibil-
ity of pursuing NATO membership is shaping up as a major 
issue for the 2018 parliamentary elections. It is significant 
that a bloc of parties favoring membership has been leading 
in some polls as of early 2017.11 In Finland, a 2016 govern-
ment white paper explic itly underscored the importance of 
not just security collaboration with the United States and 
NATO, but the pos si ble pursuit of a NATO membership op-
tion in the  future and the value that such an option could 
provide, even if ultimately not exercised, for helping Finland 
deal effectively with a more threatening Rus sia.12
In summary, Finland and especially Sweden lean West-
ward, but they also have strong traditions of neutrality rooted 
in pragmatism and a rugged sense of self- reliance. Consid-
eration of NATO membership tends to get an airing only 
when acute threats from Rus sia and the absence of alterna-
tive reliable means of ensuring national security overcome 
more historical ways of thinking. Of course, at pres ent  those 
Rus sian threats feel acute in some Nordic quarters, and NATO 
membership is being discussed much more than has histori-
cally been the case.
G E O R G I A ,  U K R A I N E ,  M O L D O VA ,  A N D  B E L A R U S
The four countries of Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Be-
larus can be usefully analyzed together. Even though Geor-
gia is closer geo graph i cally to Armenia and Azerbaijan, it 
shares the distinction with Ukraine of having been invaded 
by Rus sia in recent years and of having been promised, in 
2008, eventual NATO membership. Georgia and Ukraine 
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can, thus, naturally be considered together. Belarus and Mol-
dova are somewhat less contentious, given the former’s geo-
strategic closeness to Moscow and the latter’s smaller size 
and greater distance from Rus sia, but both are in the same 
general part of Eu rope and both could certainly be caught 
up in a tug- of- war between NATO and Rus sia in the  future. 
Moldova also has a part of its territory, the Transnistria re-
gion, populated primarily by Rus sian speakers and func-
tioning as an autonomous zone of sorts, with Russian troops 
on its soil, as well as an economy benefiting from Rus sian 
largesse and prob ably  doing better financially than the rest 
of the country.13
Georgia is wedged between the Black Sea and beautiful 
mountains in the Caucasus region of southwest Asia. Though 
populated primarily by a distinct ethnic group known, ap-
propriately enough, as Georgians, it is also very cosmopolitan 
and diverse.14 Historically, it was at the crossroads of com-
petition involving Ottomans, Persians, and, for a time, 
Mongols before being incorporated into Rus sia in the early 
nineteenth  century. Like Ukraine, it had a brief period of 
in de pen dence, from 1918 through 1921, before being ab-
sorbed into the Soviet Union. The three non- Georgian parts 
of Georgia, known as Abkhazia, Adjara, and South Ossetia, 
 were accorded special status and autonomy in 1936.
Georgia has a special place in Rus sian hearts. Not only 
 were some of Rus sia’s greatest writers, like Tolstoy, taken 
with the country, but Stalin, his special police chief Lavrenti 
Beria, and former Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevard-
nadze all came, originally, from Georgia. Georgia’s relation-
ship with Rus sia has thus been one of closeness but also of 
some tension, as the strong Georgian sense of identity com-
bined with the country’s small size and geographic distance 
from Moscow have created complex dynamics.15
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Events since the end of the Cold War and the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union have exacerbated tensions. Fighting and 
ethnic cleansing ensued  after Georgia became in de pen dent 
in the early 1990s. Shevardnadze came back to Tbilisi from 
Rus sia in 1992 and became president in 1995. But Mikheil 
Saakashvili and other strong- willed reformers led movements 
that increasingly opposed what they saw as the Soviet- like 
ways and patterns of corruption of the Shevardnadze govern-
ment. They  were supported by American NGOs and groups 
like the National Demo cratic Institute and the International 
Republican Institute, government- funded agencies that  were 
sometimes portrayed as part of a conspiracy to steer Geor-
gian politics in a pro- Western direction. Armed only with 
flowers,  these reformers led a “ Rose Revolution”  after disputed 
elections in 2003, and demanded Shevardnadze’s resignation, 
which was secured  after troops refused the president’s order 
to disperse protesters. Saakashvili then won a hastily arranged 
election in January 2004, with 94  percent of the vote. As he 
then tightened ties to Washington and sought to bring Ab-
khazia as well as South Ossetia back  under Tbilisi’s control, 
relations with Putin deteriorated. On April  3, 2008, at its 
Bucharest summit, NATO promised Georgia eventual mem-
bership, in Article 23 of the summit declaration. That same 
August, Rus sia invaded Georgia.16 It kept large forces in South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia well  after the invasion had technically 
ended and even  after the new Obama administration sought 
a reset in relations between Moscow and Washington.17
It is not difficult to see why Georgia, with its Eu ro pean 
mores and distinct ethnic group and its location far from 
Moscow, would aspire to be a part of Eu ro pean institutions. 
It is also not difficult to see why Rus sia would consider it a 
serious affront—if not to its  actual physical security, then at 
least to its sense of self and its history and traditions— that 
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Georgia be courted by faraway NATO and promised  future 
membership.
Of course the story with Georgia did not end in 2008. 
Saakashvili lost his own hold on power and, indeed, some-
what bizarrely, relocated to Ukraine, where he has become a 
politician there. He is now very unpop u lar in Georgia. Indeed, 
he may have contributed to his former party’s defeat in Octo-
ber 2016 elections at the hands of the Georgian Dream party 
by suggesting that he might come back to seek office again. 
The NATO question is now on indefinite hold, though in 
surveys, the idea of membership has consistently remained 
relatively favorable among Georgians (with 50 to 65  percent 
typically approving fully and another 20  percent supporting 
the idea in more lukewarm fashion since 2008–09).18 The 
“frozen conflicts” with the autonomous regions persist unre-
solved, and relations with Rus sia remain uncertain. Georgia 
now has an Association Agreement with the Eu ro pean Union, 
which surely raises eyebrows and furrows foreheads in Mos-
cow.19 Even so, the country continues to strug gle in many 
ways, including in the strength of its civil society and demo-
cratic institutions, and its economy remains troubled. The 
Georgian  future remains murky.20
Ukraine is a case similar to Georgia in some ways, though 
with almost ten times as many  people, it is an entirely diff er-
ent  matter in  others. Indeed, it is the largest, and far and 
away the most populous, country  under consideration  here. 
As Ambassador Steven Pifer writes in his book The Ea gle and 
the Trident, Ukraine’s history is deeply interwoven with Rus-
sia’s. Apart from, perhaps, Belarus, Ukraine may be the for-
mer Soviet republic that has the deepest sense of common 
identity with the Rus sian Federation— yet at the same time a 
strong and growing sense of separate nationhood and sover-
eignty,  whether Rus sians like Putin recognize it or not.
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Ukraine and Rus sia  were essentially part of the same an-
cient polity, Kyivan Rus’, from 882 to 1240. Of course, given 
the huge expanses of central Eurasia, the myriad ethnic and 
religious groups, the ebbs and flows of invaders, and many 
other  factors, it would be misleading to think of Kyivan Rus’ 
as the equivalent of a strong nation- state with a type of 
governance resembling the modern era.  These  were,  after all, 
the  Middle Ages, when much of Western Eu rope was only 
gradually witnessing the development of the nation- state 
itself.
Ukraine then experienced several centuries of separate ex-
istence. During that long period, vari ous parts of its territory 
shifted hands on numerous occasions. Lithuanians, Austro- 
Hungarians, Crimeans, Poles, Rus sians, even Ottomans exer-
cised some degree of control at times. Then, in 1654, its leaders 
(of the Cossack group or  people) agreed to join Rus sia, and the 
accession held  until the Bolshevik Revolution. From 1918 to 
1921, Ukraine was briefly in de pen dent before joining the 
Soviet Union.21
The Soviet de cades included enormous pain and suffer-
ing. Stalin’s rule led to the  Great Famine and the death of 
millions of citizens. Ukraine was obliterated by World War 
II, losing an estimated 15   percent of its population in the 
course of the conflict.22
Premier Khrushchev famously gave Crimea to Ukraine 
in 1954. This could be interpreted as an act of  great generos-
ity or, alternatively, as  little more than an administrative 
rearrangement given that the constituent republics of the 
Soviet Union  were entirely subservient to Moscow. The fact 
that the Black Sea Fleet was based in Sevastopol on the 
Crimean peninsula underscored the degree to which Moscow 
would hardly have seen this change as reducing its own 
control of all  matters Ukrainian.
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Pifer argues that in the years since the dissolution of the 
Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, American policy  toward 
Ukraine has been decidedly mixed in its effectiveness. He 
asserts that Washington found a good balance of incentives 
and disincentives in dealing with Ukraine’s foreign and se-
curity policies. Notably, Kiev was persuaded to denuclearize 
 after inheriting a substantial fraction of the Soviet Union’s 
nuclear infrastructure and arsenal. This decision was accom-
panied by the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, by which Rus-
sia, the United States, and the United Kingdom promised to 
uphold Ukraine’s security— a promise that clearly has not 
been kept, most notably not by Rus sia.
If Washington was happy with Ukraine’s decision to 
denuclearize, it was less successful over the years in en-
couraging domestic and economic reform. Some reforms 
have been enacted in areas such as the pricing of energy, 
the transparency of the financial holdings of government 
officials, and the country’s fiscal situation.23 However, the 
current Ukrainian state remains mired in corruption and 
poor management and a fractious po liti cal system.24 The so- 
called Orange Revolution of 2004–05, as well as the Maydan 
Revolution of 2013–14, failed to lead to major improve-
ments. If one compares Ukraine and Poland— two former 
parts of the Warsaw Pact, countries of roughly comparable 
population and GDP per capita at Cold War’s end—it is 
striking that Poland is now three times richer per person. 
This divergence in economic fortunes occurred despite the 
facts that Ukraine has some of the world’s best farmland 
and that it inherited a substantial fraction of the former 
Soviet Union’s high- technology industrial base (though as 
economist Clifford Gaddy has convincingly argued, the 
latter was a very mixed blessing for building a post- Soviet 
economy).25
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Again, it is impor tant to note that the sense of Ukrainian 
identity among Ukrainians is quite strong despite the many 
centuries in which Rus sia and Ukraine  were part of the 
same country or empire. This and other  factors led to strong 
support for in de pen dence when a referendum was held 
in late 1991, with 90  percent supporting self- determination. 
 These nationalistic sentiments have prob ably strengthened 
further since the Rus sian aggressions that began in 2014. 
However, while impressing themselves and the world with 
their strong sense of nationalism, Ukrainians often have 
found in the last quarter  century that their geopo liti cal value 
for the West is less than they might have hoped.26
Ukrainian identity and nationalism have historically been 
strongest in the country’s western regions. In eastern Ukraine, 
a higher proportion of the population is ethnic Rus sian (that is 
where most of the nation’s Rus sians, who make up 17  percent 
of the population, live). However, more recently the po liti cal 
line between east and west Ukraine has begun to blur. Po liti-
cal parties based in the east have started to enjoy some support 
in the west of the country, and vice versa. Anti- Russian senti-
ment has hardened, as the Donbas war has by now taken 
10,000 lives— even if  there is still an ele ment of pragmatism in 
trying not to alienate Moscow entirely among the country’s 
key po liti cal parties and leaders.27 Polls in April 2014 revealed 
that a large portion of the population in eastern areas, includ-
ing even the conflict- afflicted Donbas regions of Donetsk and 
Luhansk, wanted to remain in Ukraine,28 yet only a modest 
plurality of Ukrainians overall supported NATO membership 
as of June 2016, by a margin of thirty- nine to thirty- two (with 
support much stronger in the west and center than the east or 
south).29
In terms of national security policy, Kiev has sought to 
strengthen its military with modest NATO and EU help to 
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defeat Russian- aided separatists in the east. It has also 
maintained support for the so- called Minsk and Minsk II 
pro cesses (based on pacts negotiated in 2014 and early 
2015).  These would lift Western sanctions on Rus sia and 
accord Donetsk and Luhansk more autonomy in exchange 
for a cessation of hostilities and standing down of armed 
units  there. However, Kiev has believed that the separat-
ists, and Moscow, should make efforts on the latter  matters 
before it carries out any major initiatives or constitutional 
changes in regard to the autonomy question.30 Rus sia and 
the separatists have not obliged; thus, the situation remains 
stuck, and the conflict saw an uptick in vio lence in early 
2017 yet again.
A brief word is in order about Belarus and Moldova. 
They are the much smaller neighbors of Ukraine. Belarus is 
essentially just south of the Baltic states, and to the north 
of Ukraine— thus, like Ukraine, situated squarely between 
Poland and Rus sia. Moldova does not share a border with 
Rus sia but has a modest- sized Russian- speaking population 
that has effectively broken off from the rest of the tiny coun-
try. It is a very poor and landlocked state, bordering Roma-
nia, as well. Like Ukraine, both Belarus and Moldova have 
historically been at the junction of competing nationalities 
and cultures and religions, given their locations in central 
and eastern Eu rope. Both are dominated by distinct ethnic 
groups from which their countries draw their names, and 
their minority populations are not unimportant in size or 
po liti cal weight (roughly 75  percent of Moldova’s population 
is Moldovan, almost 85   percent of Belarus’s is Belarus sian, 
with Rus sians about 6  percent of the former’s population and 
8  percent of the latter’s).31
Neither country has had a successful post- Soviet experi-
ence. Belarus has effectively been taken over by the auto-
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cratic Alexander Lukashenko, a close ally of Rus sia (even 
before Putin’s rise to power) and strong critic of NATO. He 
has ruled since 1994, having recently “won” a fifth presiden-
tial term in sham elections, controlling the state with an iron 
fist and  little tolerance for dissent or opposition. The coun-
try had been reasonably prosperous in earlier times, by Soviet 
standards, at least. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, 
it was granted favorable terms for importing energy by 
Moscow but remained saddled with an obsolete and state- 
controlled industry.32 It has not flourished.
Moldova is a very small and weak state. The year 2014 
seemed to augur a brighter  future, as it featured completion 
of an Association Agreement with the Eu ro pean Union and 
also an accord on visa- free travel in Eu rope,33 but the coun-
try has since experienced numerous changes of government, 
as well as a huge and costly banking scandal. Its po liti cal 
class is mostly ineffectual; its citizenry is struggling, not 
particularly or ga nized po liti cally, and not very confident in 
the nation’s effort to build a new democracy out of the ves-
tiges of the Soviet Union.34 By about a two to one plurality 
since 2015, its citizens consistently oppose the idea of Mol-
dova joining NATO.35
At pres ent neither Belarus nor Moldova seems likely to 
drive the NATO enlargement discussion. That said, a change 
in po liti cal leadership in  either country could lead to new 
dynamics in relations with Rus sia and, thus, the broader 
NATO debate.
A R M E N I A  A N D  A Z E R B A I J A N
The Armenia and Azerbaijan region of the Caucasus is also 
relevant to the  future of security organ ization and architec-
ture in Eu rope. The two countries are closely linked with 
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each other—by a common border, by an ongoing “frozen 
conflict” over the Nagorno- Karabakh region, by their shared 
history as former Soviet republics. In one sense, the two small 
states are far away from it all and not particularly germane to 
the security concerns of anyone besides each other on a day- 
to- day basis. On the other hand, their potential for further 
vio lence could erupt into open warfare again, at which point 
Rus sia and Turkey and  others might feel the repercussions of 
the fighting or become involved in it themselves. Indeed, the 
situation did erupt into a brief period of focused combat in 
the spring of 2016, when Azerbaijan tried unsuccessfully 
to benefit from a recent period of military buildup with 
what some have described as the largest attack in the area 
in more than twenty years. That may not be the last word in 
the  matter.36
Geo graph i cally, Armenia and Azerbaijan both border 
Georgia. Georgia and Azerbaijan essentially create an east- 
west swath through the Caucasus region that links the Black 
Sea to the Caspian Sea, with Rus sia to the north of that 
swath of land and Armenia to the south. Landlocked Arme-
nia also borders Turkey, of course, and shares a short border 
with Iran. Technically, Azerbaijan is also landlocked, since 
its only littoral is along the inland Caspian Sea. In addition 
to Armenia, Georgia, Rus sia, and Iran, Azerbaijan also 
shares a short common border with Turkey, due to a small, 
separated piece of territory to the west of the main part of 
the country.
Armenia benefits from good relations with Moscow and 
is part of the Eurasian Economic Union, along with Ka-
zakhstan, Rus sia, and Belarus. It is also part of the Collec-
tive Security Treaty Organ ization, along with Rus sia, Be-
larus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.37 However, 
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it is in a difficult strategic position, with no access to the sea 
or “global commons” except via one of the four neighboring 
countries with which it has complex relations. Much of its 
energy comes from Rus sia via pipeline through Georgia. As 
for Azerbaijan, its best foreign relationships include  those 
with Turkey and several western states.
Both countries are dominated by ethnic groups that give 
the countries their names and languages. Azerbaijan has 
more than three times the population of Armenia, but the 
latter has a global diaspora of some 10 million  people (Azer-
baijan’s diaspora is prob ably as large, though much of it is in 
nearby Iran). Armenia’s  actual population has been shrink-
ing due to economic and po liti cal challenges. Azerbaijan 
certainly has its own share of economic prob lems, but hy-
drocarbon revenue stimulates at least some sectors of the 
economy and some regions of the country. In terms of GDP 
as well as per capita income, it is well ahead of Armenia 
 today. It sends its oil and gas exports to the world via Geor-
gia and Turkey as well as Rus sia.38
Both countries rank in the world’s top ten for the frac-
tion of their respective GDPs devoted to their armed forces, 
due principally to their conflict with each other.39
Po liti cally, Armenia has had stable presidential leader-
ship for nearly a de cade  under Serzh Sargsian, but  after con-
stitutional revision, it is soon to make the transition to a 
parliamentary system and a new head of state. Azerbaijan is 
closer to an authoritarian regime. President Ilham Aliyev 
has been in power since 2003 and elections in the country 
have not been deemed to be up to international standards.
Armenia has a very long history. It was the first nation 
to declare itself a Christian po liti cal system, in the fourth 
 century, based on a tradition with many similarities to the 
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Rus sian Orthodox Church. Given its location and small 
size, it was frequently at the mercy of nearby powers, includ-
ing the Ottomans and Persians and Rus sians. The Ottoman 
Empire ceded eastern parts of present- day Armenia to Rus-
sia in the nineteenth  century. Armenians suffered genocide 
at the hands of Turkish forces in 1915, caught up in the ri-
valry and vio lence between Rus sia and Turkey. Like many of 
the other countries at issue in this book, it made a brief 
break for in de pen dence  after World War I and the Bolshe-
vik Revolution, only to be subjugated by the Soviet Union 
shortly thereafter.
Azerbaijanis are a mix of Turks, Persians, and other groups 
who settled in areas to the east of Armenia over the course of 
many centuries.40 However, the Nagorno- Karabakh region of 
Azerbaijan is almost entirely populated by Armenians. As 
such, it was granted special autonomous status in the 1920s by 
the Soviet Union. That mostly quelled dissent  under the coer-
cive Soviet system— though not entirely, as  there  were protests 
in the 1960s in which Armenians demanded the territory 
back.41 The situation erupted when the Soviet Union broke 
apart in the early 1990s, leading quickly to a war between Ar-
menia and Azerbaijan that remains ongoing.42 It is not truly a 
“frozen” conflict; indeed, it seems pos si ble that having em-
barked on a military buildup in recent years, and in the ab-
sence of any successful international mediation effort (by 
 either the OSCE or Moscow, both of which have tried and 
failed), Azerbaijan may again escalate hostilities in an attempt 
to reestablish control of the territory.43 Meanwhile, the situa-
tion remains essentially as before: Armenian forces, aided by 
Rus sia, have managed to help the local population establish a 
greater degree of separation and autonomy than they previ-
ously had, but at the price of Nagorno- Karabakh existing now 
in a sort of po liti cal no- man’s-land.
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Armenia remains in an uncertain place vis- a- vis Turkey, as 
well. Efforts at rapprochement dating to a 2009 understanding 
that addressed the history question and other  matters have not 
been translated into an official accord or formal improvement 
of relations.44 Armenia has been attempting to strike a balance 
in ties with Moscow and the West. It is seeking to complement 
its membership in the Eurasian Economic Union with closer 
economic ties with the United States and EU, for example.45
Armenia and Azerbaijan remain a long way from most 
of the world’s attention, in one sense. But with an ongoing 
conflict between them, the potential for serious prob lems 
that could affect the equities and interests of other parties 
remains real, as well.
C Y P R U S ,  S E R B I A ,  A N D  T H E  B A L K A N S
Fi nally,  there is the Balkans region, together with Cyprus. 
This region may be far from Rus sia geo graph i cally, but it 
is quite impor tant strategically. The Balkans region includes 
not only Serbia but also Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, as well as Kosovo. Macedonia and Bosnia have 
formal NATO Membership Action Plans; Montenegro has 
just acceded to the alliance. Kosovo has declared its in de pen-
dence from Serbia, something Washington and more than 
100 other countries have recognized, but it remains in a sort 
of diplomatic and strategic limbo.
All of the Balkan entities at issue are small. Serbia is the 
big kid on the block with 7 million  people (not counting 
Kosovo), with 85  percent or so of  those citizens Serb by eth-
nicity. Bosnia has just  under 4 million inhabitants; Montene-
gro has about 650,000. Each of  those two countries is about 
30  percent Serbian. Bosniaks make up half of the population 
of Bosnia, and about 15   percent of the country is Croat. 
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Montenegrins make up almost half of the citizens of Monte-
negro. Kosovo has almost 2 million citizens, more than 
90  percent of whom are Kosovar Albanian. Macedonia has 
about 2 million citizens, with Albanians the most sizeable 
minority.
The Balkans have been a major source of post– Cold 
War contention between Moscow and Western governments 
 going back to the Yeltsin days. NATO’s intervention in the 
Kosovo war of 1999, an action opposed by Moscow and, thus, 
not approved by the UN Security Council, was seen as one of 
the original sins of Western and American unilateralism by 
many Rus sians (including Putin, even though he was not yet 
president), as discussed in chapter 1. Serbia, with its orthodox 
traditions, had been close to Rus sia for many years. The out-
break of World War I had its catalyst in the Balkans, not least 
 because of competing Rus sian and Western interests  there. 
Yugo slavia formed in that war’s aftermath and became a 
communist yet partially non aligned autocracy  under Tito 
during the Cold War. When Tito died in 1980, the country 
managed to hold together another de cade, but the end of the 
Cold War and the arrival on the scene of Slobodan Milosevic 
as the leader of Serbia led to the multinational confederation’s 
breakup in the early 1990s.46 NATO intervened to help end 
the Bosnian civil war, which was largely a result of Milosevic’s 
expansionism and sectarian favoritism, in 1995. When it 
sought to do something similar within Serbia itself, helping 
protect Kosovar Albanians from Milosevic’s ravages in 1999, 
Rus sia cried foul.47
The twenty- first  century has remained complicated for 
the Balkans, as well. Serbia began to move po liti cally in a 
generally pro- Western direction; Milosevic lost at the polls 
in 2000 and was subsequently extradited to the Hague, where 
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he died in 2006. But Serbs did not feel quickly rewarded for 
their reforms. The small remaining Yugo slav Federation, 
made up of Serbia and Montenegro, dissolved in 2006, 
with the latter electing for in de pen dence, and now NATO 
membership as well.48
Kosovo declared in de pen dence on February 17, 2008—
an action recognized by the United States the next day. More 
than 100 other countries have done so, as well, as noted, but 
not Serbia or Rus sia (or China), and as such, Kosovo is not 
currently a member state of the United Nations.
With  these developments, Serbia has taken several hits. It 
lost its access to the sea via Montenegro, an impor tant and 
historic region populated primarily by co- religionists. It also 
effectively lost Kosovo, also a key part of its history and cul-
ture, containing among other  things the fabled Field of the 
Blackbirds, the location of the  great 1389  battle that pitted 
Serbian Christians against invading Ottomans in a strug gle 
that Milosevic exploited when he first came to power.49 Ser-
bia has become smaller and more isolated in its corner of 
Eu rope than when it was a part of a larger federation.
Bitterness over this  matter lingers between Moscow and 
Western capitals. Even in 2016, Rus sia’s RT media outlet 
(formerly Rus sia  Today) was publishing an article wrongly 
claiming that Milosevic had somehow been exonerated for 
his war crimes, not wanting to let go of that earlier issue.50 
Part of the bitterness is, undoubtedly, explained by the fact 
that  these  matters are not merely  matters of history. In light 
of existing NATO- related plans for Macedonia, Montene-
gro, and Bosnia, and the aspirations of many Kosovars not 
only to fully separate from Serbia but to join NATO, the 
geostrategic competition between Rus sia and the West con-
tinues in the Balkans. Serbia, meanwhile, is taking gradual 
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steps  toward joining the Eu ro pean Union, though it retains 
some bitterness at the West and some pro- Russian senti-
ments, as well. At pres ent it does not, therefore, seem inter-
ested in NATO membership.
As for Cyprus, the situation is, perhaps, somewhat less 
fraught, but even in this distant Mediterranean island of just 
over 1 million, East- West tensions linger. Cyprus was ruled 
by Britain for centuries  until achieving in de pen dence in the 
twentieth  century, with a power- sharing formula established 
for its Greeks and Turks. But a Greece- supported coup in 
1974 led to the countervailing intervention of Turkish troops 
on the northern third of the island, where they remain. 
Cyprus is now part of the Eu ro pean Union, but the normal 
terms of association only apply where the internationally 
recognized government rules, in the southern two- thirds of 
the island. Both Cyprian governments now express an in-
terest in reunification of some type but acceptable terms 
have not yet been reached.51
Meanwhile, Cyprus remains geo graph i cally close to the 
 Middle East and Syria in par tic u lar. Its associations with the 
West could, therefore, have strategic implications in Moscow’s 
eyes if they extended to substantial military cooperation or 
even NATO membership. Cyprus has also become an 
impor tant financial haven and vacation getaway for many 
Rus sians, constituting one of Rus sia’s few remaining friendly 
outposts in Eu rope. While much of the narrative in 2016 
and 2017 in the West has been about Rus sian encroachment 
on Western democracy, from Moscow’s vantage point the 
broad sweep of history prob ably looks very diff er ent, as Rus-
sia has lost most previous close alliances and friendships in 
eastern Eu rope and the Balkans over the last quarter  century 
or so. Cyprus represents a partial exception to that overall 
trend.
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C O N C L U S I O N :  H O W  N A T O  E U  R O P E  S E E S  
T H E  C R I S I S   T O D AY
Although this chapter’s main purpose is to understand how 
the countries that would be at the center of the new security 
architecture see their interests and their options, it is worth 
taking stock of some broad sentiments within the existing 
alliance  today, as well. With twenty- nine countries, NATO 
is a complex entity.  Today, several of its longest- standing 
members are in the midst of major po liti cal change of one 
type or another, several of its newer members are showing 
signs of internal strain, and all of its nations are sorting 
through the dual shocks of the refugee crisis combined with 
the renewed threat of Rus sian revanchism.
One ele ment of the discussion is what might be termed 
NATO’s front- line states,  those bordering Rus sia or close to 
it.  These countries include Norway in the north, Estonia 
and Latvia in the northern Baltic region, and Lithuania plus 
Poland in the southern Baltic/central Eu ro pean area. Of 
 these, the most exposed are the Baltic states and Poland. 
 These are also the places where the United States is carry ing 
out its Eu ro pean Reassurance Initiative, part of NATO’s 
broader Operation Atlantic Resolve.
Taken together, the typical thinking within  these four 
states can prob ably be summarized this way. First, they 
are, collectively, rather ardent in their belief in NATO 
expansion— not only out of gratitude for being included 
themselves, but out of a belief that an inclusive approach to 
the alliance’s  future also stands to benefit close neighbors, 
such as Ukraine. They would not feel right about denying 
options to countries like Ukraine that they have benefited 
from themselves. The original logic of the expansion pro cess 
saw it as a way to stabilize a  whole region, benefiting not just 
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any individual country receiving an Article V guarantee that 
an attack on one is an attack on all, but its neighbors, as well. 
At the same time,  these four countries are acutely aware of 
the potential threat posed by Rus sia in recent times. They do 
not tend to justify or excuse Rus sian hostilities of the last few 
years with reference to the fact of earlier NATO expansion. 
They do tend to appreciate the sensitivities in the relation-
ships  today, recognizing that the current situation has 
 become far more tense and dangerous than when they joined 
(1999 in the case of Poland, 2004 for the three Baltics).52
A word is also in order on Turkey. That nation, on the 
front lines of the Syrian civil war and among the leaders of 
the anti- democratic backlash movement in Eu rope  today, has 
suffered enormously since 2011. Its leader, Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan, has moved in autocratic directions internally, while 
encountering a renewal of domestic vio lence involving Kurd-
ish groups and a huge threat from ISIS and  others in the Arab 
world. Perhaps all that can be said with confidence is that 
Turkey’s new strategic directions are up in the air. Erdogan 
has changed his thinking considerably already. He has moved 
 toward limited forms of collaboration with Rus sia and sug-
gested that, perhaps, he no longer insists on regime change in 
Damascus,  after having made the removal of Bashar al- Assad 
his preeminent goal earlier in the Syrian conflict. Turkey feels 
si mul ta neously somewhat abandoned by NATO and in need 
of NATO, angry at Putin yet unable to afford the luxury of a 
complete showdown with Rus sia, and broadly nationalistic 
yet also at a moment in its history at which most of its key 
decisions are made by just one man. It is improvising, and 
where that  will lead in the years to come is very difficult to 
fathom.53
As for the rest of the NATO states, a useful crystallization 
of key attitudes emerges from a poll released in June 2015 
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that the Pew Research Center conducted over the previous 
several months. It showed in a nuanced way both NATO’s 
enduring strength as an organ ization and its members’ di-
vided views about just how firmly to push back against 
Rus sia. To the extent that  these poll results are similar to 
attitudes  today, it suggests that NATO is still serious about 
holding together as a self- defense organ ization, but it is not 
spoiling for a fight with Rus sia and does not tend to foresee 
the need for military force.
The Pew study surveyed publics in Poland, Spain, France, 
Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and 
Canada. It found that majorities of citizens in a number of 
key NATO states would not  favor the use of force to protect 
another alliance member in the event of Rus sian aggression. 
That would seem, on its face, to ignore Article V of the NATO 
alliance’s founding charter, the Washington Treaty of 1949, 
which states that an attack on one is an attack on all, and 
should be treated accordingly.54 Specifically, Article V says:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or 
more of them in Eu rope or North Amer i ca  shall be 
considered an attack against them all and consequently 
they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of 
them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective 
self- defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of 
the United Nations,  will assist the Party or Parties so 
attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in con-
cert with the other Parties, such action as it deems nec-
essary, including the use of armed force, to restore and 
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. . . .  
This lack of willingness to commit to an automatic military 
response may appear to some as tantamount to an invitation 
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to renewed Rus sian aggression. It seems to raise the sce-
nario of Vladimir Putin again employing his patriotic cyber 
attackers and “ little green men,” not just in Crimea but, per-
haps, in Latvia or Estonia— former republics in the Soviet 
Union turned in de pen dent nations and, since 2004, mem-
bers of NATO. Each also has significant populations of Rus-
sian speakers that, Putin can purport, want to be re united 
with the motherland. Each is too far east for NATO to easily 
mount a military defense in any case. Operation Atlantic 
Resolve together with the Eu ro pean Reassurance Initiative 
only partially addresses the prob lem. Are such parts of the 
Western alliance, and perhaps other countries like Poland, 
therefore, now vulnerable to Rus sian aggression?
In fact, it would be a  mistake to reach this conclusion 
based on the Pew survey or any other recent polling. While 
 there are, indeed, some troubling findings in the Pew results, 
on balance what emerges is the picture of an alliance that still 
provides the West with considerable cohesion, and consider-
able leverage, in addressing the prob lem of Putin. Yet Western 
publics also wisely see the current crisis as one that funda-
mentally should not have to be solved by military means.
Before trying to chart a path for the  future, it is impor tant 
to summarize not just the headline- dominating findings just 
noted, but several other key results from Pew, which gener-
ally comport with more recent indicators of NATO public 
sentiment:
• The NATO publics had negative views of Rus sia and 
Putin. They seem to have  little doubt of who is primarily 
responsible for the crisis in relations of the last several 
years, dating to the immediate aftermath of the Sochi 
Olympics, when protests in Ukraine forced out the coun-
try’s previous leader, President Yanukovich.
03-3257-0 ch2.indd   60 6/21/17   11:09 PM
 B E Y O N D  N A T O  61
• Publics in five of eight NATO countries surveyed (the 
UK, France, Spain, Italy, and Germany) opposed sending 
weapons to Ukraine to defend itself in the current crisis, 
as did President Obama as a  matter of American policy.
• Nonetheless, six of the eight countries had majorities in 
 favor of bringing Ukraine into NATO, with percentages 
ranging from France’s 55  percent to Canada’s 65  percent. 
In Germany and Italy, however, the figures  were only 
about 35  percent.
• NATO countries remained more than willing to employ 
sanctions against Rus sia over its be hav ior. This was true 
in  every alliance member- state that was polled, includ-
ing Germany, the most pro- Russian NATO state that was 
included in the polling.
• Although just 38  percent of Germans favored a military 
response in the event of a hy po thet i cal Rus sian attack 
against another NATO member, they remained in  favor 
of sanctions against Rus sia. Only 29   percent favored a 
loosening of the current sanctions,  unless Rus sia’s be-
hav ior  were to change.
• Putin remained extremely popu lar in Rus sia, with favor-
ability ratings approaching 90  percent; Rus sians blamed 
the West, and falling oil prices, for their current eco-
nomic woes, and not their own government or its poli-
cies. (Two years  later, in 2017, this basic situation appears 
unchanged.)
• Forebodingly, most Rus sians believe that eastern Ukraine, 
where the current fighting rages, should not remain part 
of Ukraine but should  either become in de pen dent or 
join their country.
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Two more key points are impor tant to remember. First, 
the type of hy po thet i cal Rus sian attack against a NATO 
country that formed the premise for the Pew question about 
Article V was not clearly specified. Perhaps respondents  were 
in some sense wondering if a takedown of several Latvian or 
Estonian computer networks, or something similar in scale, 
or a very minor incursion by a small number of Rus sian forces 
over a remote border,  really needed to be met with NATO 
tanks. For most Western publics, the advisability of a major 
military response might well, understandably enough, depend 
on the nature of the perceived Rus sian attack as well as the 
other options available to the alliance.
Second, and related, it is impor tant to remember that 
Article V does not demand an automatic, unconditional mili-
tary response by each alliance member. It says, rather, that an 
attack on one should lead to a response by all— involving 
what ever means the individual states determine. Specifically, 
in quoting Article V again, note the phrase that is italicized:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or 
more of them in Eu rope or North Amer i ca  shall be 
considered an attack against them all and consequently 
they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of 
them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective 
self- defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of 
the United Nations,  will assist the Party or Parties so 
attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in con-
cert with the other Parties, such action as it deems nec-
essary, including the use of armed force, to restore and 
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. . . .  
Furthermore,  there are two more sentences in Article V, 
which read: “Any such armed attack and all mea sures taken 
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as a result thereof  shall immediately be reported to the Se-
curity Council. Such mea sures  shall be terminated when the 
Security Council has taken the mea sures necessary to re-
store and maintain international peace and security.” In 
other words, the NATO Treaty assumes that a conflict might 
not be ended by NATO’s own response, but only  after the 
UN Security Council has engaged as well.
This ambiguity may risk complicating deterrence, to be 
sure. It also needs to be reflected upon as a potential indicator 
of where alliance thinking about pos si ble further enlarge-
ment might go in the  future. If alliance publics are already 
skittish about defending the Baltics, it needs to be asked how 
likely their governments ever  will be to invite more members 
into NATO. Even if they do, it can be questioned  whether 
they would necessarily fight in the defense of faraway friends 
located right next to Rus sia. For all of NATO’s enthusiasm 
about bringing in thirteen new members since the Cold War 
ended, none of  these countries was at real risk of Rus sian at-
tack when they  were offered membership. The enlargement 
imperative was driven much more by the desire to consoli-
date democracy, stability, and civilian rule in new parts of the 
continent than by consensus about offering countries protec-
tion against a potentially aggressive Moscow.
A more recent set of Pew polls in NATO shows strong 
support for the alliance  today, in all countries surveyed 
except Greece. In the United States, where Donald Trump 
spent 2016 denigrating the alliance, a February 2017 Gallup 
poll showed a whopping support of 80   percent among the 
American public.55 But the Pew polling also showed ambiv-
alence in Eu rope about any increase in military spending. 
That was before Trump’s victory in the United States on 
November 8, yet was prob ably still relevant as another in-
dication of most alliance members’ longstanding bud getary 
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priorities. Across eleven countries surveyed, positive views 
about NATO dominated negative ones by a fifty- seven to 
twenty- seven median margin. Yet most publics had a strong 
preference for keeping military spending roughly where it 
was or cutting spending further. (In the typical country, 
perhaps 30 to 35  percent of respondents favored increasing 
spending, 45 to 50  percent favored holding the line, and the 
remainder preferred reductions.)56
The overall picture that tends to emerge is one of an alli-
ance where support for current security arrangements is 
solid, but enthusiasm for new obligations—or even defend-
ing new members with force in certain kinds of scenarios 
and circumstances—is much more limited. Perhaps the en-
largement proj ect, however noble its motivations, has now 
run its full course. That is the question to which chapter 3 
now turns.
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Rather than leave the situation in dangerous limbo, it is time that Western nations conceptualize and seek to ne-
gotiate a new security architecture for the neutral countries 
of eastern Eu rope. The countries in question collectively 
form a broken-up arc from Eu rope’s far north to its south— 
Finland and Sweden, Ukraine and Moldova and Belarus, 
Georgia and Armenia and Azerbaijan, Cyprus, as well as 
Serbia and other Balkan states.1 As we have seen in the pre-
vious chapter, most though not all are ambivalent them-
selves about NATO, and where  there is interest in joining, it 
is often due to a recent sense of threat from Rus sia that could 
be substantially mitigated by a new security order. More-
over, many existing NATO member states have publics that 
are already ambivalent about their military commitments to 
the eastern extremes of the alliance, making the very feasibil-
ity and the wisdom of any further expansion dubious. Put 
differently, NATO could actually be weakened by further 
expansion, if the core mutual- defense pact that undergirds 
C H A P T E R   3
The Case for a New  
Security Architecture
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the alliance  were cast into some doubt by a membership that 
became too large and extended too far. The arrival in power 
of the Trump administration in the United States provides a 
golden opportunity to pursue a new vision and a new para-
digm. The discussion pro cess should begin within NATO, 
and then include consultations with the neutral countries 
themselves. The formal negotiations would then include all 
the aforementioned states as well as Rus sia.
 Today’s situation in Eu rope, and therefore globally, is 
highly fraught. At pres ent, no one’s intentions are clear. NATO 
may or may not someday offer formal Membership Action 
Plans to countries, including Sweden and Finland; it has al-
ready vaguely but quite publicly promised to offer MAPs to 
Ukraine and Georgia. Ukraine is considering a national refer-
endum on the NATO membership concept. It has now suf-
fered some 10,000 fatalities and huge economic decline as a 
result of Russian- sponsored aggression in its east. Rus sia may 
or may not attempt to anticipate and fend off such alliance en-
largement with further efforts to annex territory or to stoke 
“simmering” conflicts as it has from Moldova to northern 
Georgia to Crimea to eastern Ukraine over the past ten years 
or so.
Moscow may continue the other kinds of actions and 
threats it has perpetrated over the last de cade, as well. A par-
tial list includes:2
• Cyber attacks on Estonia in 2007
• The promulgation of a new foreign policy doctrine 
claiming the right to defend Rus sian citizens and busi-
ness interests abroad in 2008
• Frequent buzzing of the aircraft and ships of NATO 
countries and neutral states in recent years
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• Provocative deployment of Iskander- M nuclear- capable 
short- range missiles to Kaliningrad
• Large- scale no- notice military exercises near NATO bor-
ders that violate the 1990 Vienna Document among OSCE 
countries
• The abduction of an Estonian military officer in 2014
• An attempt to influence the outcome of the U.S. presi-
dential election in 2016
• Disinformation campaigns involving slander against 
NATO troops as they deploy to the Baltic states, purport-
ing heinous crimes that, in fact, did not occur
• Apparent deployment of as many as several dozen nuclear- 
armed SSC-8 ground- launched cruise missiles in viola-
tion of the Intermediate- Range Nuclear Forces treaty
The stakes are high. Even war is not out of the question. 
President Putin or another nationalist Rus sian leader could 
elect to take even more aggressive steps. A crisis could be 
concocted within a Baltic state, for example, that provided a 
pretext for a limited Rus sian incursion to “protect” Rus sian 
speakers. If conducted quickly and bloodlessly enough, using 
vari ous methods of deception and so- called hybrid warfare 
that Rus sia has been employing of late— including ele ments 
such as the non- uniformed “ little green men” who became 
so noteworthy in the 2014 seizure of Crimea—it could quickly 
create a fait accompli.3 Perhaps NATO nations would not 
consider it worth the risk to mount a huge conventional op-
eration, with all the associated risks of nuclear escalation, to 
liberate a few towns in Latvia or Estonia.4 Or so Moscow 
might hope. This prospect might make the operation seem 
appealing and relatively safe to the Kremlin. Moscow could 
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decide it was worth the perceived risks if it stymied any fur-
ther NATO expansion. Indeed, Moscow might even hope 
that such a sequence of events could weaken NATO at its 
core, by revealing internal disagreement over how to honor 
the alliance’s Article V mutual- defense pledge in a gray- area 
scenario. And once Article V  were revealed to be less than 
robust in one place, it would inevitably suffer a degree of re-
duced credibility more generally.
The odds of such a showdown seem low to modest  today. 
But even a modest risk of a conflict that could in theory 
escalate into war among nuclear- armed states is uncomfort-
ably high.5 The dangers could also grow larger in the  future if 
relations with Rus sia continue on their downward spiral. 
The acrimony in U.S.- Russian and NATO- Russian relations 
also impedes cooperation on other urgent  matters, such as 
the need for improvements in the security of nuclear mate-
rials worldwide.6  There is also  little reason to think that, 
left essentially on geostrategic autopi lot, the relationship  will 
markedly improve in the years ahead. Perhaps President 
Donald Trump can change  things for the better simply by 
turning over a new leaf with Mr. Putin, but both of Trump’s 
pre de ces sors came to office with the same aspirations and 
 were stymied. The structural clash of core interests appears 
serious and  will be difficult to defuse.7 The investigations over 
possibly illicit contact between members of the Trump presi-
dential campaign and Moscow in 2016 have also seriously 
dampened the prospects for an easier relationship.
 Today, Ukraine and Georgia, in par tic u lar, have been 
publicly and officially promised  future NATO membership, 
yet with no specificity about when or how that might be 
achieved. As a result, they are strategically exposed. They 
enjoy no current benefit of Article V protection guarantees, 
yet Rus sia has extra incentive to keep them in its crosshairs, 
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since by destabilizing them and raising the prospect or real-
ity of conflict, it reduces to near nil the odds that NATO 
 will, in fact, commit firmly to offer them membership. This 
half- pregnant state for Ukraine and Georgia is in some ways 
the worst of all worlds— just enough provocation to Rus sia to 
give Moscow reason to destabilize some of  these countries, 
yet no  actual protection now or in the foreseeable  future from 
NATO’s mutual- defense pact. Except for the Nordic states, 
 these countries are collectively  doing badly in economic, po-
liti cal, and security terms, and geostrategic uncertainty about 
their  future is a big part of the cause. As Samuel Charap and 
Timothy Colton persuasively put it, at pres ent, “every one 
loses.” That every one includes Rus sia, as well.8
T H E  S O V E R E I G N  R I G H T S  O F  S T A T E S  A N D  
T H E  P R O P E R  R O L E  O F  A L L I A N C E S
A new security architecture for eastern Eu rope needs to be 
based on several foundational concepts. The first, as a  matter 
of moral princi ple and strategic necessity, is that all coun-
tries, big or small, east or west, are fully sovereign and have 
inherent rights to choose their own form of government, 
po liti cal leadership, diplomatic relations, and economic as-
sociations. This is as true for Ukraine and Georgia, and 
other countries of eastern Eu rope, as for Amer i ca’s tradi-
tional core allies or any other nation. They cannot be con-
ceded or condemned to some Rus sian sphere of influence. A 
new security architecture must not amount to a “Yalta 2” 
that, with echoes of the February  1945 summit between 
Churchill, Stalin, and Roo se velt held in Crimea to discuss 
the postwar security order, effectively relegates a number of 
in de pen dent and sovereign countries to Rus sian domina-
tion. Indeed, they must be accorded  every right to think of 
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themselves as Western. Their  future neutrality, or perhaps 
better described as alliance non alignment, only concerns for-
mal membership in mutual- defense security organ izations; in 
other ways, they must be able to “align” themselves as they 
choose.
This princi ple of complete sovereignty and in de pen dence 
is inherent to the UN Charter. It is also central in the 1975 
Helsinki Final Act, with its emphasis on self- determination 
and territorial security, that was signed by virtually all Eu ro-
pean countries, including the Soviet Union.9 Anything short 
of this standard would invite a return to the great- power poli-
tics of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as well 
as previous eras in  human history, which  were notable for 
their frequent interstate conflict and hegemonic wars. Even 
if it  were deemed normatively acceptable that  great powers 
have spheres of influence,  there is no natu ral way to define 
 these that would or could be stable. Once the pursuit of such 
spheres is condoned, history and logic suggest that  great pow-
ers  will define them in increasingly ambitious and expansive 
terms, ultimately producing conflict.10
It is worth underscoring the point about economics. 
Without complete economic freedom, a country might 
sacrifice not only its prosperity but its national security as 
well. Absent strong economic foundations, a nation  will gen-
erally lack the ability to build modern and effective security 
forces. It  will also, possibly, squander the self- confidence and 
strength needed for cohesive governance of its own country 
and population. To be sure, if  there  were some specific eco-
nomic association that sought its own advancement at the 
expense of  others, through mercantilist or other self- serving 
mechanisms, countries on the outs of any such association 
could object to its close neighbors joining the group. But the 
Eu ro pean Union is not of this nature. If countries in Eu rope 
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not currently part of the EU wish to join it, and the EU 
wishes to invite them in, Rus sia has no reasonable basis for 
objecting.11 Any new security order must reinforce this es-
sential princi ple.
Eventual EU membership need not be mutually exclu-
sive with favorable economic relationships that countries 
such as Ukraine and Georgia might also negotiate with Rus-
sia. Indeed, it would be good that they do so, if acceptable 
terms could be reached.12
By contrast, it is more reasonable to discuss  whether the 
security provisions of the Eu ro pean Union— which effec-
tively echo  those of NATO— should be extended to any new 
members. I argue below that they should not be, in fact.
Similarly, the EU’s policies on migration are not prejudi-
cial to the interests of Rus sia, regardless of which countries 
might join. A Ukraine or Georgia entitled to the  free move-
ments of individuals across national borders, as would be 
implied by EU membership, does not harm Rus sia. They 
would not, for example, encourage any brain drain of indi-
viduals out of Russia— since the Ukraine- Russia border and 
associated controls on the flow of  people and goods could 
remain. As such, Moscow should not claim any special right 
to influence or approve  these kinds of arrangements.
In short, and in summary, eastern Eu ro pean neutral states 
should be in charge of their own po liti cal, diplomatic, eco-
nomic, and demographic destinies. And before approaching 
Moscow about any discussion on a new security architec-
ture, Washington and other Western capitals should en-
gage in vigorous diplomacy with the nonaligned countries 
to convey that message clearly and to hear and consider 
their concerns.
By contrast, security organ izations are a diff er ent  matter, 
and the option of NATO membership is not one that the 
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Western nations should presume to be available to any coun-
try.  There is no inherent prerogative for all countries to join 
any security organ ization they wish. Security organ izations 
are not inherent to the Westphalian state system or even the 
post– World War II UN- supervised international order. They 
are constructs designed to serve par tic u lar purposes for spe-
cific countries during certain periods. If well designed, they 
 will improve security first and foremost for their own mem-
bers, but also for the regional or global order writ large, with-
out prejudice to the security interests of other states. The 
effort to or ga nize international society is an ongoing one that 
involves many diff er ent layers of interaction and organ ization 
among states, with no clear, predominant role for alliances as 
the ultimate and central feature of that society.13 Alliances 
may help in some cases; they may be irrelevant or cause dam-
age in  others. No norm of global governance or international 
order exists that creates an inherent right for additional coun-
tries to join NATO; the North Atlantic Treaty Organ ization 
charter is not the international equivalent of the American 
Bill of Rights for its own citizens.
One need not believe in the concept of “offshore balanc-
ing” or sympathize with isolationism to believe that Wash-
ington should be highly selective in which  future alliance 
commitments, if any, it seeks to take on.14 Some talk of the 
importance of sovereign choice for the neutral countries of 
Europe— but the United States, and other NATO countries, 
also have their own right to sovereign choice in terms of 
which countries they pledge to help defend.15 In 1954, 
George Kennan emphasized the importance to the United 
States of the United Kingdom, the western Eu ro pean heart-
land, Japan, and Rus sia in world politics, arguing that  these 
centers of economic activity and military potential could 
not be allowed to fall  under the control of a single potential 
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adversary.16 The United States has devised a  grand strategy 
that places several of  these zones, as well as much of the 
 Middle East and several other regions, within its security 
system. Doubting the value of  future NATO enlargement 
is, thus, hardly tantamount to isolationism— and may be 
fully consistent with the logic of Kennan’s  grand strategic 
thinking.
Indeed,  were NATO enlargement to go too far, its integ-
rity and credibility for its core members might be weakened. 
Promising to risk war to defend faraway lands seen by 
American citizens as less than central to their own security 
might lead to a general lessening in the believability of NA-
TO’s core mutual- defense pledge— risking deterrence failure 
as well as the gradual weakening of the alliance from within. 
 There is such a  thing as overreach, even for a country with as 
expansive interests, and as impressive a network of overseas 
alliances, as the United States of Amer i ca.
 There  were a number of ideas promulgated in the after-
math of the Cold War for new Eu ro pean security architec-
tures based on first princi ples of international relations and 
the broad lessons of history. It is time to get back to that way 
of thinking for the currently neutral states of the continent, 
rather than to somewhat reflexively assume that any and all 
countries wishing to join NATO somehow should have that 
opportunity.17
Indeed, permanent neutrality is itself a possible ele ment of 
a security architecture, if chosen carefully and widely ac-
cepted by all. Neutrality has not always worked out so well, as 
with the fates of Belgium and Holland in the world wars. But 
in other cases, like  those of Switzerland and Austria, it has 
helped ensure the safety and sovereignty of the countries in 
question while also helping stabilize relations between neigh-
boring powers or blocs.
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Some have counseled me not to use the term neutrality 
to describe the status of the eastern Eu ro pean states at issue 
 here  under the  future security order I propose. They worry 
that it could be interpreted as a state of complete ambiva-
lence, an unmooring of countries that may wish to be part of 
the West— a sort of strategic purgatory. However, I have cho-
sen to use the term unapologetically in its strictest sense— 
neutrality in regard to security pacts with mutual- defense 
provisions. This sense of the term is well known and, as noted, 
has numerous historical pre ce dents. Countries remaining 
non allied with NATO and, thus, neutral can, according to 
the security architecture proposed  here, remain not only 
pro- Western but part of the West themselves, if that concept 
is defined in any other way.
Article X of the North Atlantic Treaty Organ ization 
charter states the following: “The Parties may, by unan i mous 
agreement, invite any other Eu ro pean State in a position to 
further the princi ples of this Treaty and to contribute to the 
security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.” 
Some could read this to suggest an inherent right of any and 
all Eu ro pean states to join NATO. That would be a misread-
ing of the treaty—as well as an illogical and unfounded analy-
sis. It is worth underscoring a key operative phrase in Article 
X: “any other Eu ro pean state in a position to . . .  contribute to 
the  security of the North Atlantic area.” If NATO member-
ship for another state would not contribute to improving Eu-
ro pean security,  there is no implication or suggestion that 
membership should be offered. That statement should not be 
 interpreted only to refer to the noble intentions and military 
burden sharing capacities of prospective new members, but 
also to their specific geostrategic circumstances. Not all 
countries that might mea sure up to NATO standards in po-
liti cal and military terms should necessarily be part of the 
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alliance. It is also worth noting that as NATO expands east-
ward, its new members get further and further away from the 
geographic area of the North Atlantic that was intended to be 
the focal point of the alliance and that gave it its name. Geor-
gia is not even in Europe. We are also now more than a quar-
ter  century beyond the Cold War that gave rise to NATO, and 
its Article X clause, in the first place. The world has changed. 
Judgment calls about new members are required; not  every 
case is the same, and circumstances are certainly not what 
they  were in 1949.
In this era of Donald Trump— and even in other eras—it 
is worth putting this argument in more nationalist terms 
from an American perspective. The United States alone out-
spends the rest of NATO by more than two to one in its mili-
tary bud get, despite having a GDP that is relatively compara-
ble to the rest of the alliance in aggregate. Another way to say 
this is that the United States spends more than twice as high a 
fraction of its GDP on its military as does the typical NATO 
ally.18 The United States remains the military backbone of the 
alliance. Burden sharing is not fair and equal across the alli-
ance. As such, one might observe that Eu ro pean states do not 
have the inalienable right to expect American military un-
derwriting of their security. Given that the United States is 
potentially committing the lives of its sons and  daughters to 
the defense of Eu rope whenever it takes in new alliance mem-
bers, like other NATO states, it has an inherent right to decide 
 whether such a move makes sense— for its own security, for 
existing NATO allies, and for Eu rope writ large.
N A T O ’ S  L E G A C Y  A N D  N A T O ’ S   F U T U R E
NATO has been a remarkable organ ization throughout its 
history. It remains remarkable  today. It did much to protect 
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the security of demo cratic states and to preserve peace in Eu-
rope during the Cold War (with very limited exceptions, no-
tably Turkey and Greece’s strug gle over Cyprus in 1974). It 
then successfully changed into a mechanism for stabilizing 
the post– Cold War order thereafter, including in places such 
as Bosnia and, more recently, even distant Af ghan i stan. It 
transformed itself from what was primarily a self- defense 
organ ization to an institution seeking to promote demo cratic 
governance, civilian control of the military among member 
states, peace among new member states (some of which had 
active territorial disputes before joining NATO, as with Hun-
gary and Slovakia or Hungary and Romania, disagreements 
that NATO has helped hold in check), and broader regional 
order.19 It helped several former Warsaw states and the Baltic 
states solidify their transition to post– communist polities.
 Whether post-1989 NATO expansion was on balance a 
wise strategic move or not, it was well intentioned and nobly 
undertaken. Even if opposed to it myself throughout the 
last twenty- plus years, I always saw the argument against 
expansion as a sixty/forty proposition rather than a slam 
dunk. NATO did provide real benefits for the new member 
states, primarily in terms of promoting the quality of their 
internal governance and civil- military relations, as well as 
their broader roles in the international order.20 It may have 
protected some new members from the kind of Rus sian 
meddling that non- NATO states like Ukraine and Georgia 
have suffered; we cannot know, and thus cannot rule out the 
possibility. It does not threaten Rus sia and has taken pains to 
reduce any plausible bases for any perception to the contrary. 
Most notably, longstanding members have chosen not to sta-
tion significant foreign combat forces within the territory of 
any of the new members admitted since the Cold War ended. 
Even  today, Operation Atlantic Resolve— the effort to shore 
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up NATO’s commitment to Poland and the Baltic states by 
the combined stationing of several thousand troops in  those 
four countries combined—is as notable for its modest scale as 
its welcome resoluteness. NATO also created mechanisms 
such as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the 
Partnership for Peace program to reach out in collegial and 
collaborative ways to Rus sia and other former members of 
the Warsaw Pact.21 The G-7 invited Rus sia to join its ranks 
in the late 1990s as well, though Rus sia  later lost that standing 
when it invaded Ukraine in 2014.22
At times, moreover, the  whole  thing seemed to be work-
ing. The first President Bush got along well with President 
Gorbachev, as did Bill Clinton with Boris Yeltsin. This  century, 
President George W. Bush felt he had a rapport with Vladimir 
Putin in the early years, and President Barack Obama at-
tempted a “reset” in relations featuring a major change in U.S. 
missile defense plans for Eu rope that was designed, in part, to 
alleviate Rus sian worries.23 Rus sia itself did not always seem 
so convinced that NATO expansion was a terribly threatening 
or unfriendly  thing.
Yet this is an American point of view. The fact that most 
Westerners fully believe it does not mean that  others can or 
should be expected to do so. Rus sians, in general, have not. 
 Whether most truly see NATO as a physical threat, many 
do see it as an insult— a psychologically and po liti cally im-
posing antibody that has approached right up to their bor-
ders. This attitude is found not only among older former 
Soviet apparatchiks, and Rus sia’s current hard- liner presi-
dent, but even among many younger reformers. A striking 
example can be seen in the eloquent comments of the young 
Rus sian scholar Victoria Panova at Brookings in the fall of 
2014, for example.24 Putin in par tic u lar seems motivated by 
a petulant variant of this outlook. But the views may be 
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at least partly sincere. They are also consistent with the way 
 human beings have traditionally viewed the actions of com-
petitor states in the international arena through history.25 
For Americans, history may have ended, at least temporar-
ily, in 1989. For most Rus sians, it did not. As Richard Betts 
trenchantly and presciently put it in regard to post– Cold War 
Rus sia, “Defeated  great powers usually become competitive 
again as soon as they can.”26
This train of thought also leads me to some skepticism 
about the wisdom of the democracy promotion mission as-
sociated with NATO enlargement. Yes, it was sincere and 
noble in its goals, and yes, it did help consolidate democracy 
as well as civilian control of the military within a number of 
mid- sized states in Eastern Eu rope. But it did so at the risk of 
setting back democracy within Rus sia itself, by providing a 
pretext for hyper- nationalists to oppose liberalism and re-
form. The net effect of  these dynamics— more democracy in 
smaller countries, less within Russia— has not been so clearly 
favorable to the overall cause of democracy promotion or 
to the goal of peace and stability in Eu rope. The lit er a ture 
on demo cratic peace theory— the notion that democracies 
do not tend to fight each other— shows that it is not simply 
about countries holding elections, but that it is  those coun-
tries that maintain strong and in de pen dent institutions and 
a transparent, fair- minded media that remain peaceful.27 
As such, Rus sia’s early moves  toward democracy should not 
have been assumed to be adequate or irreversible.28 A NATO 
enlargement pro cess that set back Rus sian democracy to help 
strengthen democracy in much smaller and inherently less 
power ful countries rested on dubious logic.
All that said, one might reasonably ask how Rus sia could 
view a NATO that had no substantial combat formations 
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within hundreds of miles of its borders as a threat. Surely 
Rus sians should have seen that Western democracies had be-
come so casualty averse that they  were highly unlikely to 
launch aggressive conflicts abroad.  Couldn’t Moscow see that, 
as Bob Kagan famously put it, Eu ro pe ans themselves  were 
now “from Venus,” not interested in fighting any more than 
absolutely necessary, and much more intent on sustaining 
their high standards of living than on sustaining strong armed 
forces? And  wasn’t the welcome given Rus sia on the world 
stage— including in the G-8, establishing a special NATO- 
Russia relationship based on the so- called Founding Act and 
from 2002 onward the NATO- Russia Council, forging vari ous 
nuclear arms control collaborations, tightening economic 
engagement— further proof of the West’s desire to move be-
yond the Cold War and treat Rus sia as a true partner?
Even  today, the battalion rotations that NATO has com-
mitted to conduct in the Baltic states and Poland are very-
modest in their military capabilities. They  will be respectively 
led by Britain, Canada, Germany, and the United States 
(working from north to south, Estonia to Latvia, and then 
Lithuania, and fi nally to Poland).29 They are to be constituted 
as combat formations, but modest ones, each with about 
1,000 total uniformed personnel. Even collectively they stop 
short of a single robust, integrated, joint- force- capable combat 
brigade recommended by former Deputy SACEUR General 
Sir Richard Shirreff and far short of the RAND Corporation’s 
proposal to station the capability for seven such brigades in 
eastern member states. The NATO- Russia Founding Act of 
1997 by which NATO pledged not to carry out “additional 
permanent stationing of substantial combat forces” is, thus, 
still being observed— even  after Rus sia’s aggressiveness of re-
cent years and even  after its violation of the 1994 Budapest 
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Memorandum  under which Washington, London, and Mos-
cow pledged to uphold Ukrainian security.30
It is the case, in my view, that some Rus sians, including 
President Putin, have whipped themselves up into an unjus-
tified anger over perceived slights by NATO nations. Putin 
uses that anger to excuse classic bullying and revanchist be-
hav ior, which is truly dangerous. Indeed, his regime uses it 
to provide cover for squelching dissent and silencing oppo-
nents at home, including through po liti cal vio lence.31 Such 
be hav ior absolutely must not be appeased.32 But it is not 
impossible for a state to be motivated si mul ta neously by 
greed as well as a desire for honor and/or a fear of  others, 
as Thucydides timelessly taught us. In other words, some of 
Putin’s sentiments, while not necessarily legitimate or fair- 
minded, may not fall so far out of the historical norm for 
 human be hav ior.
It is not only Putin and the older Rus sian cold warriors 
who feel put out. Many Rus sians feel that NATO did not win 
the Cold War. Rather, a new generation of leaders of their 
own country had the wisdom to end it. They  were then re-
warded for their good sense, not only by a reaffirmation of 
the organ ization that had been their nation’s adversary, but by 
a major expansion of that very alliance.33 President Gorbachev 
had taken a  great deal of time to accept the idea of a reunified 
Germany remaining in NATO. The first President Bush was 
unapologetic that Germany had the right to do so, but still 
worked hard with Secretary of State Baker and  others to ad-
dress as many reasonable Rus sian/Soviet concerns as pos si ble, 
including a pledge not to station non- German NATO forces 
on former East German territory.34 But then, in the ensuing 
de cade and a half, the NATO alliance moved its eastern bor-
der 1,000 kilo meters east. This is not to say that NATO broke 
an  actual promise never to expand; no such explicit promise 
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was made.35 However, the discussion over Germany reveals 
very clearly the Rus sian sensitivities even about the territory 
of the former East Germany, to say nothing about countries 
much closer to Rus sia.
The perception among Rus sians that its former adver-
sary was being triumphalist and insulting proved hard to 
extinguish, especially as Rus sia endured the hardships and 
chaos of Yeltsin’s Rus sia of the 1990s. Former Secretary of 
Defense William Perry pointed out, when opposing immedi-
ate NATO enlargement at the end of President Clinton’s first 
term, that Rus sia would need more time to move beyond the 
habits and mindsets of the Cold War. Even if some degree of 
NATO expansion might eventually make sense, he thought 
that rushing the pro cess could cause severe setbacks.36 But 
NATO enlargement occurred anyway— and then did so again 
in ensuing years. Rus sian resentments gradually grew. It was 
not only President Putin, but also former President Medve-
dev, who opposed this pro cess.37 Gorbachev criticized the 
idea of NATO expansion, as well. Other Rus sian officials, 
such as former Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, expressed 
serious reservations as far back as the early to mid-1990s.38
In Rus sian eyes, not just the Kosovo war but also the 
Western world’s reaction to the events of 9/11 challenged any 
sense that the world’s mature democracies  were passive, as 
noted in chapter 1. President Bush’s policies of regime change 
and the freedom agenda seemed that they might even target a 
state like Rus sia, even if only by nonmilitary means. The color 
revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia, and elsewhere made Rus-
sian conspiracy theorists think that no region of the world 
was off limits to the Americans.
Much of this thinking was overwrought, to be sure. But 
 there is  little doubt that the United States and other NATO 
nations  were trying to do more than just ensure a peaceful 
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world. They  were trying to create a world more in their 
image, with Western notions of democracy and individual 
rights at the heart of it— a vision that other countries could 
find off- putting, especially if they saw it as being promoted 
in a self- serving way. One can believe in the basic morality 
and wisdom of the Western approach to governance, but at 
the same time recognize that it is associated with American 
hegemony by many other  peoples.39 One can also acknowl-
edge that the United States and allies often make major 
 mistakes in how they pursue that agenda, exacerbating re-
sentments as a result.40
NATO’s expansion to the Baltic states— not just former 
members of the Warsaw Pact, but former constituent repub-
lics of the Soviet Union— followed by a promise in 2008 to 
someday invite Georgia and Ukraine into the alliance fur-
thered the sense among Rus sians that the West’s ambitions 
knew few bounds. As former government official and scholar 
Angela Stent put it, “[The George W. Bush administration] 
wanted NATO membership for Ukraine more than Ukraine 
itself wanted it— even as American officials throughout the 
post– Cold War period brushed off any willingness to talk se-
riously to Rus sia about its own pos si ble long- term member-
ship in the alliance.”41
In military terms, Rus sia’s anx i eties about NATO mem-
bership often seemed excessive— but  were not entirely without 
kernels of understandable, even if incorrect, concern. Rus sia’s 
history and exposed geostrategic position have created a 
deeply rooted strategic culture that has power ful defensive as 
well as offensive characteristics.42 NATO access to bases in 
new member states could provide the hy po thet i cal capacity 
for a major military push eastward even if alliance forces are 
not routinely stationed in such places in peacetime. More-
over, ongoing advances in technologies such as cyber, stealth, 
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and robotics realms could lead to worries that traditional 
deterrence concepts and conventional military forces might 
no longer be quite enough to protect core state interests.43 
American attack submarine capabilities may make Rus sia’s 
ballistic missile submarine fleet less survivable than Rus sia 
would like, even  today; U.S. strengths in stealth, and in geo-
graphic position, give it advantages in air defense against 
Rus sia’s bomber deterrent as well. Ongoing U.S. research in 
missile defense may someday produce systems that could 
pose a meaningful capability against Rus sia’s ICBMs, too 
(even though  today’s do not). Rus sia’s declining popula-
tion and weak economy when contrasted with  those of 
NATO states— currently roughly a $1.5 trillion GDP and less 
than 150 million  people, versus a combined NATO total of 
$40 trillion in GDP with 900 million  people (to say nothing 
of NATO’s fifteen to one advantage in military spending)— 
may heighten the sense of relative enfeeblement. Rus sian 
doctrines like “escalate to de- escalate” that threaten early 
nuclear weapons employment in the context of a  future war 
with the West sound belligerent and reckless. But they may 
also reflect a ner vous ness among Rus sians that the imbalance 
of power with NATO combined with advances in weaponry 
may leave them quite vulnerable in a  future conflict, absent 
such a bold warfighting concept.44
So Rus sia has deci ded to push back. By the early 2000s, it 
increasingly had the means to do so, as it emerged from 
acute economic malaise caused by de cades of communism 
and a turbulent transition to a quasi- market economy.45 It 
established some degree of social stability  under President 
Putin, enjoyed stronger commodity prices on global markets, 
paid off international loans, and regained some of its swagger. 
And in many Rus sian minds, the invasions of neighboring 
sovereign states, and violations of the OSCE and UN charters 
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as well as the Budapest Memorandum that  these actions con-
stituted,  were justifiable in light of the supposed provocations 
that had preceded them. That this argument is wrong does 
not make it purely cynical; many Rus sians likely believe it 
quite genuinely.
The importance of Rus sia’s partial economic recovery is 
easy to miss. Many theories of hegemonic change in world 
politics might not underline the significance of such a par-
tial comeback of a middle- sized power, since they often 
focus on the most power ful countries— and Rus sia, by most 
mea sures, was no longer such an entity.46 But  middle pow-
ers, especially  those with certain great- power attributes and 
traditions, can push back against  others in their own neigh-
borhoods if they choose. That is what Rus sia proceeded to 
do, and what it is still  doing  today. Its economy is not truly 
healthy; even beyond the immediate issues of sanctions and 
lower oil prices, President Putin has failed to change an 
oligarch- based economy that largely benefits him and his 
cronies. Rus sian manufacturing is still characterized by 
what Clifford Gaddy called a “virtual economy,” in which 
many industries actually lose value— they produce goods 
worth less than their component parts. Corruption remains 
rife, inefficiency remains pervasive. But Putin did arrest the 
economic  free fall of the Yeltsin years.
Thus,  those who believe that “time is on NATO’s side” and 
we only need wait out Putin  until his own star dims or Rus-
sia’s strength further erodes make an unwise argument. How 
the world’s largest country, in possession of nearly 5,000 nu-
clear warheads, can be outwaited is difficult to see. Already, 
Rus sia is far weaker than the West— but even so, it is perfectly 
capable of making trou ble in places where it feels a strong in-
terest and believes it can outmaneuver even much wealthier 
and healthier nations. Nothing about the trajectory that Rus-
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sia is now on  will change  these basic realities over the next 
 couple of de cades. Even if it did, living with the kind of danger 
in Western- Russian relations that we have  today is not some-
thing the world should blithely do in the meantime, while it is 
awaiting Rus sia’s supposed  future submission.
Not all of the Rus sian narrative is credible, of course. Many 
of  its arguments are hijacked in  favor of a hyper- nationalist 
agenda that Putin and some of his cronies  favor for their own 
reasons having  little to do with the  actual merits of the case. If 
the narrative  were so inherently compelling, why would 
Putin need to prevent serious debate and dissent about it— 
silencing his po liti cal critics and opponents? Rus sia’s be hav-
ior has been brutal at times, as well. It has invaded not just 
one but two former Soviet republics— Georgia in 2008, 
Ukraine in 2014. It has also refused to withdraw military 
equipment from Moldova (as required by the Adapted CFE 
Treaty accord of 1999, with which Rus sia subsequently “sus-
pended” compliance in 2007).47 Even having seen Moldova 
show  little interest in NATO membership, Rus sia keeps its 
forces  there for reasons it claims relate to peacekeeping, but 
which may, in fact, also preserve its leverage over a smaller 
neighbor and fellow former Soviet republic.48
Thus, no proposal for a new security architecture for 
central Eu rope should be made out of a sense of redress in re-
gard to Rus sia. Although I agree with much of George Ken-
nan’s argument when, in early 1997, he called pos si ble NATO 
expansion “the most fateful error of American policy in the 
entire post– cold- war era,” it is impor tant not to overdo the 
critique.49 Rus sia’s reactions  were predictable, and predicted. 
But they have not been justifiable in any objective moral or 
strategic sense. In practical terms, NATO expansion may 
have been a misjudgment, and in any event it no longer 
makes sense in my eyes. But  there  were reasonable efforts 
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made to assuage Rus sian concerns, and  there  were  viable ar-
guments in  favor of the idea in terms of cementing democ-
racy and peace in Central and Eastern Eu rope.
Indeed, it is impor tant to make a proposal for a new se-
curity architecture with the willingness and ability to walk 
away, should Moscow begin to engage in negotiations and 
then escalate its demands— perhaps proposing that some 
new NATO members be removed from the alliance, or that 
the alliance itself be somehow recast or neutered. The for-
mer idea should be entirely nonnegotiable for the West. The 
latter could only be countenanced if it preserved NATO’s 
substance while changing some of its procedural modalities 
or perhaps its name— and that kind of largely cosmetic 
change would likely not be enough to please Moscow. Thus, 
 there must be clear limitations on how far NATO would 
bend over backward to please Russia— and  there should 
not be any form of apology from Western capitals as they 
discuss and negotiate the idea. A proposal for a new security 
system for the neutral states of Eu rope should not be a pen-
ance for past perceived offenses, given that  there  were solid 
reasons for that expansion and that many efforts  were made 
to defuse Rus sian objections. But at this juncture—with NATO 
on Rus sia’s doorstep, the enlargement pro cess stalled for rea-
sons that  will be hard to overcome, and the level of east- west 
animosity conjuring up echoes of the Cold War—it should 
be attempted.
C O N C L U S I O N
NATO has been an excellent organ ization throughout its 
history, and even the questionable pro cess of NATO en-
largement has been well intentioned.  There is no reason the 
West should feel somehow guilty about the overall prepon-
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derance of its power, or believe that somehow a strong 
NATO is inherently destabilizing. The growth of NATO 
has,  after all, occurred mostly  because of its appeal to  others. 
 There is also no historical reason to believe that more equal 
“balances of power” in the world would make it a safer, 
more stable place.50 NATO nations should be proud of what 
their organ ization has been and what it has accomplished in 
its long history, and continue to seek to improve its rele-
vance for  today’s world.51 But NATO states should rethink 
the presumption of further expansion and be creative in 
imagining  future security  orders for Eu rope, particularly 
for  those states in the central and eastern parts of the conti-
nent that are presently neutral.
 There is no guarantee, of course, that President Putin or 
other key Rus sian leaders  will prove interested in negotiat-
ing an East Eu ro pean Security Architecture. They may not 
want a resolution of the hegemonic competition now under-
way between Rus sia and the West in the countries of east-
ern Eu rope. Moscow may feel  there is no realistic prospect 
of Ukraine or Georgia in par tic u lar being offered member-
ship in NATO, or the EU, anytime soon— weakening the 
incentive that it might other wise perceive to create a new 
and durable security architecture. Putin may be as troubled 
by the prospect of EU enlargement as NATO enlargement, 
in which case my proposal would likely do  little to assuage 
his concerns. He may also prefer to keep  today’s simmering 
conflicts simmering, with an ultimate goal of further terri-
torial aggrandizement or at least the retention of leverage 
against smaller countries he sees as within Russia’s natu ral 
sphere of influence. Putin may further conclude that the 
sanctions imposed on Rus sia over the Crimea and Donbas 
aggressions  will weaken or dissipate without any Rus sian 
action being necessary, as po liti cal forces and leaders change 
04-3257-0 ch3.indd   87 6/21/17   11:09 PM
88 Michael E. O’Hanlon
in the West. Putin might well even welcome an ongoing 
standoff with the West for the additional excuses it provides 
him for his strongman be hav ior at home and his pursuit of 
grandeur abroad.52 Yet at the same time, if he can claim to be 
the Rus sian leader who stabilized the country’s economy, re-
built its military, and halted NATO’s further expansion on 
his watch, he may conclude that the advantages of this kind of 
deal— along with the lifting of sanctions and greater oppor-
tunity for economic interaction with the West that it would 
include— are in his interest.  After all, he has collaborated be-
fore with Washington and other western capitals on  matters 
ranging from Iran sanctions to North  Korea sanctions to the 
war in Af ghan i stan (at least for a stretch). Provided that no 
accord is proposed without means of verification, and with-
out means of redress in the event of  future noncompliance, 
Putin’s pos si ble willingness to do a deal with the West should 
be explored.
The outcome of any attempt to create a new security ar-
chitecture is, thus, of course, uncertain. That is all the more 
reason that Western leaders should pursue it confidently and 
unapologetically, and not portray it as some compensation to 
Moscow that Rus sian leaders might believe to be only an 
opening bid or an admission of previous wrongdoing. None-
theless, the negotiation should be attempted.  There is  little to 
be lost by trying, provided the West stays true to its princi ples 
and consults closely with the neutral states at issue through-
out the pro cess. If Rus sia refuses to negotiate in good faith, or 
fails to live up to any deal it might initially support (an issue 
that is revisited in chapter 4),  little  will be lost, and options for 
a toughening of  future policy against Rus sia  will remain.
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It is time to pursue an East Eu ro pean security architecture as a durable means of stabilizing the currently neutral 
countries of eastern Eu rope, thereby helping to place the 
West’s relations with Rus sia on a more solid and predictable 
foundation.
The mechanisms and security systems that involve Rus sia 
and the West  today are inadequate to the tasks at hand. Some-
times Rus sia and the West cooperate on prob lems, as with the 
Ira nian nuclear challenge and Af ghan i stan at certain times 
in the recent past, but sometimes their dealings outside of 
Eu rope only intensify animosities, as with the Syrian war to 
date. Within Eu rope, the situation is worse, and the available 
means of addressing the crisis seem demonstrably inade-
quate to the task at hand. The Organ ization for Security and 
Cooperation in Eu rope (OSCE) has been deeply engaged in 
Ukraine, but it lacks the po liti cal mandate or the operational 
capacities to address, let alone resolve, core issues. The NATO- 
Russia Council, set up to create a more equal and effective 
C H A P T E R   4
Constructing an East Eu ro pean 
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partnership, has been recently suspended— just when it is 
needed most.1 In light of the  causes and circumstances of 
the Ukraine crisis, a bigger idea is needed than simply arm-
ing the Ukrainian military, slapping additional sanctions 
on Rus sia, or hoping against hope that the current Minsk II 
diplomatic pro cess  will succeed.
The big idea proposed  here is this: NATO should not 
expand further into eastern Eu rope, along a long arc stretch-
ing from Finland and Sweden down to Cyprus and Serbia, 
including Kosovo. NATO and the United States should work 
with the neutral states of the region and Rus sia to develop 
a permanent alternative security architecture for  those coun-
tries that would verifiably guarantee their sovereignty and 
security without NATO membership. It should also ensure 
complete freedom for their diplomatic and economic activi-
ties; they should not somehow be part of the sphere of influ-
ence of Rus sia or any other country or group.
C H I E F  E L E  M E N T S  O F  T H E  E A S T  E U  R O  P E A N  
S E C U R I T Y  A R C H I T E C T U R E
A new security architecture for the neutral countries of 
eastern Eu rope would be founded on the concept of sus-
tained neutrality for  those countries not now in NATO. 
That is, they would not join NATO in the  future. Nor would 
any of them not currently in the Eu ro pean Union be granted 
the security guarantees of the EU, should they eventually 
join that latter body. The only way this could change, as-
suming full and proper implementation of the new security 
architecture and continued compliance with it by Moscow, 
would be if Rus sia chose not to raise any objections to the 
idea of expansion in the  future— perhaps in a situation 
where it, too, had elected to seek membership in the North 
05-3257-0 ch4.indd   90 6/21/17   11:10 PM
 B E Y O N D  N A T O  91
Atlantic Treaty Organ ization. Clearly such a day is a long 
way off.2
Ideally, this architecture could be codified in treaty 
form. The treaty could be  simple  because the architecture 
would not create a new organ ization, though it would for-
malize certain types of monitoring and verification prac-
tices. It would, then, be ratified by key legislative bodies in 
the relevant countries. In the case of the United States that 
would, of course, mean the U.S. Senate.  Because ratification 
could prove controversial and could fail, it would be wise to 
acknowledge the possibility throughout the negotiation pro-
cess and consider adopting the concept through executive 
agreement as a fallback alternative. This approach would be 
less satisfactory, since it would be less binding on  future gov-
ernments in the respective countries. That said, even treaties 
can be annulled by  future presidents (as with the ABM 
Treaty  under President George W. Bush), and even executive 
agreements can prove durable if in the mutual interests of 
the respective parties or other wise difficult to overturn (as 
with the recent Iran nuclear deal). Moreover, treaties that fail 
to achieve ratification are often observed for considerable 
stretches, as with SALT II and the Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty.
As noted, the neutral states would also agree not to be 
covered by the security provisions of the Eu ro pean Union 
Treaty, even if they did join the EU in its other dimensions. 
This idea of separating out “security membership” in the EU 
from economic and po liti cal membership was broached by 
the Dutch prime minister in 2016, though in a less compre-
hensive and more tactical way than envisioned  here.3 The 
reason for making this distinction is that, while the Eu ro-
pean Union is primarily a po liti cal and economic entity, it 
has security dimensions as well.4 Specifically,  under the 
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2009 Lisbon Treaty, which updated the Treaty on the Eu-
ro pean Union, EU member states make a commitment of 
mutual defense and assistance. Article 42.7 states that “if a 
Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its ter-
ritory, the other Member States  shall have  towards it an 
obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their 
power, in accordance with Article 51 [the right to self- defense] 
of the United Nations Charter.”5 This phrasing is in some 
ways even more sweeping and unconditional than Article V 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organ ization, which implies 
that military force would and should be considered in re-
sponse to an attack on any member state, but does not oblige 
 every other member to an armed action, and invites each to 
exercise its own judgment. The EU does not require members 
to forgo formal neutrality or join any alliance. Thus, Austria, 
Finland, and Sweden are covered by the Eu ro pean Union’s 
security umbrella (and share in its obligations) yet are also 
still neutral countries. Nonetheless, I believe the EU’s territo-
rial security pledges should not be extended to new countries, 
lest they confuse and complicate the basic logic of the new se-
curity architecture proposed  here.6 New EU members could 
still participate in security- related activities of the EU in areas 
such as counterterrorism and maritime security, however.7 
They would also be understood to have  every right to partici-
pate in multilateral security operations on a scale comparable 
to what has been the case in the past— even  those operations 
that might be led by NATO— provided they  were authorized 
through the United Nations Security Council (where Rus sia, 
of course, enjoys veto rights).
The Crimea issue could be finessed separately in vari ous 
ways. Rus sia’s transgression  there could effectively be forgiven, 
as a show of good faith by the West, and in recognition of the 
unusual history and character of that Russian- majority re-
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gion. More realistically, it could simply be put aside, with the 
United States and other Western nations choosing not to rec-
ognize the annexation (and limiting their willingness to par-
ticipate in certain types of activities or meetings  there), but 
other wise not treating it as an impediment to relations. Alter-
natively, some modest number of sanctions could be retained 
to sustain the objection to Rus sia’s annexation, not necessarily 
in the expectation that Moscow would someday reverse course 
but more as a  matter of princi ple. This might be a situation, 
however, where it could be counterproductive to stand too 
forcefully on princi ple, especially if a new security order beck-
oned and offered the expectation that the Crimea experience 
would not be repeated elsewhere in Eu rope.
The Ukrainian civil war would be resolved and Rus sian 
presence in the Donbas verifiably reversed  under this plan. 
Minsk II would, in effect, be implemented, and the Donbas 
region would receive some autonomy within Ukraine as hos-
tilities  were ended. Current Ukrainian politics might make 
the autonomy arrangements difficult to negotiate, but in the 
context of a broader pact that ended the war, one would 
hope for flexibility from Kiev.
The “frozen conflicts” in Transnistria in Moldova, as well 
as South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, would also have to 
be resolved as part of this negotiation; so would the status of 
Kosovo, ideally. In princi ple, internationally supervised refer-
enda on in de pen dence or accession could be conducted in the 
Transnistria or the autonomous parts of Georgia, provided 
the mechanisms  were transparent and the outcomes verifi-
able.  There would be an understanding that no new “frozen 
conflicts” would be created on the territories of sovereign 
states in the  future, as well.
By this proposal, Armenia and Belarus could retain their 
current po liti cal and security associations with Rus sia, 
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notably  under the Collective Security Treaty Organ ization 
(CSTO), since it seems fair to say that this is not seen as 
threatening by Western countries. As part of the new secu-
rity paradigm, Rus sia should agree, however, not to dramat-
ically expand its own forward military presence in CSTO 
countries, as a  simple  matter of reciprocity and fairness.
 Under the plan, NATO would not offer new Member-
ship Action Plans to any currently neutral and non aligned 
countries. Technically,  these MAPs do not constitute a for-
mal plan for eventual membership, and the alliance reserves 
the right to make an  actual invitation at a  later date. Practi-
cally speaking, they are designed for countries seeking mem-
bership, as reflected in the alliance’s own official depiction 
of the program: “The Membership Action Plan (MAP) is a 
NATO programme of advice, assistance and practical sup-
port tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to 
join the Alliance.” The official language goes on to say: “Par-
ticipation in the MAP does not prejudge any decision by the 
Alliance on  future membership.”8 But as a practical  matter, 
MAPs have led to membership, and as such, they should no 
longer be employed.
At pres ent, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former 
Yugo slav Republic of Macedonia have MAPs.  Under my 
proposal, MAPS that had not yet resulted in alliance mem-
bership by the time of the negotiations would, ideally, be 
transformed into mechanisms to help usher  these Balkan 
states into a new security architecture rather than NATO 
itself. Were Kosovo’s in de pen dence to be fully established at 
some  future point, it, too, would be given the opportunity to 
be part of the new security architecture, remaining neutral 
rather than seeking to join NATO.
Preferably, Finland and Sweden would also remain outside 
of NATO, despite their Western sensibilities and associations. 
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Historically and practically, they have long traditions of fi-
nessing their security relationships as neutral countries out-
side of any alliance. The fact that this longstanding aspect of 
their strategic cultures is being called into question, especially 
in Sweden, at pres ent is a reflection of the acute tensions in 
Western relations with Rus sia. It is hard to believe that NATO 
membership reflects the genuinely preferred outcome among 
most Swedes or Finns. If forced to choose between East and 
West, they  will likely choose the latter— indeed, by most defi-
nitions, they are already part of the latter— but more likely, 
they would prefer to avoid a stark choice about their  future 
security associations. As such, a new security architecture that 
offered the promise of a much improved and more stable rela-
tionship between the Western world and Rus sia would likely 
reduce the newfound openness to the NATO option in  these 
two proudly self- reliant countries. Should Rus sia  either reject 
the idea of a new security architecture outright or fail to up-
hold its commitments  under such a new security system at 
some  future date, Sweden and Finland, like the other coun-
tries considered  here, could, of course, reconsider, in consulta-
tion with existing NATO states.
While my proposal could, in theory, go forward even if 
some or all the existing MAPs with Balkans states went 
forward— and, indeed, even if Sweden and Finland joined 
NATO, as well— this would not be the preferred course of 
action. Especially if the latter sought to join the Western al-
liance, that decision would implicitly reflect a lack of confi-
dence in the effectiveness of any new security architecture. As 
the strongest states among the group considered  here, and 
the two with arguably the strongest traditions of neutrality, 
Finland and Sweden would do much to set the tone for 
every one  else’s consideration of a new paradigm for the 
broader region. Moreover, it is unlikely that Moscow would 
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trust the intentions of the West, or be favorably inclined to 
negotiate a new security architecture if NATO expansion 
was si mul ta neously proceeding apace, even if in a limited 
way. Sweden and Finland, certainly, could stay within the 
Eu ro pean Union, of course, and they could continue to be 
part of its security pacts and mechanisms, too. Indeed, the 
mutual defense clause of the Eu ro pean Treaty provides a 
compromise of sorts for  these two Nordic countries, allow-
ing them at least an impor tant symbol of association with 
the West in security terms without extending all the way to 
NATO membership.
Most impor tant, as part of the new architecture, NATO’s 
signals to Ukraine and Georgia in 2008 that they would 
someday be invited into the alliance would have to be walked 
back. They would be superseded by the new East Eu ro pean 
Security Architecture (EESA), which would reliably ensure 
their sovereignty and might prove negotiable far more 
quickly than NATO membership could ever have been 
achieved, given current strategic conditions. It is impor tant 
to underscore that if the new architecture works as I believe 
it could, and likely  will, it  will be preferable to NATO mem-
bership for the  simple reason that it is a far more credible and 
attainable arrangement, on a much shorter time horizon.9 
Some might argue that Rus sia’s violation of the Budapest 
Memorandum of 1994, which had guaranteed Ukrainian 
sovereignty, suggests that Moscow would not uphold its obli-
gations  under any new security arrangement. That is pos si-
ble, and means of verification as well as mea sures of pos si ble 
response to Rus sian transgressions must be developed, as 
discussed  later. It is also worth noting that since 1994 NATO 
has added thirteen new members, mostly former Warsaw 
Pact members or former Soviet republics.  Doing so did not 
amount to an explicit violation of any promise ever made to 
05-3257-0 ch4.indd   96 6/21/17   11:10 PM
 B E Y O N D  N A T O  97
Moscow, but as  has been argued  here, it did dramatically 
change the Eu ro pean security landscape in Rus sian eyes. By 
contrast, the new security order would be intended to create 
a permanent arrangement that covered the  whole continent. 
This would create a much diff er ent situation than what fol-
lowed the Budapest Memorandum.
Of course no one can guarantee it  will prove pos si ble to 
negotiate an East Eu ro pean Security Architecture. Certain 
neutral states may reject the concept in the hope that NATO 
would someday reconsider and offer them membership in-
stead. At one level, their acquiescence is not strictly needed, 
since they are not being asked to take any active steps or 
join any new organ ization. On another level it could prove dif-
ficult to negotiate this arrangement, designed as it is to en-
hance their security, over their adamant objections. Their 
active cooperation would be needed to end the “frozen con-
flicts”; for example, as noted, Ukraine would need to do its 
part to implement Minsk II. Ideally, they would take the pub-
lic step of inviting this new security order  after a certain 
period of consultation.
In fact,  there is a good chance the idea  will, ultimately, 
prove appealing to the neutral states, once discussed and 
explained and refined. Countries like Ukraine and Georgia 
surely know that, what ever their long- term prospects,  there 
is virtually no chance of near- term NATO membership 
being offered them, due to their simmering conflicts with 
Rus sia and the lack of consensus about further alliance ex-
pansion among current NATO members. Yet Rus sia knows 
that NATO has had a tendency  toward expansion, even when 
it has gone through lull periods, and bases current policies 
on that expectation. This current state of affairs is, thus, in 
many ways the worst of all worlds. An EESA would not cre-
ate the same perverse incentives or profound uncertainties.
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Of course, Rus sia may very well reject this proposal. Presi-
dent Putin may believe that a state of semi- permanent con-
flict, or at least severe tension, with the West is in his domestic 
po liti cal interest. He has squelched virtually all domestic op-
position and  free media, using the notion of a Rus sia besieged 
by outsiders to justify his crackdowns.10 He may also thrive 
on geostrategic competition with the West, and on the gen-
eral reassertion of Rus sian power throughout much of East-
ern Eu rope and the  Middle East. Put simply, he may enjoy 
this latest incarnation of the “ great game” more than he lets 
on. His expectations about Georgia, Ukraine, and other 
Soviet republics may also extend beyond a desire for their 
 simple strategic neutrality; he may well not rest  until they are 
again within some Rus sian “sphere of influence” or “zone of 
privileged interests.”11
 Whether Rus sia accepted the idea or not, this proposal 
for a new security architecture  will strike some in the West 
as distasteful or worse. It would allow Vladimir Putin— who 
has squashed Rus sian po liti cal and civil society and pro-
voked violent conflicts near his own borders—to claim that 
he was the Rus sian leader who stopped NATO in its tracks, 
preventing any further expansion. But we need to keep our 
eye on the ball. NATO membership for Ukraine and other 
nearby countries is not a  viable means of settling the current 
crisis in any event; not even the most hawkish voices within 
NATO are calling for near- term alliance membership for 
Ukraine or any other central Eu ro pean state. Moreover, 
NATO expansion was never designed as a way to pressure 
or punish Rus sia (except in the eyes of certain Rus sians, of 
course), so a decision not to expand is also not a reward. Al-
lowing Putin to claim some degree of vindication is a far less 
injurious outcome than  running an unnecessarily height-
ened risk of war— and perpetuating a period of poor relations 
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between Rus sia and the West that impedes cooperative action 
against other prob lems of mutual concern in the  Middle East 
and Asia.
Indeed, a negotiated settlement could substantially reduce 
the risks of direct NATO- Russia conflict— which, while still 
small, have grown significantly over the last three years. Ef-
forts to assign blame for how we got to this point must not be 
allowed to stand in the way of addressing prob lems that could 
impose enormous costs and risks if left unresolved. For ex-
ample, a 2015 report by the Eu ro pean Leadership Network 
details how the intensity and gravity of incidents involving 
Rus sian and Western military forces have increased, raising 
the risk of an accident or military escalation between nuclear 
superpowers.12 Such incidents and activities have hardly 
relented since then. Military- to- military contacts have also 
been inadequate. They should expand even before a new 
security order can be constructed, as U.S. Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford has been wisely 
promoting.13 But they  will almost surely be piecemeal absent 
a broader strategic understanding between the  great powers.
A deal could also substantially improve the prospects 
that Ukraine can find peace and begin to refocus on po liti-
cal reform and economic recovery. It would also lower the 
chances of escalation of the current war. Similar consider-
ations would apply to the case of Georgia.
A new security architecture could not be negotiated over-
night. In theory the plan is  simple enough to be achievable 
within months, but more likely one to two years might be 
required to work through vari ous dimensions of the idea. In 
addition, implementation of a deal once negotiated could take 
some time— though it should not be a multi- year pro cess.
While negotiations to devise and formalize the new secu-
rity architecture  were ongoing, most aspects of current West-
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ern policy should not change. Notably, sanctions should be 
sustained but,  unless Rus sia escalates its military activities 
further, they should not be expanded.
Once the EESA was signed, ratified, and at least partially 
implemented, sanctions on Rus sia could be lifted.14 They 
could be removed step- by- step, in synchronization with the 
verified withdrawal of Rus sian forces from the Donbas re-
gion of Ukraine and from Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 
Georgia. Alternatively, once Rus sia’s withdrawal had begun, 
they could all be quickly lifted as a show of good faith.
Of course if Rus sia suspended its withdrawal or other wise 
 violated its commitments, consequences would ensue. Sanc-
tions could and should be reimposed with the same kind of 
“snapback” automaticity that was worked out through UN 
channels in regard to Iran’s compliance with the 2015 Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action. Similarly, it is difficult to 
imagine a new security architecture coming into being, or 
surviving long, if Rus sia sustained or intensified its covert 
and nefarious meddling in Western elections.15 More is said 
on this  later.
R E S O L U T E N E S S  A N D  R E S I L I E N C E
While a new security regime is being negotiated, and even 
 after it is implemented, NATO must, of course, stay resolute 
in vari ous dimensions of security policy. A new architecture 
for the neutral states of eastern Eu rope would likely be sta-
bilizing. But it would not end all prob lems between Rus sia 
and the West anytime soon, so it should not lead to a lower-
ing of NATO’s collective guard.16
To begin, the United States and NATO allies would not 
have had to dismantle any existing weapons or bases  under 
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an EESA regime. In that sense, the physical steps of creating 
the new security architecture, and the associated costs and 
risks, would be quite modest. Nor would NATO denigrate 
the standing of any existing members, or weaken its com-
mitment to their security, as it attempted to negotiate a new 
security regime. Even  those, like myself, who  were NATO 
expansion skeptics can, and should, acknowledge that its ra-
tionale was not crazy— and that it would be dangerous to 
reconsider the  matter. One can argue that it was risky for 
NATO to expand all the way to the Baltics. But one can also 
argue that Rus sia, given the Soviet history of aggressively 
annexing  those countries during World War II, should have 
been quick to acknowledge that it now owed them  every 
right to determine their  future without interference. In any 
case, what is done is done.  There is no undoing Baltic state 
membership or that of other eastern Eu ro pean states already 
in NATO. To reopen that debate would risk deterrence fail-
ure and war.
 Under the proposed EESA, therefore, the United States 
and other NATO member states should continue to imple-
ment their plans to station modest amounts of equipment in 
the easternmost NATO countries  under the Eu ro pean Reas-
surance Initiative and Operation Atlantic Resolve. This is a 
modest effort involving some 5,000 military personnel, the 
main effects of which are not to create substantial forward- 
deployed combat power but to signal resolve and to create, 
in effect, a robust tripwire force. It is not objectionable 
and should continue. Indeed, the four- battalion presence in 
NATO’s east might be expanded modestly, at least  until the 
current crisis in relations can be eased and a new security 
architecture  adopted. The additional U.S. brigade presence 
now intended as a temporary expedient for 2017 could be 
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sustained in defi nitely, for example. It is at pres ent a comple-
ment to NATO’s other very modest recent initiatives— notably, 
the NATO Response Force (NRF) formed at the 2014 Wales 
summit and its newest incarnation as a Very High Readiness 
Joint Task Force. Another  U.S. Army brigade could be sta-
tioned in Germany; the American drawdown  there prob ably 
went too far in recent years, anyway.
I do not, however, support  those voices arguing for addi-
tional U.S. and other NATO brigades, anywhere from two to 
six or more in the alliance’s east, that some reputable indi-
viduals and organ izations have proposed. It seems excessive 
relative to the likely conventional threat to NATO and, most 
of all, more likely to do net harm to U.S.- Russian and NATO- 
Russian relations. That action should only be considered if 
the Rus sian threat to the Baltics or Poland substantially in-
tensifies and if the effort to develop a new security architec-
ture for eastern Eu rope also fails.17
Arms sales within NATO can and should continue. Par-
ticularly impor tant, and also unthreatening to Moscow, are 
systems to improve cyber and command/control resiliency, 
to maintain air defense capacities, and to deploy antitank 
weapons.18 Internal NATO dialogues intended to foster 
greater defense collaboration and efficiency among key 
subgroups of states, such as the Visegrad Group of Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, should be un-
apologetically continued, as well. NATO’s modest efforts to 
increase presence in the Black Sea are worthy of sustain-
ment, too, with an eye  toward shoring up the credibility of 
commitments to NATO member states bordering that body 
of  water— Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey— rather than sig-
naling any intention to bring Ukraine and Georgia into the 
alliance.
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Capabilities for operating in the Arctic should be modestly 
expanded, too. Augmentation of U.S. Coast Guard and Navy 
presence in Arctic  waters should not be viewed principally as a 
 matter of rivalry with Rus sia (or China or anyone  else); in-
deed, climate change and the gradual melting of polar ice, 
 together with changing travel routes, should be seen as the 
primary impetus. In par tic u lar, new conditions argue strongly 
for an expansion of capabilities such as icebreaking fleets, 
where the United States has allowed its assets to atrophy.19
On missile defense, the Iran nuclear deal may remove the 
imminent threat of an Ira nian nuclear weapon for a de cade 
or more, assuming the deal holds. But the East Eu ro pean 
Security Architecture is not a near- term tactical adjustment 
in policy; it is designed as a permanent, or at least long- term, 
security framework for Eu rope. As such, Moscow should not 
be given false impressions that the current relatively relaxed 
concern in Western capitals about Iran’s capabilities  will 
remain relaxed. NATO must keep open its missile- defense 
options while maximizing collaboration on them with Rus-
sia to the extent pos si ble.  After the Obama administration 
did an impressive job of adjusting American missile- defense 
plans for Eu rope to create a design that was even less hypo-
thetically capable against Rus sian nuclear forces than the 
Bush plan had been, Moscow remained adamantly against it 
and excoriated NATO for the idea. Rather than kowtow to 
such pressure, NATO must stand firm in insisting it  will pro-
tect itself to the extent any  future threat may require. To be 
sure, such systems should be designed to mitigate what ever 
reasonable Rus sian objections might be anticipated. They 
could even be constrained in some way in a  future arms con-
trol accord. But they should not be precluded by any kind of 
a deal on a new security system for Eu rope.
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On  matters of cybersecurity, information warfare, and 
asymmetric warfare, NATO must actually step up its game. 
Rus sia’s be hav ior in regard to the American elections of 
2016 was sufficiently egregious that it cannot be allowed to 
recur. This means being ready, as in the Cold War, to fight 
fire with fire. Putin already believes the United States was 
 behind the Rose, Orange, Tulip, and Maydan revolutions. 
But Washington’s efforts in  those places  were transparent 
and innocuous, featuring the work of organ izations like the 
International Republican Institute and the National Demo-
cratic Institute. Covert and far more calculated efforts akin 
to what Rus sia did in the United States, and is attempting in 
vari ous Eu ro pean countries now as well, should be carried 
out proportionately if need be.  These methods can include 
not only help for reformist po liti cal movements and politi-
cians but also, if necessary, disinformation efforts against 
the Rus sian Federation and its top leaders. One hopes that 
 will not be needed.
Then  there is the cyber front. Western states need better 
cybersecurity practices at home. Additionally,  there needs to 
be the development of a set of pos si ble reprisal options should 
Rus sian misbehavior continue. The better practices at home 
have been discussed, for example, in the 2017 Defense Sci-
ence Board study on cybersecurity and should prioritize, in 
the first instance, U.S. nuclear forces and central command 
and control, but extend to key domestic infrastructure, as 
well.20 Clearly Rus sia is not the only potential threat of con-
cern in this regard. As for reprisal capacities, the idea of cre-
ating a Cyber Command distinct from the National Security 
Agency that focuses more on prompt and effective offensive 
operations makes sense for the United States at this juncture 
and should not be slowed or stymied  because of any attempt 
to negotiate a new security order.
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Responses to the next incident might not be entirely within 
the cyber realm, given Amer i ca’s relatively greater dependence 
on cyber infrastructure and, thus, greater vulnerability to an 
escalating conflict in cyberspace. They could include targeted 
and proportionate economic responses; for example, prohibi-
tions on the sale of specific American high- tech products to 
Rus sia. Cooperation with Rus sia on space launch, on produc-
tion of key components of advanced commercial aircraft, 
and on other advanced technical  matters could be curtailed— 
and once interrupted, a number of  these supply- chain ar-
rangements could be very difficult to restore, upping the stakes 
for Rus sia. Targeted sanctions against individuals or organ-
izations of the type imposed by President Obama late in 2016 
are also useful options.
I need not set out a detailed agenda  here. The key point is 
that nothing about negotiation of a new security pact should 
blind the West to the potential for other ongoing prob lems 
with Rus sia and the need for mea sures to protect ourselves 
against them and also to retaliate— even while attempting 
to negotiate or preserve a new EESA.
Staying resolute does not, however, mean unnecessarily 
raising the temperature in Western- Russian relations. As one 
key domain where restraint is still appropriate, for example, 
the United States and other NATO countries should not 
send weapons to Ukraine’s military at this juncture. Such 
shipments may be morally justifiable in some sense, but 
the most likely consequence would be a Rus sian counter-
reaction, including additional buildup of arms in eastern 
Ukraine, followed by even more deadly fighting for all sides 
 there, and damaged prospects for successful negotiation 
and implementation of the proposed EESA. Modest train-
ing and provision of some non-lethal arms to Ukraine can 
continue but should not be expanded while a broader peace 
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deal is pursued— unless, that is, Rus sia escalates its own in-
volvement in the war.
 F U T U R E  S E C U R I T Y  C O O P E R A T I O N  W I T H  
N E U T R A L  S T A T E S  A N D  N A T O
Another key set of issues concerns ongoing security collab-
oration of vari ous types that, even  today, neutral countries 
that might be part of a  future EESA share with NATO.  These 
activities are legitimate and nonthreatening and, often, 
impor tant to the security of the participating states. Thus, it 
 will be essential not to interrupt or end them, even with an 
EESA in place.
Consider first the issue of security assistance. The United 
States and other Western states already provide limited 
amounts of security assistance to most of the neutral coun-
tries at issue. Much of this support is for helping ensure ci-
vilian control of the armed forces and developing means to 
collaborate with NATO, through the Partnership for Peace 
program as well as other activities, on security tasks of 
mutual interest. For example, the Partnership for Peace 
effort, overseen by the Euro- Atlantic Partnership Council, 
has recently included twenty- two countries— Armenia, Aus-
tria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ireland, 
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Malta, the Republic of 
Moldova, Montenegro, Rus sia, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Tajikistan, the former Yugo slav Republic of Macedonia, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.21 Sixteen of  these 
receive some financial support through Warsaw Initiative 
Funds— all but Austria, Ireland, Malta (with a small excep-
tion), Rus sia, Sweden, and Switzerland.22
Take one example of recent activity involving NATO 
and several Partnership for Peace nations that occurred in 
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Ukraine in the summer of 2016. Known as Rapid Trident, it 
was an exercise involving command and field training di-
mensions, with an emphasis on peacekeeping and stability 
operations but with potential applicability to other activi-
ties, as well. Some 2,000 personnel took part, from a total 
of fourteen countries— including Ukraine, the United States, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Georgia,  Great Britain, Moldova, 
Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and Turkey. 
The exercise emphasized key tasks such as countering impro-
vised explosive devices, convoy operations, and patrolling.23
Another impor tant example concerns Georgia. That na-
tion has been involved in Partnership for Peace association 
with NATO since the 1990s. PfP helped provide a frame-
work  under which Georgia could send somewhat more than 
a company- sized unit (typically a  couple hundred soldiers) to 
the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo from 1999 to 2008. 
Georgia has also been a key contributor to the NATO- led In-
ternational Security Assistance Force mission, and now the 
Resolute Support mission, in Af ghan i stan. It deployed nearly 
1,000 soldiers at the peak of the mission in early 2011; at that 
time, it was the second largest non- NATO troop contributor 
to the operation,  after Australia. It also has a mountain train-
ing site, accredited as a Partnership Training and Education 
Center by the alliance, which offers courses and training to 
NATO members and other partner countries.24
 There have also been maritime exercises involving non- 
NATO countries. Some are tailored to par tic u lar purposes, 
such as cold- weather training involving several allied states 
plus Finland and Sweden. The Cold Response exercise of 
March 2016 is one such example.  These kinds of activities 
should also be allowed to continue  under a new security 
architecture—as should maritime exercises emphasizing 
search and rescue, or environmental surveillance and 
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monitoring, or interdiction of international criminal or ter-
rorist operations.25 It would make sense to conduct them at a 
modest scale, however, since large- scale exercises would rep-
resent an escalation of security cooperation and could imply 
an intended focus against Rus sia.
However, other types of military preparations with the 
neutral nations motivated by a poor relationship with Rus sia 
might be phased out over time. Training on tasks such as an-
tisubmarine warfare, or coordination of contingency plan-
ning for pos si ble conflicts against Rus sia involving the Baltic 
Sea, should not be continued in defi nitely once the relation-
ship with Rus sia is stabilized— and once the frequent provo-
cations that Rus sian forces have carried out in recent years 
have presumably come to an end, a situation that can be 
monitored and verified.26 During the negotiation and early 
implementation phase of the new security order,  these activi-
ties might be continued but would, presumably, not increase 
in scale or frequency.
The United States sells very few arms to the group of 
twenty- two nations that participate in the Partnership for 
Peace. In 2015, for example, only Sweden, Ukraine, and 
Uzbekistan received any weapons shipments, for a combined 
 grand total of only about $50 million in value.27 Similar lev-
els of defense trade should be acceptable in the  future, or 
even modestly more (as the economies of the affected coun-
tries begin to grow faster, perhaps).
NATO’s Mediterranean initiatives and dialogues, which 
include a number of Arab and North African states and 
focus on issues such as refugee flows and Mideastern secu-
rity, are also impor tant. The threats they address are suffi-
ciently acute that more effective collaboration would be highly 
desirable.28 Thus, one would not wish to cap, in any quanti-
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tative sense, pos si ble  future joint security activities. Most 
such efforts should involve Rus sia, too, in some way.
Then  there is the  matter of Syria. I am not proposing 
some global “ grand bargain” by which all  matters over which 
Moscow and the West quarrel are somehow si mul ta neously 
resolved. It is pos si ble, moreover, that the Syrian civil war may 
be addressed more quickly than an EESA could be created. 
But it is, nonetheless, worth noting that  there is a power ful 
logic in  favor of Washington and Moscow working together in 
Syria; it is hard to imagine a solution without such coopera-
tion, given the military and po liti cal influence Rus sia now 
commands  there. American and Rus sian interests in Syria, 
while in some tension, may not be diametrically opposed.29 
Thus, a new security arrangement for Eu rope may help grease 
the skids  toward more effective collaboration in Syria (and 
elsewhere). But, again, I am proposing neither a  grand bargain 
nor linkage, per se.
In summary, ongoing channels of contact and coopera-
tion involving NATO or the EU with the neutral states of 
eastern Eu rope should not be precluded  under a new secu-
rity order. But they could be loosely capped in scale and 
character. The neutral states must not be deprived of the 
ability to work with the world’s best military alliance, or its 
individual members, on issues of common concern.
What if new circumstances arose? For example, what 
if the be hav ior of a country such as China or Iran gave 
NATO states and the likes of Sweden or Finland or Ukraine 
or Georgia common reasons for concern? That could, in turn, 
lead to a desire for larger- scale and more combat- oriented 
exercises or deployments. A logical corollary of the frame-
work proposed  here, however, is that any such activities 
should be conducted only  after close and careful consultation 
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with Moscow— and, ideally, perhaps even with Rus sian 
participation.
How does one “loosely cap cooperation” in a way that  will 
not produce inevitable disputes over what types of collabora-
tion are allowable and which are not? It would, admittedly, be 
difficult, and prob ably undesirable, to be overly precise about 
exactly what limits to place on security assistance, arms sales, 
and exercises. But  there is still value in the idea of agreeing 
that  future activities would not generally exceed the scale of 
past and ongoing efforts in  these domains. A useful analogy 
is the U.S.- China agreement in 1982 that the United States 
would cap (and gradually reduce) its arms sales to Taiwan.30 
China has argued for years that the agreement, in fact, com-
mitted Washington to wind down  these arms transfers more 
quickly than has been the case; the two countries argue over 
the interpretation of that accord to this day. But the argu-
ments, while sometimes even acrimonious, occur within cer-
tain par ameters defined by that 1982 agreement that limit 
the degree to which this issue has infected the broader 
relationship.
V E R I F I C A T I O N  A N D  C O M P L I A N C E
Even if it  were successfully negotiated and implemented, a 
new East Eu ro pean Security Architecture might not be the 
end of the story, of course. One would need to take the same 
“distrust but verify” approach to the creation of any new 
order, as Ronald Reagan famously articulated when negoti-
ating with Soviet leaders.
It is entirely pos si ble that Rus sia  under Putin, or another 
leader like Putin, is not simply an aggrieved state acting in 
response to a sense of embitterment and encirclement, but 
also now fundamentally a revanchist or revisionist power. 
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(The terms revanchist and revisionist are often used inter-
changeably, along with the word irredentist— and while  there 
may be subtle differences, all three words imply a desire to 
reclaim what was once viewed as a nation’s rightful posses-
sions or areas of influence.) In that event, most likely Moscow 
would simply not be willing to negotiate the security frame-
work proposed  here. But even if it did, it might do so cyni-
cally. It might see the architecture as just a temporary truce 
and reject it  later. Or, it might view it as a means of constrain-
ing the West, and lulling it into a false sense of complacency 
while allowing Rus sia to carry out surreptitious activities in 
the states in question. Moscow might also seek to create a cli-
mate of intimidation that would produce a ring of partially 
subservient states near Rus sia’s borders despite Moscow’s 
promise to allow full diplomatic and economic freedoms as 
endorsed in this proposal.
As such, in addition to sustaining prudent defensive mea-
sures like the Eu ro pean Reassurance Initiative and improv-
ing preparation against Rus sian cyber attacks or po liti cal 
tomfoolery, Washington and other Western capitals need to 
devise a rigorous system of verification and a framework for 
responding to pos si ble acts of noncompliance or even aggres-
sion by Moscow.
The ultimate recourse if the security architecture failed 
would be to reopen the possibility of further NATO expan-
sion. Indeed, NATO could indicate to Moscow that, should it 
blatantly violate the terms of the EESA, NATO expansion 
might actually accelerate in the  future— not being constrained 
any longer by the expectation that candidate nations would 
first resolve their territorial disputes with neighbors before 
being considered for membership. But that would be a last and 
least desirable resort. More modest steps need to be conceptu-
alized, in advance, as well.
05-3257-0 ch4.indd   111 6/21/17   11:10 PM
112 Michael E. O’Hanlon
The first challenge is monitoring and verification. A neu-
tral organ ization like the Organ ization for Security and Co-
operation in Eu rope would need to have the capacity and the 
formal responsibility to monitor compliance with the agree-
ment, to  handle any  future disputes about security challenges 
faced by any of the eastern Eu ro pean countries covered by the 
accord and to investigate and adjudicate complaints. With 700 
monitors in Ukraine, the OSCE has been key in observing on-
going fighting and tracking the involvement of vari ous par-
ties. This kind of capability, at least on a roving basis, should 
be sustained  under the new EESA. This concept plays to the 
strengths of an organ ization like OSCE— which is inherently 
more about promoting certain norms of be hav ior and en-
hancing confidence- building activities than about physi-
cally guaranteeing security.
Certain ele ments of verification could be expected to 
be relatively straightforward. Monitoring the locations and 
movements of large amounts of conventional weaponry, as 
was done for years  under the Conventional Armed Forces 
in Eu rope treaty (CFE), is not difficult. That treaty involved 
hundreds of inspections a year at declared sites, with stipu-
lations requiring notification if equipment was moved or 
repositioned. Aircraft-flying missions through the Open 
Skies arrangement— which has typically involved some 100 
flights per year over vari ous parts of Eurasian and North 
American territory— can also contribute usefully to the ef-
fort.31 Indeed, in the course of 2014, U.S. intelligence was 
capable of tracking the movements of Rus sian equipment 
so well that, at times, it provided exact counts on the num-
ber of heavy military vehicles that had crossed the border 
with Ukraine. Observers from the OSCE  were also capable 
of careful monitoring of such movements. Journalistic 
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 accounts, including interviews with captured fighters, com-
mercially available imagery, and social media are among 
the available tools that, together, are increasingly likely to 
notice any clandestine foreign military presence as its scale 
grows.32
Of course addressing the issue of who owns given pieces of 
equipment can be complex, as demonstrated by the Donbas 
experience in eastern Ukraine since 2014. So- called Rus sian 
volunteers operated in that region, bringing weaponry with 
them and, at times, transferring it to Ukrainian separatists. 
Determining who was who required, among other  things, so-
phisticated American signals intelligence— including sources 
and methods that the United States was not willing to share in 
all cases.33 Moreover, Rus sia retained some degree of deniabil-
ity for the actions of  these so- called volunteers, at least in 
its own mind, even if most  others  were not fooled for long. 
Rus sia’s Maskirovka policies can employ a range of tactics— 
special forces deployed in small numbers and embedded 
within locally friendly populations, the hiding of military ca-
pabilities and supplies within humanitarian supply convoys, 
and so forth.34 Fortunately, as the scale and frequency of such 
activities increase, their deniability tends to decline. In addi-
tion to national technical means, and OSCE inspectors, a few 
other capabilities and methods could be authorized within the 
EESA, as well. For example, the current observation provi-
sions in the OSCE’s Vienna Document should be improved to 
allow “snap inspections,” when countries conduct snap exer-
cises, as suggested by the Netherlands’ special envoy for con-
ventional arms control, Lucien Kleinjan.35
For modest- scale violations, some form of redress would 
be needed short of immediate annulment of the entire 
 security architecture. One option, stipulated in the formal 
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document establishing the new Eu ro pean zone of neutral-
ity, might be that in such a situation, other interested parties 
could temporarily and proportionately offer to step up their 
own security activities within the same state as desired.
A second option could employ sanctions. Several high- tech 
sectors where cooperation occurs  today could be targeted, 
for example. Individuals close to Putin could be, too. Greater 
efforts could be made— perhaps even using NATO infrastruc-
ture dollars to leverage public- private investment options—to 
further harden Eu rope against the possibility of Rus sian retal-
iatory gas export cutoffs. Eu rope has many more options for 
its energy supplies now than it used to.  Because of its improved 
pipeline system, as well as options for importing liquefied 
natu ral gas, among other possibilities, it is far less vulnerable 
to Rus sian embargo than it once was. A concerted Western 
plan to improve resilience further could be undertaken should 
Rus sian be hav ior become unacceptable again.36
If a violation  were sufficiently serious, however, and re-
dress could not be achieved, the entire deal could be de-
clared dead. In other words, if, for example, Rus sia again 
invaded Ukraine, the United States and other NATO states, 
as well as the Eu ro pean Union more broadly, would retain 
the right to respond. Appropriate steps could include re-
imposing economic sanctions, providing lethal arms to 
Ukraine’s military, or considering NATO membership for 
Ukraine, even in the absence of a settlement of its disputes 
with Rus sia. The United States might, along with other allies, 
pledge to rapidly establish a military presence in Ukraine 
with operational units  under such circumstances. The terms 
of the security order should explic itly allow such an option 
in the event of blatant noncompliance or treaty violation. 
Washington should not overemphasize  these issues in any 
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negotiations, lest the entire purpose of the effort to negoti-
ate a new security architecture be lost in worst- case discus-
sions that could be interpreted as threats or expressions 
of bad faith. But the United States, along with allies, should 
make clear that  there would likely be significant conse-
quences to any breach of a new security order.
A related issue concerns crises or direct military conflicts. 
For example, what if two of the neutral states wound up at war 
with each other, or one of them fought a NATO member state, 
and Rus sia used the opportunity to intervene— perhaps purely 
cynically, perhaps with some degree of reasonable strategic 
logic? For example, if Armenia and Azerbaijan started to fight 
again, how might Rus sia respond— and how should the United 
States and NATO react to any pos si ble Rus sian military activ-
ity? In other words, if Rus sia did not start the fight, and seemed 
to have a defensible argument about the wisdom of interven-
ing to help one party or the other, would that be a serious 
violation of the new security architecture?
It would be a  mistake to think that one could find a sin-
gle binding answer to this question in advance. Just as the 
United States would never forswear any pos si ble interest or 
role in a conflict near its own shores, it would be unrealistic 
to expect Rus sia to do so. That said,  there would have to be 
mechanisms to improve the odds of promptly detecting in-
tervention done  under false pretenses. In general, in de pen-
dent investigation of the  causes of any conflict would be the 
proper response. And, of course, once the immediate issue 
was resolved (even if Rus sia’s role  were legitimate), Rus sian 
forces would have to withdraw, perhaps in  favor of an inter-
national peacekeeping force. Moscow could reasonably in-
sist on the same arrangements in regard to pos si ble NATO 
intervention in a neutral state of Europe.
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C O N C L U S I O N :   T O W A R D  A  L O N G - T E R M  V I S I O N  
F O R  U . S . -  R U S S I A  R E L A T I O N S
If a new security arrangement  were well designed and suc-
cessfully brought into existence, it could do much to trans-
form NATO- Russian relations. Clearly, it would not be the 
only determinant of their  future interactions. Events in other 
theaters of mutual concern, like the  Middle East, would in-
fluence politics and policymaking in Rus sia and the West. 
The specific characters and motivations of  future leaders in 
key countries would have a major impact, as well. Rus sia’s 
own ability to build a healthy population and healthy econ-
omy would be crucial in shaping the federation’s own  future 
and, thus, the nature of its interactions with the world writ 
large. The China  factor could be significant in vari ous ways 
for every one, as well, of course.
All that said,  there is reason to think that a new security 
arrangement for the currently neutral and strategically con-
tested countries of eastern Eu rope could go far  toward de-
fusing hegemonic competition in Eu rope between NATO 
and Rus sia. It is quite likely the most impor tant single issue 
affecting broader U.S.- Russian relations and NATO- Russian 
relations in general. Two world wars and the Cold War cen-
tered on the Eu ro pean theater; Eu rope is the geographic 
space that Rus sia and the West collectively share.
None of this is to say that creation of an EESA would 
make every thing easy in  future NATO- Russia relations. 
Rus sia seems likely to think of itself differently than do most 
Western nations for many years into the  future. It is doubt-
ful that Moscow  will want to join the Eu ro pean Union, for 
example (and doubtful that the EU would want Rus sia any 
time soon). Rus sia’s po liti cal culture is likely to remain, in 
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impor tant ways, non- Western and fiercely nationalistic for a 
long time to come.
Rus sians are proud of their history and their nation and 
their state. They also tend to think it is still relevant for ensur-
ing their security. They see a rising China to their east, a highly 
assertive Amer i ca and its allies to their west, and trou ble to 
their south. They also have felt embarrassed and anxious over 
the decline in their nation’s cohesion and power  after the Cold 
War. They are not a  people who  will quickly dismiss the im-
portance of the state; nor do they have many natu ral partners 
in building any post– Westphalian system, since they do not 
feel par tic u lar kinship to any other large bloc of nations. Putin 
may exemplify this attitude most poignantly, but his 90  percent 
popularity at vari ous points during the Ukraine crisis, the 
generally favorable reaction of normal Rus sians to his asser-
tiveness in the Crimea, and the general weakness of civil soci-
ety and in de pen dent media within the country as a  whole 
suggest it  will not quickly fade away.
It does not seem realistic to imagine Rus sia joining NATO 
in any reasonably short timeframe,  either, even  after Putin 
passes from the scene. A Rus sia within NATO might have 
been an option soon  after the Cold War,37 but that day is gone 
and  will not easily or quickly return. Most Rus sians see the 
alliance as largely anti- Russian in membership, character, 
and purpose; even  after creation of an EESA, such attitudes 
 will not rapidly dis appear.38
Even if it is incredulous that a  future Rus sia would seek to 
join NATO, it is not beyond belief that a post– Putin Rus sian 
state could look to mend fences and develop a modus vivendi 
with the Western world. Several motivations could drive Rus-
sians  toward such an outcome. Rus sia could seek to improve 
its economic growth and prosperity through more robust 
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trade. It could also see a strong association with the EU or 
NATO as a useful hedge against Islamist extremism and Chi-
na’s rise. To reach this mindset, Rus sia would not necessarily 
have to abandon all security fears, real or  imagined, but would 
have to conclude that the greater dangers came from the south 
or east (or within) and could be more effectively checked with 
Western help.
The effect of this kind of policy could be something of a 
return to the calmer days of NATO- Russian relations of the 
1990s— but in the context of a confident and stable Rus sia. 
New institutional mechanisms might be created to address 
 matters of common concern; alternatively, existing vehicles 
such as the OSCE, NATO- Russia Council, restored G8, and 
UN Security Council might be strengthened. Nuclear arms 
control might resume, missile defense issues could become 
less acrimonious, and strategic cooperation on counterter-
rorism, Iran, North  Korea, Af ghan i stan, Iraq, and Syria could 
become more standard.
Perhaps more realistic in the foreseeable  future, however, 
is a more modest goal, what Clifford Gaddy and I coined as 
a “Reaganov Rus sia.” This vision would assume a proud, na-
tionalistic state with a strong military. If the Rus sian Fed-
eration could take pride in reestablishing itself as a success-
ful status- quo power, it might not see the need for revanchism 
or other aggression.39 It could pragmatically weigh its own 
interests across a wide range of policy options, often con-
cluding that it should cooperate with the West on key 
strategic issues for its own well- being. Freed by greater self- 
confidence from the kind of anger and embitterment that 
has characterized recent years, it could cooperate with the 
West when interests aligned— prob ably most of the time— 
and contain the fallout from  those situations where interests 
diverged.
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This framework for the  future Rus sian state might envi-
sion the defense sector providing technological innovations 
that could be spun off to help revive the Rus sian scientific 
and manufacturing sectors more broadly. Such spinoffs 
happened often in the United States  under Reagan and other 
Cold War presidents, and in the Soviet Union, too. It is also 
an idea advanced by  people such as defense official Dmitry 
Rogozin in the modern Rus sian context.40
Of  these two categories of possibilities— a generally 
friendly or pro- Western Rus sia of some type, and a “Reaganov 
Russia”— the latter may be the most realistic aspiration we 
should hold in the West. It may not fit the model of a liberal, 
genuinely Western Rus sia that many in the West (and many 
intellectuals and reformers in Rus sia itself) might prefer, but 
a  Reaganov Rus sia could be a more self- confident and self- 
satisfied and, therefore, less truculent, nation than what we see 
today.
This outcome could be good news, and a desirable re-
sult, for Washington. The West and Rus sia would appear, 
in objective terms, to share most global interests on 
 matters ranging from nuclear nonproliferation to counter-
terrorism to shaping China’s rise in benign ways. A Rus-
sian strategic perspective that cleared away emotional bag-
gage and allowed a relatively clear- eyed assessment of 
when and where to cooperate with outside powers should 
produce a Rus sia that is easier to deal with. If the highly 
sensitive issue of NATO can be managed, this could lead 
to a world in which the Rus sian state retained a distinctly 
diff er ent character than Western nations, but one with 
which core interests could be mutually pursued and the 
threat of direct conflict virtually eliminated. It may be the 
best we can hope for, and it would be a major improvement 
over  today.
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At some point, the Rus sian polity may change to the point 
where history, even if not ending, can enter a fundamentally 
new era. At that point, a new and more inclusive security 
order might become pos si ble, with Rus sia as well as many or 
all of  today’s neutral states and NATO nations allied in true 
partnership,  whether  under the auspices of something still 
called the North Atlantic Treaty Organ ization or something 
 else. But that day is clearly far off, and  until it arrives the 
world  will be safer and more stable with a neutral zone in 
eastern Eu rope.
05-3257-0 ch4.indd   120 6/21/17   11:10 PM
121
Notes
C H A P T E R  O N E
1. Gareth Jennings, “NATO Fighter Scrambles on the Rise in 
Response to Growing Rus sian Air Activity,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 
April  5, 2017, p.  9; and Eric Schmitt, “Two Rus sian Bombers Fly 
Near Alaska, and U.S. Scrambles Jets,” New York Times, April 18, 
2017 (https:// nyti . ms / 2pzXBhp).
2. Daniel Wasserbly, “Rus sia’s Inventory of Non- Strategic Nu-
clear Weapons Worries EUCOM,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 5, 
2017, p.  5; and Alexey Arbatov, “Understanding the U.S.- Russia 
Nuclear Schism,” Survival, vol. 59, no. 2 (April- May 2017), p. 61.
3. Jacob Pramuk, “Declassified: Read the Intelligence Report 
on Rus sia Interfering with U.S. Election,” CNBC . com, January 6, 
2017 (www . cnbc . com / 2017 / 01 / 06 / intelligence - community - says 
- putin - ordered - campaign - to - inf luence - election - denigrate 
- clinton . htm).
4. Much of this section benefits from Fiona Hill and Clifford 
Gaddy, Mr.  Putin: Operative in the Kremlin, rev. ed. (Brookings 
Institution Press, 2015), pp. 285–311.
06-3257-0 bm.indd   121 6/21/17   11:12 PM
5. Ibid.
6. See Körber Stiftung, “Europa— aber wo liegen seine Gren-
zen?” [Europe— but where do its frontiers lie?], 104th Bergedorfer 
Gesprächskreis [104th Bergedorf Roundtable], Warsaw, Königss-
chloss, 1995 (www . koerber - stiftung . de / fileadmin / bg / PDFs/bnd_104 
_ de . pdf).
7. President William Jefferson Clinton, A National Security 
Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, D.C.: Feb-
ruary 1995), p. ii.
8. James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, Power and Pur­
pose: U.S. Policy  toward Rus sia  after the Cold War (Brookings 
Institution Press, 2003), pp. 208–10.
9. Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: 
NATO’s War to Save Kosovo (Brookings Institution Press, 2000).
10. NATO’s intervention also shook the Rus sian public. Polls 
conducted by VTsIOM, the pre de ces sor polling agency to the 
Levada Center, showed that the share of Rus sians polled who had 
a negative view of the United States  rose from barely 20  percent to 
well over 50  percent in the first half of 1999. Levada Center data as 
reported in Sberbank Investment Research, Rus sia Economic 
Monthly, July 2014.
11. See Vladimir Putin, “Obrashcheniye Prezidenta Rossiys-
koy Federatsii” [Address by the President of the Rus sian Federa-
tion], March 18, 2014 (news.kremlin.ru/news/20603). An En glish 
translation is available (eng.news.kremlin.ru/news/6889).
12. Goldgeier and McFaul, Power and Purpose, p. 249. For an 
American diplomat’s side of the story, see Strobe Talbott, The Rus­
sia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy (New York: Ran-
dom House, 2002), pp. 298–331.
13. Ibid.
14. See Goldgeier and McFaul, Power and Purpose, pp. 261–62.
15. Ibid., p. 263.
16. Ibid., p. 264.
17. For a personal account by someone who interacted with 
Putin during the Kosovo events, see Strobe Talbott, “Vladimir 
Putin’s Role, Yesterday and  Today,” Washington Post, March 21, 
2014. Talbott, former deputy secretary of state in the Clinton 
122 Notes to Pages 11–15
06-3257-0 bm.indd   122 6/21/17   11:12 PM
administration, described his meeting with Putin in the latter’s 
capacity as head of the Rus sian Security Council. Putin’s role 
in  Rus sia’s intervention in Kosovo, notes Talbott, “remains a 
mystery.”
18. See “Terror Strikes— and Putin Proposes an Antiterrorist 
Alliance,” in Angela E. Stent, The Limits of Partnership: U.S.­ Russian 
Relations in the Twenty­ First  Century (Prince ton University Press, 
2014), pp. 62–66. Rus sian military commanders also tried to draw 
direct comparisons between Chechnya and the NATO bombing 
campaign in Yugo slavia in a diff er ent way, explaining that they 
 were simply emulating NATO’s strategy in trying to deal with the 
terrorist operations in Chechnya. See Michael Gordon, “Imitating 
NATO: A Script Is Adapted for Chechnya,” New York Times, 
November 28, 1999.
19. Stent, The Limits of Partnership, pp. 62–63.
20. Ibid., p. 67.
21. Ariel Cohen, Rus sia’s Counterinsurgency in North Cauca­
sus: Per for mance and Consequences (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Stud-
ies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2014), pp. 20–52.
22. Stent, The Limits of Partnership, p. 69. This is a quote from 
an interview that Stent conducted with former Rus sian foreign 
minister Igor Ivanov.
23. See the section “Chechnya, Again” in Goldgeier and 
 McFaul, Power and Purpose, pp. 267–86.
24. See Vladimir Putin, “Vstrechi s predstavitelyami razli-
chnikh soobshchestv” [Meetings with representatives of diff er ent 
communities], September  15, 2001 (archive.kremlin.ru/appears 
/2001/09/15/0003_type63376type63377_28632.shtml).
25. For a detailed discussion of Rus sian attitudes  toward U.S. 
ballistic missile defense, including extensive interviews with 
Rus sian officials, see Bilyana Lilly, Rus sian Foreign Policy  toward 
Missile Defense: Actors, Motivations and Influence (New York: 
Lexington Books, 2014).
26. The Baltic states secured in de pen dence from Rus sia  after 
World War I. The United States and other countries did not recog-
nize the Soviet Union’s reincorporation of the states  after World 
War II.
 Notes to Pages 16–18 123
06-3257-0 bm.indd   123 6/21/17   11:12 PM
27. Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy, Mr. Putin: Operative in 
the Kremlin, rev. ed. (Brookings Institution Press, 2015), p. 304.
28. As an example, see Putin’s televised speech to the Rus sian 
 people given  after the tragedy at Beslan. Vladimir Putin, “Obrash-
cheniye Prezidenta Vladimira Putina” [Message from the Presi-
dent of Rus sia, Vladimir Putin], September 4, 2004 (http:// archive 
. kremlin . ru / appears / 2004 / 09 / 04 / 1752 _ type63374type82634 
_ 76320 . shtml).
29. See Stent, The Limits of Partnership, pp. 97–123, for a de-
tailed discussion of Rus sian responses to the color revolutions and 
Rus sian government interpretations of events. See also Condoleezza 
Rice, Democracy: Stories from the Long Road to Freedom (New York: 
Twelve, 2017), pp. 166–201.
30. For more information on the policies related to the Bush 
administration’s Freedom Agenda, see the George  W. Bush 
 archives (georgewbush - whitehouse . archives . gov / infocus / freedom 
agenda); and Paulette Chu Miniter, “Why George Bush’s Freedom 
Agenda Is  Here to Stay,” Foreign Policy, August  21, 2007 (www 
. foreignpolicy . com / articles / 2007 / 08 / 20 / why _ george _ bushs 
_ ldquofreedom _ agendardquo _ is _ here _ to _ stay _ ).
31. Stent, The Limits of Partnership, p. 10.
32. See, for example, the text of “Cheney’s Speech in Lithua-
nia,” New York Times, May 4, 2006.
33. Vladimir Putin, “Speech and the Following Discussion at 
the Munich Security Conference on Security Policy,” February 10, 
2007 (http:// archive . kremlin . ru / eng / speeches / 2007 / 02 / 10 / 0138 _ t
ype82912type82914type82917type84779 _ 118123 . shtml); and Stent, 
The Limits of Partnership, pp. 147–49.
34. Vladimir Putin, “Press Statement and Answers to Journal-
ists’ Questions Following a Meeting of the Russia- NATO Coun-
cil,” April  4, 2008 (archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2008 
/04/04/1949 _type82915_163150.shtml).
35. Cited in Stent, The Limits of Partnership, p. 161.
36. Ibid., pp. 238–39.
37. Bobo Lo, “Medvedev and the New Eu ro pean Security 
 Architecture,” Centre for Eu ro pean Reform, London, July  2009 
124 Notes to Pages 19–22
06-3257-0 bm.indd   124 6/21/17   11:12 PM
(www . cer . org . uk / sites / default / files / publications / attachments / pdf 
/ 2011 / pbrief _ medvedev _ july09 - 741 . pdf).
38. Stent, The Limits of Partnership, pp. 168–76.
39. Ibid., pp. 211–34.
40. Putin declared Qaddafi’s death an “outrage” (bezobraziye) 
in his November  11, 2011, meeting with the Valdai Discussion 
group, which also covered many of  these same issues.
41. “Vladimir Putin’s Unshakeable Popularity,” The Econo­
mist, February 4, 2016.
42. Paul Saunder, “Sergey Lavrov: The Interview,” National In­
terest , March  29, 2017 (http:// nationalinterest . org / feature / sergey 
- lavrov - the - interview - 19940).
43. Vladimir Putin, “A Plea for Caution from Rus sia: What 
Vladimir Putin Has to Say to Americans about Syria,” New York 
Times, September 11, 2013. (The op-ed was published on Septem-
ber 11 but is listed on the website as September 12.)
44. See Vladimir Putin, “Obrashcheniye Prezidenta Rossiys-
koy Federatsii” [Address by the President of the Rus sian Federa-
tion], March 18, 2014, available on the Kremlin’s website archive 
in Rus sian (news.kremlin.ru/news/20603). An En glish translation 
is available (eng.news.kremlin.ru/news/6889).
45. On the cyber dimensions, see Ben Buchanan and Michael 
Sulmeyer, “Rus sia and Cyber Operations: Challenges and Oppor-
tunities for the Next U.S. Administration,” Car ne gie Endowment 
for International Peace, Washington, D.C., December  13, 2016 
(http:// carnegieendowment . org / 2016 / 12 / 13 / russia - and - cyber 
- operations - chal lenges - and - opportunit ies - for - next - u .  s . 
- administration - pub - 66433).
46. Adriana Lins de Albuquerque and Jakob Hedenskog, 
“Ukraine: A Defense Sector Reform Assessment,” FOI Report R-
4157- SE, FOI, Stockholm, Sweden, December 2015 (file:///C:/Users/
MOHAN LON/Downloads/http— webbrapp.ptn.foi.se- pdf-
78b12d4c-19d6-4727- b96b-7faa5ba088dc%20(5).pdf).
47. See, for example, Julianne Smith and Jerry Hendrix, 
 “Assured Resolve: Testing Pos si ble Challenges to Baltic Security,” 
Center for a New American Security, Washington, D.C., 2016, p. 2.
 Notes to Pages 22–25 125
06-3257-0 bm.indd   125 6/21/17   11:12 PM
48. In their early analy sis of Putin, Herspring and Kipp noted: 
“Watching Putin deal with Moscow’s foreign debt is especially 
in ter est ing. He wants nothing more than to pay it.” Dale  R. 
Herspring and Jacob Kipp, “Understanding the Elusive Mr. Putin,” 
Prob lems of Post­ Communism, vol. 48, no.  5 (September/October 
2001), p. 15.
49. See Mikhail Barabanov, “Hard Lessons Learned: Rus sian 
Military Reform up to the Georgian Conflict,” and “Changing the 
Force and Moving Forward  after Georgia,” in  Brothers Armed: 
Military Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine, edited by Colby Howard 
and Ruslan Pukhov (Minneapolis: East View Press, 2014), pp. 74–
90, 91–123. France suspended the Mistral contract in late 2014, 
pending further developments in Ukraine.
50. See Jim Nichol, “Rus sian Military Reform and Defense 
Policy,” Congressional Research Ser vice, Washington, D.C., 
August 24, 2011.
51. Christian Le Miere and Jeffrey Mazo, Arctic Opening: Inse­
curity and Opportunity (London: International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 2013), p. 84.
52. Tomas Malmlof, Roger Roffey, and Carolina Vendil Pallin, 
“The Defence Industry,” in Rus sian Military Capability in a Ten­ 
Year Perspective–2013, edited by Jakob Hedenskog and Carolina 
Vendil Pallin (Stockholm, Sweden: FOI, 2013), pp. 128–29.
C H A P T E R  T W O
1. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military 
Balance 2016 (Oxfordshire,  England: Routledge, 2016), pp. 85–207, 
486–90.
2. Bo Ljung, Tomas Malmlof, Karlis Neretnieks, and Michael 
Winnerstig, eds., The Security and Defensibility of the Baltic States: 
A Comprehensive Analy sis of a Security Complex in the Making 
(Stockholm, Sweden: FOI, 2012) (www . foi . se).
3. Luke Coffey and Daniel Kochis, “The Role of Sweden and 
Finland in NATO’s Defense of the Baltic States,” Heritage Foun-
dation, Washington, D.C., April 2016 (www . heritage . org / research 
/ reports / 2016 / 04 / the - role - of - sweden - and - finland - in - natos 
- defense - of - the - baltic - states).
126 Notes to Pages 29–39
06-3257-0 bm.indd   126 6/21/17   11:12 PM
4. Edward Lucas, “Why NATO Needs Finland and Sweden,” 
Center for Eu ro pean Policy Analy sis, Washington, D.C., May 2016 
(http:// cepa . org / Why - NATO - needs - Finland - and - Sweden).
5. See Gordon F. Sander, The 100­ Day Winter War: Finland’s 
Gallant Stand against the Soviet Army (University Press of Kan-
sas, 2013).
6. Alyson J. K. Bailes, Gunilla Herolf, and Bengt Sundelius, The 
Nordic Countries and the Eu ro pean Security and Defense Policy 
(Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research In-
stitute, and Oxford University Press, 2006), pp.  1–11; and Toivo 
Martikainen, Katri Pynnöniemi, and Sinikukka Saari, Neighbour­
ing an Unpredictable Rus sia: Implications for Finland (Helsinki, 
Finland: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, October 2016) 
(www . fiia . fi / en / publication / 629 / neighbouring _ an _ unpredictable 
_ russia).
7. Carl Bergovist, “Determined by History: Why Sweden and 
Finland  Will Not Be More Than NATO Partners,” War on the Rocks, 
July  13, 2016 (https:// warontherocks . com / 2016 / 07 / determined - by 
- history - why - sweden - and - finland - will - not - be - more - than - nato 
- partners).
8. Russell Goldman, “Rus sian Violations of Airspace Seen as 
Unwelcome Test by the West,” New York Times, October 6, 2015 
(www . nytimes . com / 2015 / 10 / 07 / world / europe / russian - violations 
- of - airspace - seen - as - unwelcome - test - by - the - west . html).
9. For an exception, see Ingemar Dorfer, The Nordic Nations in 
the New Western Security Regime (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow 
Wilson Center Press, 1997).
10. See, for example, Carl Hvenmark Nilsson, “Sweden’s Evolv-
ing Relationship with NATO and Its Consequences for the Baltic Sea 
Region,” Commentary blog, Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, Washington, D.C., October 7, 2015 (www.csis.org/analysis/
sweden%E2%80%99s-evolving-relationship-nato-and-its-con-
sequences-baltic-sea-region); and Barbara Kunz, “Sweden’s NATO 
Workaround: Swedish Security and Defense Policy against the 
Backdrop of Rus sian Revisionism,” Focus Strategique No. 64 (Paris: 
IFRI, November 2015), pp. 34–37 (www . ifri . org / sites / default / files 
/ atoms / files / fs64kunz _ 0 . pdf).
 Notes to Pages 39–41 127
06-3257-0 bm.indd   127 6/21/17   11:12 PM
11. Gabriela Baczynska, “Wary of Rus sia, Sweden and Finland 
Sit at NATO Top  Table,”  Reuters, July 8, 2016 (www.reuters.com/
article/us-nato-summit-nordics-idUSKCN0ZO1EO); and Richard 
Milne, “Swedes Ponder Joining NATO as Trump Presidency Fo-
cuses Minds,” Financial Times, November 21, 2016 (www . ft . com 
/ content / 8b83d6e2 - aff9 - 11e6 - a37c - f4a01f1b0fa1).
12. Pauli Jarvenpaa, “Finnish White Paper on Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy,” June  2016 (www.icds.ee/blog/article/finnish-white-pa-
per-on-foreign-and-security-policy); and Prime Minister’s Office, 
“Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy,” 
Prime Minister’s Office Publications 9/2016 (Helsinki, Finland, June 
2016), pp. 23–24 (http:// valtioneuvosto . fi / documents / 10616 / 1986338 
/ VNKJ092016+en . pdf / b33c3703 - 29f4 - 4cce - a910 - b05e32b 676b9).
13. Hannah Thoburn, “Border Security in Eastern Eu rope: 
Lessons for NATO and Partners,” Policy Brief No.  46, German 
Marshal Fund of the United States, January  2017, p.  3 (https:// 
hudson . org / research / 13239 - border - security - in - eastern - europe 
- lessons - for - nato - and - partners).
14. See James A. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolu­
tion, War and Peace, 1989– 1992 (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 
1995), p. 667.
15. See, for example, Angela E. Stent, The Limits of Partner­
ship: U.S.­ Russian Relations in the Twenty­ First  Century (Prince-
ton, N.J.: Prince ton University Press, 2014), pp. 103–05.
16. Stent, The Limits of Partnership, pp. 99–110; and “Bucha-
rest Summit Declaration,” Bucharest, Romania, April 3, 2008 (www 
. nato . int / cps / en / natolive / official _ texts _ 8443 . htm).
17. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Hard Choices (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 2014), p. 239.
18. Center for Insights in Survey Research, “Public Opinion 
Survey, Residents of Georgia, March- April  2016,” International 
Republican Institute, April  2016 (www . iri . org / sites / default / files 
/ wysiwyg / georgia _ 2016 . pdf).
19. Neil Melvin and Giulia Prelz Oltramonti, “Managing Con-
flict and Integration in the South Caucasus: A Challenge for the 
Eu ro pean Union,” SIPRI­ CASCADE Policy Brief, November 2015, 
p. 4 (www . cascade - caucasus . eu / en _ GB / 827).
128 Notes to Pages 41–44
06-3257-0 bm.indd   128 6/21/17   11:12 PM
20. See, for example, Maciej Falkowski, “Georgian Drift: The 
Crisis of Georgia’s Way Westwards,” Centre for Eastern Studies, Os-
rodek Studiow Wschodnich, Warsaw, Poland, February 2016 (www.
osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/pw_57_ang_georgian_drift_net.pdf); 
Giorgi Areshidze, “Georgia’s Election Was about More Than Rus sia,” 
National Interest, December  20, 2016 (http://nationalinterest.org/
feature/georgias-election-was-about-more-russia-18799?page=2); 
and Orysia Lutsevych, “How to Finish a Revolution: Civil Society 
and Democracy in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine,” Chatham 
House Briefing Paper, Chatham House, London, January 2013 (www 
. chathamhouse . org / publications / papers / view / 188407).
21. See Paul Robert Magocsi, A History of Ukraine (University 
of Toronto Press, 1996); and Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A History 
(University of Toronto Press, 1988).
22. See Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Eu rope between Hitler 
and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010) for an account of the 
tragic 1930s and 1940s.
23. Fiona Hill and Steven Pifer, “Dealing with a Simmering 
Ukraine- Russia Conflict,” Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 
October  2016 (www . brookings . edu / research / dealing - with - a - simm 
ering - ukraine - russia - conflict).
24. See also, for example, Adrian Karatnycky, “Ukraine: Into 
and Out of the Abyss,” Politico, February 17, 2016 (www.politico.eu/
article/ukraine-heads-into-the-abyss-petro-poroshenko-arseniy-
yatsenyuk); and Wojciech Kononczuk, “Oligarchs  after the Maidan: 
The Old System in a ‘New’ Ukraine,” Centre for Eastern Studies, 
Osrodek Studiow Wschodnich, Warsaw, Poland, February 16, 2015 
(www . osw . waw . pl / sites / default / files / commentary _ 162 _ 0 . pdf).
25. Clifford G. Gaddy, The Price of the Past: Rus sia’s Strug gle 
with the Legacy of a Militarized Economy (Brookings Institution 
Press, 1996); see also International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
Strategic Survey 2016: The Annual Review of World Affairs (Ox-
fordshire,  England: Routledge, 2016), p. 216.
26. Pifer, The Ea gle and the Trident (Brookings Institution 
Press, 2017), pp. 1–20.
27. Mikhail Alexseev, “The Tale of the Three Legitimacies: The 
Shifting Tone and Enduring Substance of Moscow’s Ukraine 
 Notes to Pages 44–47 129
06-3257-0 bm.indd   129 6/21/17   11:12 PM
Policy,” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 431, June 2016 (www 
. ponarseurasia . org / memo / tale - three - legitimacies - shifting - tone 
- and - enduring - substance - moscows - ukraine - policy).
28. See International Crisis Group, “Ukraine: Military Dead-
lock, Po liti cal Crisis,” Briefing No. 85, Brussels, Belgium, December 
2016, pp. 5–7 (www . crisisgroup . org / Europe - central - asia / eastern 
- europe / Ukraine / b85 - ukraine - military - deadlock - political - crisis); 
David J. Kramer, “The Ukraine Invasion: One Year  Later,” Journal of 
World Affairs, March/April  2015 (www . worldaffairsjournal . org 
/ article / ukraine - invasion - one - year - later); and Diane Francis, 
“Ukraine’s Survivor: Yulia Tymoshenko,” National Post, October 7, 
2016 (http:// news . nationalpost . com / full - comment / diane - francis 
- ukraines - survivor - yulia - tymoshenko).
29. Center for Insights in Survey Research, “Public Opinion Sur-
vey, Residents of Ukraine, May- June 2016,” International Republican 
Institute, June  2016 (www . iri . org / sites / default / files / wysiwyg / 2016 
- 07 - 08 _ ukraine _ poll _ show _ skepticism _ glimmer _ of _ hope . pdf).
30. Fiona Hill and Steven Pifer, “Dealing with a Simmering 
Ukraine- Russia Conflict,” in Brookings Big Ideas for Amer i ca, edited 
by Michael  E. O’Hanlon (Brookings Institution Press, 2017), 
pp. 349–56; and Daniel Szeligowski, “NATO- Ukraine Cooperation 
 after the Warsaw Summit,” PISM Bulletin No. 49, Polish Institute of 
International Affairs, Warsaw, Poland, August 4, 2016 (www . pism . pl 
/ files / ? id _ plik​=​22273).
31. Serhii Plokhy, “The ‘New Eastern Eu rope’: What to Do with 
the Histories of Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova?” East Eu ro pean 
Politics and Socie ties vol. 25, no. 4 (November 2011), pp. 763–69; see 
also Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2016 (www.
cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/md.html and 
www . cia . gov / library / publications / the - world - factbook / geos / bo 
. html).
32. BBC, “Belarus Country Profile,” June 24, 2016 (www . bbc 
. com / news / world - europe - 17941131).
33. See Sonia Liang, “A View from Moldova: Moldova’s Rap-
prochement with NATO,” NATO Association of Canada, Toronto, 
Canada, May  4, 2016 (http:// natoassociation . ca / a - view - from 
- moldova).
130 Notes to Pages 47–49
06-3257-0 bm.indd   130 6/21/17   11:12 PM
34. Orysia Lutsevych, “How to Finish a Revolution: Civil Soci-
ety and Democracy in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine,” Chatham 
House Briefing Paper, Chatham House, London, January  2013 
(www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/188407); Inter-
national Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 2016: The 
Annual Review of World Affairs (Oxfordshire,  England: Routledge, 
2016), p.  216; and John Lowenhardt, Ronald  J. Hill, and Margot 
Light, “A Wider Eu rope: The View from Minsk and Chisinau,” 
International Affairs, vol. 77, no. 3 (2001), pp. 605–20.
35. Center for Insights in Survey Research, “Public Opinion 
Survey, Residents of Moldova, September  2016,” International 
Republican Institute, April  2016 (www . iri . org / sites / default / files 
/ wysiwyg / iri _ moldova _ september _ 2016 _ moldova _ poll _ for 
_ review . pdf).
36. Alexander Clapp, “Prisoner of the Caucasus,” National 
Interest, no. 148 (March/April 2017), pp. 43–53.
37. See GlobalSecurity . org, “Collective Security Treaty Organ-
ization,” March 2014 (www . globalsecurity . org / military / world / int 
/ csto . htm).
38. See BBC, “Armenia Country Profile,” June 2, 2016 (www.bbc.
com/news/world-europe-17398605); and International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 2016: The Annual Review of World 
Affairs (Oxfordshire,  England: Routledge, 2016), pp. 215–16.
39. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2016 
(www . cia . gov / library / publications / the - world - factbook).
40. BBC, “Azerbaijan Country Profile,” October  16, 2016 
(www . bbc . com / news / world - europe - 17043424).
41. Yegor Gaidar, Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern 
Rus sia (Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 74.
42. International Crisis Group, “Nagorno- Karabakh: New 
Opening, or More Peril?” Report No.  239, July  4, 2016 (www 
. crisisgroup . org / europe - central - asia / caucasus / azerbaijan/nago 
rno - karabakh - new - opening - or - more - peril).
43. Laurence Broers, “The Nagorny Karabakh Conflict: De-
faulting to War,” Chatham House, London, July 2016, p. 2 (www 
. chathamhouse . org / publication / nagorny - karabakh - conf lict 
- defaulting - war).
 Notes to Pages 49–52 131
06-3257-0 bm.indd   131 6/21/17   11:12 PM
44. John Pike, “Armenia— Relations with Rus sia,” GlobalSecu-
rity . org, 2017 (www . globalsecurity . org / military / world / armenia 
/ foreign - relations - ru . htm).
45. See Melvin and Oltramonti, “Managing Conflict and Inte-
gration in the South Caucasus,” p. 7.
46. Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugo slavia: The Third Balkan 
War (New York: Penguin Books, 1992); and Susan L. Woodward, 
Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution  after the Cold War (Brook-
ings Institution Press, 1995), pp. 21–45.
47. Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: 
NATO’s War to Save Kosovo (Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 
p. 176.
48. Euractiv and Agence France- Presse, “NATO and Rus sia’s 
Influence Dominate Montenegro Vote,” Euractiv . com, Octo-
ber 14, 2016 (www . euractiv . com / section / enlargement / news / nato 
- and - russias - influence - dominate - montenegro - vote).
49. Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History (New York: Harp-
erCollins, 1999), pp. 58–80; and Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and 
Revenge (Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 4–8.
50. Neil Clark, “Milosevic Exonerated, as the NATO War 
Machine Moves On,” Rus sia  Today, August 2, 2016 (www . rt . com 
/ op - edge / 354362 - slobodan - milosevic - exonerated - us - nato).
51. International Crisis Group, “Divided Cyprus: Coming to 
Terms on an Imperfect Real ity,” Eu rope Report No. 229, Brussels, 
Belgium, March  2014 (www . crisisgroup . org / europe - central - asia 
/ western - europemediterranean / cyprus / divided - cyprus - coming 
- terms - imperfect - reality).
52. See Agnieszka Bienczyk- Missala, “Poland’s Foreign and 
Security Policy: Main Directions,” UNISCI Journal, no.  40 
 (January  2016), pp.  101–18 (www.ucm.es/data/cont/media/www/
pag-78913/UNISCIDP40-6ABienczyk-Missala1.pdf); Jerzy  M. 
Nowak, “Poland’s Security Policy in an Unstable World,” Nacao e 
Defesa, no.  125-4 (Spring 2010), pp.  33–48 (https://comum.rcaap.
pt/bitstream/10400.26/3071/1/NeD125_JerzyMNowak.pdf); Mar-
garita Seselgyte, “Security Culture of Lithuania,” Lithuanian Policy 
Review, 2015, pp. 23–40 (http://lfpr.lt/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/
LFPR-24-Seselgyte.pdf); Simon Schofield, interview with Linda 
132 Notes to Pages 53–58
06-3257-0 bm.indd   132 6/21/17   11:12 PM
Eicheler, vice president of YEPP, “The Rus sian Resurgence: A View 
from Estonia,” Security and Defence, issue 2, no.  1 (April  2014) 
(www.hscentre.org/russia-and-eurasia/russian-resurgence-view-
estonia); and Luke Coffey, “The Baltic States: Why the United States 
Must Strengthen Security Cooperation,” Heritage Foundation 
Backgrounder, no.  2851 (October  2013) (http:// thf _ media . s3 
. amazonaws . com / 2013 / pdf / BG2851 . pdf).
53. Ali Tuygan and Kemal Kirisci, “U.S.- Turkey Relations  under 
Trump May Hinge More on Turkey Than on Trump,” Order from 
Chaos blog, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., November 30, 
2016 (www . brookings . edu / blog / order - from - chaos / 2016 / 11 / 30 / u - s 
- turkey - relations - under - trump - may - hinge - more - on - turkey - than 
- on - trump); and Omer Taspinar, “Foreign Policy  after the Failed 
Coup: The Rise of Turkish Gaullism,” Lobelog Foreign Policy, Sep-
tember 2, 2016 (https:// lobelog . com / foreign - policy - after - the - failed 
- coup - the - rise - of - turkish - gaullism).
54. Katie Simmons, Bruce Stokes, and Jacob Poushter, “NATO 
Publics Blame Rus sia for Ukrainian Crisis, but Reluctant to Provide 
Military Aid,” Pew Charitable Trusts, Washington, D.C., June 10, 
2015 (www . pewglobal . org / 2015 / 06 / 10 / nato - publics - blame - russia 
- for - ukrainian - crisis - but - reluctant - to - provide - military - aid); see 
also Joshua Shifrinson, “Time to Consolidate NATO?” Washington 
Quarterly, vol. 40, no. 1 (Spring 2017), pp. 109–123.
55. William  A. Galston, “How the President Can Reassure 
Eu rope,” Wall Street Journal, February  21, 2017 (www . wsj . com 
/ articles / how - the - president - can - reassure - europe - 1487722974).
56. Danielle Cuddington, “Support for NATO Is Widespread 
Among Member Nations,” Pew Research Center, July  6, 2016 
(www . pewresearch . org / fact - tank / 2016 / 07 / 06 / support - for - nato - is 
- widespread - among - member - nations).
C H A P T E R  T H R E E
1. Not every one agrees that disputes over  future security ar-
chitectures are at the heart of the current prob lems in U.S.- Russia 
relations, but many do. See, for example, International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 2016 (Abingdon,  England: 
Routledge, 2016), p. 211.
 Notes to Pages 58–65 133
06-3257-0 bm.indd   133 6/21/17   11:12 PM
2. Arianna Rowberry, “The Vienna Document, the Open Skies 
Treaty, and the Ukraine Crisis,” Up Front blog, April 10, 2014 (www 
. brookings . edu / blog / up - front / 2014 / 04 / 10 / the - vienna - document 
- the - open - skies - treaty - and - the - ukraine - crisis); Ralph  S. Clem, “Is 
This the Right Time to Relieve the Building Pressure in the Baltics?,” 
War on the Rocks, December 20, 2016 (https:// warontherocks 
. com / 2016 / 12 / is - this - the - right - time - to - relieve - the - building 
- pressure - in - the - baltics); Bruce Jones, “Lithuania Sheds Light on 
‘Information Battlefield’ Facing NATO Troops in Baltic,” Jane’s De­
fence Weekly, March 22, 2017, p. 10; Joanna Hyndle- Hussein, “The 
Baltic States on the Conflict in Ukraine,” OSW Commentary, Centre 
for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, Poland, January 2015 (www . osw . waw 
. pl / sites / default / files / commentary _ 158 . pdf); Michael  R. Gordon, 
“Rus sia Deploys Missile, Violating Treaty and Challenging Trump,” 
New York Times, February 14, 2017; and Ash Car ter, “A Strong and 
Balanced Approach to Rus sia,” Survival, vol. 58, no. 6 (Decem-
ber 2016– January 2017), pp. 52–55.
3. On such concerns, see the Federal Government of Germany, 
“White Paper 2016 on German Security Policy and the  Future 
of the Bundeswehr,” Berlin, 2016, pp.  38, 65 (www . gmfus . org 
/ publications / white - paper - german - security - policy - and - future 
- bundeswehr).
4. On why even such a discreet conventional operation might 
entail nuclear risks, see the discussion of “the threat that leaves 
something to chance” in Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Con­
flict (Harvard University Press, 1960); Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of 
Safety: Organ izations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Prince ton 
University Press, 1993); Barry  R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: 
Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Cornell University Press, 
1991); and Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control: Rede­
fining the Nuclear Threat (Brookings Institution Press, 1985).
5. On the nuclear dimension, see, for example, Alexey 
 Arbatov, “The Hidden Side of the U.S.- Russian Strategic Confronta-
tion,” Arms Control  Today, vol. 46, no.  7 (September  2016), 
pp. 20–24.
6. Matthew Bunn, Martin B. Malin, Nickolas Roth, and Wil-
liam H. Tobey, Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Continuous Improve­
134 Notes to Pages 66–68
06-3257-0 bm.indd   134 6/21/17   11:12 PM
ment or Dangerous Decline? (Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy 
School, 2016), pp. i– xi.
7. Marta Carlsson and Mike Winnerstig, Irreconcilable Differ­
ences: Analysing the Deteriorating Russian­ U.S. Relations (Stock-
holm, Sweden: FOI, 2016).
8. Samuel Charap and Timothy J. Colton, Every one Loses: The 
Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post– Soviet Eurasia 
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2017); on 
Ukraine and Georgia, see Kimberly Marten, Reducing Tensions 
between Russia and NATO (New York: Council on Foreign Rela-
tions, 2017), p. 12.
9. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Eu rope, “Hel-
sinki Final Act,” Helsinki, Finland, August  1975 (www . osce . org 
/ helsinki - final - act ? download​=​true).
10. Robert Kagan, “The Twilight of the Liberal World Order,” 
in Brookings Big Ideas for Amer i ca, edited by Michael E. O’Hanlon 
(Brookings Institution Press, 2017).
11.  There are six countries within the EU that are not in NATO: 
Finland, Sweden, Austria, Malta, Cyprus, and Ireland.  There are, 
likewise, six countries within NATO and not the EU: Norway, Al-
bania, Iceland, Turkey, the United States, and Canada, plus now 
Montenegro. Other wise, each organ ization has the same twenty- 
two other members (including, for the moment, the United King-
dom, plus Spain, Portugal, France, the Netherlands, Denmark, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, Italy, Poland, the Czech Re-
public, Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Greece, Croatia, and Slovenia).
12. See Matthew Rojansky, “The Ukraine- Russia Conflict: A 
Way Forward,” in A New Direction in U.S.­ Russia Relations? Amer­
i ca’s Challenges and Opportunities in Dealing with Rus sia, edited by 
Paul J. Saunders (Washington, D.C.: Center for the National Inter-
est, 2017), p. 31.
13. On this general subject, see, for example, Ernst  B. 
Haas,  Beyond the Nation­ State: Functionalism and Interna­
tional Organ ization (Stanford University Press, 1964); Hedley 
Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics 
(Columbia University Press, 1977); and Strobe Talbott, The 
 Notes to Pages 68–72 135
06-3257-0 bm.indd   135 6/21/17   11:12 PM
 Great Experiment: The Story of Ancient Empires, Modern States, 
and the Quest for a Global Nation (New York: Simon and Schus-
ter, 2008).
14. For an argument that seeks to rethink many existing 
American security obligations, see Barry  R. Posen, Restraint: A 
New Foundation for U.S.  Grand Strategy (Cornell University Press, 
2014).
15. Heather A. Conley and Kathleen H. Hicks, “ There Is No 
Alternative to Sovereign Choice,” Commentary, Center for Strate-
gic and International Studies, April  27, 2017 (www . csis . org 
/ analysis / there - no - alternative - soverign - choice / ? block3).
16. Barton Gellman, Contending with Kennan:  Toward a Phi­
losophy of American Power (New York: Praeger, 1984), p. 40.
17. See, for example, Richard  H. Ullman, Securing Eu rope 
(Prince ton University Press, 1991), pp. 53–82; Ashton B. Car ter, 
William  J. Perry, and John  D. Steinbruner, A New Concept of 
Cooperative Security (Brookings Institution Press, 1992); and Rob-
ert J. Art, “Creating a Disaster: NATO’s Open Door Policy,” Po liti­
cal Science Quarterly, vol. 113, no. 3 (Autumn 1998), pp. 383–403 
(www . jstor . org / stable / 2658073 ? seq​=​1#page _ scan _ tab _ contents). 
For another recent idea on a  future Eu ro pean security architecture, 
see Simon Saradzhyan, “Eu ro pean Security Reform Holds Key to 
Breaking Stalemate in Ukraine,” Rus sia  Matters, Harvard Univer-
sity, October  27, 2016 (www . russiamatters . org / analysis / european 
- security - reform - holds - key - breaking - stalemate - ukraine).
18. See, for example, Michael  E. O’Hanlon, The $650 Billion 
Bargain: The Case for Modest Growth in Amer i ca’s Defense Bud get 
(Brookings Institution Press, 2016), p. 15. See also, Colonel Lars S. 
Lervik, Norwegian Army, “Deterrence and Engagement,” U.S. 
Army War College Paper, Carlisle, PA, 2017, p. 23.
19. Strobe Talbott, “Why NATO Should Grow,” New York Re­
view of Books, August 10, 1995 (www . nybooks . com / articles / 1995 
/ 08 / 10 / why - nato - should - grow).
20. See Rachel Epstein, “Why NATO Enlargement Was a Good 
Idea,” Po liti cal Vio lence at a Glance, University of Denver, Denver, 
Colorado, September 13, 2016 (https:// politicalviolenceataglance 
. org / 2016 / 09 / 13 / why - nato - enlargement - was - a - good - idea).
136 Notes to Pages 72–76
06-3257-0 bm.indd   136 6/21/17   11:12 PM
21. See, for example, Henry Kissinger, World Order (New York: 
Penguin Press, 2014), pp.  86–95; and Strobe Talbott, The Rus sia 
Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy (New York: Random 
House, 2002), pp. 92–101.
22. James Kirchick, The End of Eu rope: Dictators, Demagogues, 
and the Coming Dark Age (University Press, 2017), p. 219.
23. On Bush and Putin, see, for example, Ivo H. Daalder and 
James M. Lindsay, Amer i ca Unbound: The Bush Revolution in For­
eign Policy (Brookings Institution Press, 2003), p. 64.
24. See “U.S.- Russia Relations: Beyond the Crisis in Ukraine,” 
Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., October 20, 2014 (www 
. brookings . edu / events / u - s - russia - relations - beyond - the - crisis - in 
- ukraine).
25. See, for example, Donald Kagan, On the Origins of War 
and the Preservation of Peace (New York: Anchor Books, 1995); 
and John  J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of  Great Power Politics 
(New York: W. W. Norton and Com pany, 2001).
26. Richard K. Betts, American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and 
Dilemmas in National Security (Columbia University Press, 2012), 
p. 194.
27. See, for example, John M. Owen, Liberal Peace, Liberal War: 
American Politics and International Security (Cornell University 
Press, 1997).
28. Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learn­
ing Curve (Washington, D.C.: Car ne gie Endowment for Interna-
tional Peace, 1999), p. 15.
29. Jaroslaw Adamowski, “NATO Agrees on E. Eu ro pean Ro-
tational Troops at Warsaw Summit,” Defense News, July 8, 2016 
(www . defensenews . com / story / defense / omr / roadtowarsaw / 2016 
/ 07 / 08 / nato - agrees - eastern - european - rotational - battalions 
- warsaw - summit / 86863516).
30. General Sir Richard Shirreff, War with Rus sia: An Urgent 
Warning from Se nior Military Command (New York: Quercus, 
2016), pp. xiii– xxix; and North Atlantic Treaty Organ ization, 
“Founding Act—on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security 
between NATO and the Rus sian Federation,” Paris, May 27, 1997 
(www . nato . int / cps / en / natohq / official _ texts _ 25468 . htm).
 Notes to Pages 77–80 137
06-3257-0 bm.indd   137 6/21/17   11:12 PM
31. Jackson Diehl, “Risking His Life to Hold Putin Account-
able,” Washington Post, March 20, 2017.
32. See Robert Kagan, “Backing into World War III,” Foreign-
Policy . com, February  6, 2017 (http:// foreignpolicy . com / 2017 / 02 
/ 06 / backing - into - world - war - iii - russia - china - trump - obama).
33. For a very good discussion of this perspective, see Ray-
mond L. Garthoff, A Journey through the Cold War: A Memoir of 
Containment and Coexistence (Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 
p. 377.
34. See James A. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolu­
tion, War and Peace, 1989– 1992 (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 
1995), pp. 230–59.
35. Steven Pifer, “Did NATO Promise Not to Enlarge? Gor-
bachev Says No,” Up Front blog, Brookings Institution, Wash-
ington, D.C., November  6, 2014 (www . brookings . edu / blog / up 
- front / 2014 / 11 / 06 / did - nato - promise - not - to - enlarge - gorbachev 
- says - no).
36. William J. Perry, My Journey at the Nuclear Brink (Stan-
ford University, 2015), pp. 127–29.
37. Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy, Mr. Putin: Operative in 
the Kremlin, new and expanded ed. (Brookings Institution Press, 
2015), p. 308.
38. Pifer, “Did NATO Promise Not to Enlarge?”; and Andrei 
Kozyrev, “Partnership or Cold Peace?” Foreign Policy (Summer 
1995), pp. 3–14 (www . jstor . org / stable / 1149002).
39. See Robert Kagan, The World Amer i ca Made (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 2012).
40. A classic discussion of this frequent contradiction between 
American ideals and American practice is Reinhold Niebuhr, The 
Irony of American History (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1952).
41. Angela E. Stent, The Limits of Partnership: U.S.­ Russian Re­
lations in the Twenty­ First  Century (Prince ton University Press, 
2014), pp. 167–68, 264–65.
42. Stephen R. Covington, “The Culture of Strategic Thought 
 Behind Rus sia’s Modern Approaches to Warfare,” Belfer Center 
Paper, Harvard Kennedy School, October  2016; and Eugene 
138 Notes to Pages 80–82
06-3257-0 bm.indd   138 6/21/17   11:12 PM
Rumer, “Rus sia and the Security of Eu rope,” Car ne gie Endow-
ment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., June 2016, p. 1 
(http:// carnegieendowment . org / 2016 / 06 / 30 / russia - and - security 
- of - europe - pub - 63990).
43. Anne Witkowsky, Sherman Garnett, and Jeff MacCausland, 
“Salvaging the Conventional Armed Forces in Eu rope Treaty Re-
gime: Options for Washington,” Brookings Arms Control Paper Se-
ries, Washington, D.C., March 2010, p. 8 (www . brookings . edu / wp 
- content / uploads / 2016 / 06 / 03 _ armed _ forces _ europe _ treaty . pdf).
44. Alexander Velez- Green, “The Unsettling View from Moscow: 
Rus sia’s Strategic Debate on a Doctrine of Pre- emption,” Center for a 
New American Security, Washington, D.C., April 2017 (https:// www 
. cnas . org / publications / reports / the - unsettling - view - from - moscow).
45. See Clifford G. Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes, Rus sia’s Virtual 
Economy (Brookings Institution Press, 2002); and Fiona Hill and 
Clifford Gaddy, The Siberian Curse: How Communist Planners Left 
Rus sia Out in the Cold (Brookings Institution Press, 2003).
46. A classic is Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Poli­
tics (Cambridge University Press, 1981).
47. Witkowsky and others, Salvaging the Conventional Armed 
Forces in Eu rope Treaty Regime,” p. 2.
48. See, for example, “Moldova: No Support for NATO Involve-
ment in Transnistria Dispute,” EurasiaNet . org, July 28, 2016 (www 
. eurasianet . org / node / 79901).
49. George  F. Kennan, “A Fateful Error,” New York Times, 
February 5, 1997 (www . netwargamingitalia . net / forum / resources 
/ george - f - kennan - a - fateful - error . 35).
50. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Cornell Univer-
sity Press, 1987); Geoffrey Blainey, The  Causes of War (New York: 
 Free Press, 1973), pp. 245–49.
51. On this agenda, see, for example, Alexander Mattelaer, “The 
NATO Warsaw Summit: How to Strengthen Alliance Cohesion,” 
Strategic Forum No. 296 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National 
Strategic Studies, National Defense University, June  2016) (ndu-
press . ndu . edu); see also Karl- Heinz Kamp, “Why NATO Needs a 
New Strategic Concept,” NATO Defense College Report (Rome, 
Italy: NATO Defense College, 2016).
 Notes to Pages 82–87 139
06-3257-0 bm.indd   139 6/21/17   11:12 PM
52. See, for example, David Sattar, “The Character of Rus sia,” 
Montreal Review, January  2012 (www . themontrealreview . com 
/ 2009 / The - Character - of - Russia - by - David - Satter . php).
C H A P T E R  F O U R
1. Des Browne, Igor S. Ivanov, and Sam Nunn, “Securing the 
Euro- Atlantic Community,” Proj ect Syndicate, February  3, 2015 
(www . project - syndicate . org / commentary / ukraine - russia - crisis 
- european - leadership - by - des - browne- et- al-2015-02).
2. For a related view, see Terry Atlas, “Brzezinski Sees Finlan-
dization of Ukraine as Deal Maker,” Bloomberg . com, April  12, 
2014 (www . bloomberg . com / news / articles / 2014 - 04 - 11 / brzezinski 
- sees - finlandization - of - ukraine - as - deal - maker); and Henry  A. 
Kissinger, “To  Settle the Ukraine Crisis, Start at the End,” Wash­
ington Post, March 5, 2014.
3. Laurence Norman and Maarten van Tartwijk, “Dutch Pre-
mier’s Demands Cast New Doubt over EU- Ukraine Pact,” Wall 
Street Journal, October 20, 2016.
4. For a good concise history of the Eu ro pean Union, which 
highlights that security and foreign policy have typically not been 
the central issues driving its creation or operations, see William I. 
Hitchcock, The Strug gle for Eu rope: The Turbulent History of a 
Divided Continent, 1945–2002 (New York: Doubleday, 2002), 
pp. 435– 64; and Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Eu rope since 
1945 (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), pp. 732– 36.
5. Eu ro pean Union External Action, “Shaping of a Common 
Security and Defense Policy,” Brussels, Belgium, July 2016 (https:// 
eeas . europa . eu / topics / nuclear - safety / 5388 / shaping - of - a - common 
- security - and - defence - policy - _ en). By contrast, Article V of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organ ization reads: “The Parties agree that 
an armed attack against one or more of them in Eu rope or North 
Amer i ca  shall be considered an attack against them all and conse-
quently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of 
them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self- 
defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Na-
tions,  will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forth-
with, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such 
140 Notes to Pages 88–92
06-3257-0 bm.indd   140 6/21/17   11:12 PM
action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to 
restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” See 
North Atlantic Treaty Organ ization, “The North Atlantic Treaty,” 
Washington, D.C., April  4, 1949 (www . nato . int / cps / en / natohq 
/ official _ texts _ 17120 . htm).
6. The Vienna- based Organ ization for Security and Coopera-
tion in Eu rope is yet another organ ization with a number of 
impor tant security missions but no standing military capability, a 
$150 million annual bud get, and an inclusive membership. Thus, 
 there should be no issue in sustaining it and including as many 
Eu ro pean states as wish to participate in its dialogues, oversight 
activities for certain purposes such as arms control or confidence 
building, and occasional small field missions with a combined 
personnel tally today of some 3,000 across seventeen countries. 
See Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Organ ization for Security and Co-
operation in Eu rope,” Washington, D.C., April 2015 (www . nti . org 
/ learn / treaties - and - regimes / organization - cooperation - and 
- security - europe - osce); and Organ ization for Security and Coop-
eration in Eu rope, “What Is the OSCE?” Vienna, Austria, March 2016 
(www . osce . org / whatistheosce / factsheet ? download​=​true).
7. Nicole Gnesotto, “Strategie de securite de l’UE: pourquoi et 
comment renouveler notre approche,” Les Carnets du Caps, no. 23 
(Summer- Autumn 2016), pp. 67– 82.
8. North Atlantic Treaty Organ ization, “Membership Action 
Plan (MAP),” Brussels, Belgium, December 4, 2015 (www . nato . int 
/ cps / en / natohq / topics _ 37356 . htm).
9. For a related view, see comments of General Sir Richard 
Shirreff, former deputy supreme allied commander/Eu rope, at the 
Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., October 19, 2016 (www 
. brookings . edu).
10. Julianne Smith and Adam Twardowski, “The  Future of U.S.- 
Russia Relations,” Center for a New American Security, Washing-
ton, D.C., January  2017, p.  8 (www . cnas . org / publications / reports 
/ the - future - of - u - s - russia - relations).
11. See, for example, Taras Kuzio, “Why Vladimir Putin Is 
Angry with the West: Understanding the  Drivers of Rus sia’s 
 Information, Cyber and Hybrid War,” Security Policy Working 
 Notes to Pages 92–98 141
06-3257-0 bm.indd   141 6/21/17   11:12 PM
Paper No.  7/2017, Federal Acad emy for Security Policy, Berlin, 
Germany, February  2017 (www . baks . bund . de / sites / baks010 / files 
/ working _ paper _ 2017 _ 07 . pdf).
12. Ian Kearns, Lukasz Kulesa, and Thomas Frear, “Preparing 
for the Worst: Are Rus sian and NATO Military Exercises Making 
War in Eu rope More Likely?,” Eu ro pean Leadership Network, 
London, August  12, 2015 (www . europeanleadershipnetwork . org 
/ preparing - for - the - worst - are - russian - and - nato - military 
- exercises - making - war - in - europe - more - likely _ 2997 . html).
13. Eugene Rumer, Richard Sokolsky, and Andrew  S. Weiss, 
“Trump and Rus sia: The Right Way to Manage Relations,” Foreign 
Affairs, vol. 96, no. 2 (March/April 2017), p. 16.
14. See Michael O’Hanlon and Jeremy Shapiro, “Crafting a Win- 
Win- Win for Rus sia, Ukraine, and the West,” Washington Post, De-
cember  7, 2015 (http:// www . brookings . edu / research / opinions / 2014 
/ 12 / 07 - russia - ukraine - ohanlon - shapiro).
15. For a compelling argument about the significance of Rus-
sian efforts to interfere with Western democracy, see address of 
Senator Christopher Coons, Brookings Institution, Washington, 
D.C., April  6, 2017 (www . brookings . edu / blog / brookings - now 
/ 2017 / 04 / 06 / putin - undeclared - war - on - international - order).
16. For an argument about the importance of resoluteness, see 
Derek Chollet, Eric S. Edelman, Michèle Flournoy, Stephen J. Had-
ley, Martin S. Indyk, Bruce Jones, Robert Kagan, Kristen Silverberg, 
Jake  Sullivan, and Thomas Wright, “Building Situations of Strength: 
A National Security Strategy for the United States” (Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings, 2017) (www . brookings . edu / research / building 
- situations - of - strength).
17. See, for example, Philip M. Breedlove, “NATO’s Next Act: 
How to  Handle Rus sia and Other Threats,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 95, 
no. 4 (July/August 2016), p. 104.
18. See Robert Beckhusen, “The Only Way to Beat Rus sia in a 
War over the Baltics,” National Interest blog, February  6, 2017 
(http:// nationalinterest . org / blog / the - buzz / the - only - way - beat 
- russia - war - over - the - baltics - 19336).
19. See “A Conversation with Commandant of the U.S. Coast 
Guard Admiral Paul F. Zukunft,” Brookings Institution, Washing-
142 Notes to Pages 99–103
06-3257-0 bm.indd   142 6/21/17   11:12 PM
ton, D.C., November  29, 2016 (www.brookings.edu/events/a -con-
versation -with-commandant-of-the-u-s-coast-guard-admiral-
paul-f-zukunft); and Niklas Granholm, Marta Carlsson, and Kaan 
Korkmaz, The Big Three in the Arctic: China’s, Rus sia’s and the 
United States’ Strategies for the New Arctic (Stockholm, Sweden: 
FOI, 2016).
20. Defense Science Board, “Task Force on Cyberdeterrence,” 
Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., February 2017 (www 
. acq . osd . mil / dsb / reports / 2010s / DSB - CyberDeterrenceReport _ 02 
- 28 - 17 _ Final . pdf).
21. North Atlantic Treaty Organ ization, “Euro- Atlantic Part-
nership Council,” Brussels, Belgium, April 7, 2016 (www . nato . int 
/ cps / en / natolive / topics _ 49276 . htm).
22. See U.S. Government, “ForeignAssistance . gov,” Washing-
ton, D.C., 2016 (http:// beta . foreignassistance . gov / explore#).
23. U . S. Army Eu rope, “Army Strong, Strong Eu rope! Exer-
cise Rapid Trident,” U.S. Army Eu rope Headquarters, Weisbaden, 
Germany, 2016 (www . eur . army . mil / RapidTrident).
24. North Atlantic Treaty Organ ization, “Relations with Geor-
gia,” Brussels, Belgium, June 7, 2016 (www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
topics_38988.htm); and Ian S. Livingston, Heather L. Messera, 
and Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Af ghan i stan Index,” Brookings In-
stitution, Washington, D.C., February 28, 2011 (www . brookings 
. edu / wp - content / uploads / 2016 / 07 / index20110228 . pdf).
25. Stefan Forss and Pekka Holopainen, Breaking the Nordic De­
fense Deadlock (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 
War College, 2015), pp.  57– 58; and North Atlantic Treaty Organ-
ization, “Key NATO and Allied Exercises,” Brussels, Belgium, 
July 2016 (www . nato . int / nato _ static _ fl2014 / assets / pdf / pdf _ 2016 _ 07 
/ 20160704 _ 1607 - factsheet _ exercises _ en . pdf).
26. For background, see Eoin Micheal McNamara, “Securing 
the Nordic- Baltic Region,” NATO Review, 2016 (www . nato . int 
/ docu / Review / 2016 / Also - in - 2016 / security - baltic - defense - nato 
/ EN / index . htm).
27. Statista, “U.S. Arms Exports, 2015, by Country,” Hamburg, 
Germany, 2016 (www . statista . com / statistics / 248552 / us - arms 
- exports - by - country).
 Notes to Pages 104–108 143
06-3257-0 bm.indd   143 6/21/17   11:12 PM
28. See, for example, F. Stephen Larrabee and Peter A. Wilson, 
“NATO Needs a Southern Strategy,” National Interest blog, Janu-
ary  27, 2014 (http:// nationalinterest . org / commentary / nato - needs 
- southern - strategy - 9769 ? page​=​3).
29. On the Syria issue, see, for example, Michael O’Hanlon, “A 
Trump Strategy to End Syria’s Nightmare,” Wall Street Journal, 
December  15, 2016 (www . wsj . com / articles / a - trump - strategy - to 
- end - syrias - nightmare - 1481847575); and Michael O’Hanlon, “De-
constructing Syria: A Confederal Approach,” Washington, D.C., 
Brookings Institution, January 2017 (www . brookings . edu / research 
/ deconstructing - syria - a - confederal - approach).
30. Richard C. Bush, Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the 
Taiwan Strait (Brookings Institution Press, 2005), pp. 23–24.
31. Department of State, “Key Facts about the Open Skies 
Treaty,” Washington, D.C., June 2016 (www . state . gov / t / avc / rls / 2016 
/ 258061 . htm); Daryl Kimball, “The Conventional Armed Forces in 
Eu rope (CFE) Treaty and the Adapted CFE Treaty at a Glance,” 
Arms Control Association, Washington, D.C., August 2012 (www 
. armscontrol . org / factsheet / cfe).
32. David  M. Herszenhorn, “Fears Rise as Rus sian Military 
Units Pour into Ukraine,” New York Times, November 12, 2014 
(www . nytimes . com / 2014 / 11 / 13 / world / europe / ukraine - russia 
- military - border - nato . html); and Mark Urban, “How Many Rus-
sians Are Fighting in Ukraine?,” BBC, March 10, 2015 (www . bbc 
. com / news / world - europe - 31794523).
33. Joe Gould, “Electronic Warfare: What U.S. Army Can Learn 
from Ukraine,” Defense News, August 2, 2015 (www . defensenews 
. com / story / defense / policy - budget / warfare / 2015 / 08 / 02 / us - army 
- ukraine - russia - electronic - warfare / 30913397).
34. Colonel J. B. Vowell, “Maskirovka: From Rus sia, with De-
ception,” RealClear Defense, October 31, 2016 (www . realcleardefense 
. com / articles / 2016 / 10 / 31 / maskirovka _ from _ russia  _ with 
_ deception _ 110282 . html ? utm _ source​=​RealClearDefense+Mornin
g+Recon&utm _ campaign​=​2db8be085d - EMAIL _ CAMPAIGN 
_ 2016 _ 10 _ 30&utm _ medium​=​email&utm _ term​=​0 _ 694f73a8dc 
- 2db8be085d - 81835773#!).
144 Notes to Pages 109–113
06-3257-0 bm.indd   144 6/21/17   11:12 PM
35. Lucien Kleinjan, “Conventional Arms Control in Eu rope: 
Decline, Disarray, and the Need for Reinvention,” Arms Control 
 Today, vol. 46, no. 5 (June 2016), p. 24.
36. Tim Boersma and Michael  E. O’Hanlon, “Why Eu rope’s 
Energy Policy Has Been a Strategic Success Story,” Order from 
Chaos blog, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., May 2, 2016 
(www . brookings . edu / blog / order - from - chaos / 2016 / 05 / 02 / why 
- europes - energy - policy - has - been - a - strategic - success - story).
37. Angela E. Stent, The Limits of Partnership: U.S.­ Russian 
Relations in the Twenty­ First  Century (University Press, 2014), 
pp. 264– 65.
38. For one perspective on Rus sia and Kosovo, see Strobe Tal-
bott, “To Understand Putin, Look to the Past,” Washington Post, 
March  21, 2014. For some of Putin’s views on missile defense, 
American conventional force modernization concepts, like prompt 
global strike, and the broader correlation of forces, see Vladimir 
Putin, State of the Union speech, December 12, 2013.
39. See James Sherr, Hard Diplomacy and Soft Coercion: Rus­
sia’s Influence Abroad (London: Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 2013), p. 57.
40. Dmitry Adamsky, “Defense Innovation in Rus sia: The Cur-
rent State and Prospects for Revival,” IGCC Defense Innovation 
Briefs, University of California Institute on Global Conflict and 
Cooperation, January 2014.
 Notes to Pages 113–119 145
06-3257-0 bm.indd   145 6/21/17   11:12 PM
06-3257-0 bm.indd   146 6/21/17   11:12 PM
147
Index
ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, 
1972), 17
Adapted CFE Treaty accord (1999), 85
Afghanistan: NATO mission in, 1, 4, 
76; Northern Distribution Network 
and, 22–23; peacekeeping 
operations in, 107; Russian 




Alternative security architecture: 
conflict resolutions as requirement 
of, 92–94; elements of, 90–100; 
foundational concepts for, 69–75; 
future climate for, 3–6, 116–120; 
NATO cooperation and, 8–10, 
106–110; NATO legacy and future 
and, 75–86; NATO membership 
and, 96–98; need for, 89–90; neutral 
states and NATO, security 
cooperation between, 106–110; 
potential countries for, 8, 65; 
resoluteness and resilience, 100–06; 
Russia and, 3–6, 9–10, 65–69, 
87–88, 98–100, 110–112, 116–120; 
timeframe for, 99–100; verification 
and compliance, 110–115. See also 
East European Security 
Architecture
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty 
(1972), 17
Arab Spring, 23, 25
Arab Winter, 25
Arctic travel, 103
Armenia, 50–52; Collective Security 
Treaty Organization and, 50; 
economy of, 50–51; Eurasian 
Economic Union and, 50; history 
of, 51–52; national security politics 
in, 49–53; population of, 36, 51; 
Russia and, 52, 93–94; Turkey and, 
52–53
Arms sales: between NATO nations, 
102; between PfP nations, 108; of 
U.S. to Taiwan, 110
al-Assad, Bashar, 33–34, 58
Austria: EU security and, 92; 
neutrality of, 4, 73
Axis of evil, 17
Azerbaijan, 50–52; economy of, 51; 
military expenditures of, 36, 51; 
national security politics in, 49–53; 
population of, 36
07-3257-0 idx.indd   147 6/21/17   11:12 PM
148 Index
Baker, James, 80
Balkans region: national security 
politics in, 53–56; NATO member-
ship and, 95; NATO operations in, 
14. See also specific states
Baltic Sea, 38–40, 108
Baltic states. See specific states
Belarus: Collective Security Treaty 
Organization and, 50; Eurasian 
Economic Union and, 50; national 
security politics in, 41–42, 48–49; 
population of, 36; Russia and, 
93–94
Belgium, neutrality of, 4, 73
Beria, Lavrenti, 42
Beslan terrorist attack (Russia, 2004), 19
Betts, Richard, 78
Black Sea: NATO presence in, 102–03; 
Russian presence in, 45
Bolshevik Revolution (Russia, 1917), 
39, 45, 52
Bosnia and Herzegovina: conflict in, 
14; national security politics in, 
53–56; NATO intervention in, 4, 54, 
76; NATO Membership Action Plan 
for, 53, 94; population of, 53; Russia 
and, 14
Bucharest NATO summit (2008), 2, 
20, 43
Budapest Memorandum (1994), 8, 46, 
79–80, 83–84, 96–97
Bulgaria: NATO membership of, 18; 
Russia and, 14
Burden sharing of NATO nations, 
74–75
Bush, George H. W., 77, 80
Bush, George W., 77, 81
Canada: NATO troops from, 79;  
poll on NATO use of force,  
58–61
CFE treaty, 85, 112
Charap, Samuel, 69
Chechnya, Russian intervention in, 
15–16
China: hypothetical threat from, 
109–110, 117–119; U.S. weapons 
sales to Taiwan and, 110
Churchill, Winston, 69
Clark, Wesley, 14–15
Clinton, Bill: Kosovo peacekeeping 
force and, 14; NATO expansion and, 




Cold Response maritime exercises 
(2016), 107–08
Cold War: end of, 10–11, 80; Finland 
and, 39–40; NATO and, 1, 4; 
security architecture following, 73, 
78; Sweden and, 40
Collective Security Treaty Organiza-
tion (CSTO), 50, 93–94
Color revolutions: in Georgia, 17, 43; 
in Kyrgyzstan, 17; in Ukraine, 17, 
19, 24, 46; United States and, 17, 19, 
24–25, 81, 104
Colton, Timothy, 69
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 
treaty (CFE, 1990), 85, 112
Corruption, 43, 46, 84
Counterterrorism: Chechnya 
intervention, 15–16; collaboration 
on, 119; U.S. intervention in Middle 
East, 16–19
Crimea: alternative security 
architecture and, 92–93; conflict 
in, 33–34, 66–67; sanctions from 
Russian aggression in, 87;  
Ukraine and, 45; Yalta Conference 
(1945), 69
CSTO (Collective Security Treaty 
Organization), 50, 93–94
Cyberattacks: of Russia, 8, 25, 66, 111; 
U.S. vulnerability to, 105
Cybersecurity, 102, 104–05
Cyprus: history of, 56, 75–76; national 
security politics in, 53, 56; 
population of, 36; Russia and, 56
Czech Republic: NATO membership 
of, 13, 18; Visegrad Group, 102
Defense Science Board, 104
Democracy: NATO promotion of, 76, 
78; in Russia, 78; U.S. promotion of, 
17, 19–20, 23–25, 81–82
Department of Defense (U.S.), priority 
concerns of, 7–8
Donbas aggressions, 6, 25, 29, 34, 47, 
87, 93, 100, 113
Dubrovka Theater attack (Russia, 
2002), 19
Dunford, Joseph, 7, 99
07-3257-0 idx.indd   148 6/21/17   11:12 PM
 Index 149
The Eagle and the Trident (Pifer), 44
Eastern Europe. See Color revolutions; 
specific countries
East European Security Architecture 
(EESA), 89–120; elements of, 
90–100; future climate for, 116–120; 
NATO cooperation and, 106–110; 
NATO membership and, 96–98; 
resoluteness and resilience, 100–06; 
Russian sanctions and, 100; 
timeframe for, 99–100; verification 
and compliance, 110–115. See also 
Alternative security architecture
Economy: of Armenia, 50–51; of 
Azerbaijan, 51; of collective NATO 
nations, 5, 26, 83; global financial 
crisis (2008), 26–27; national security 
and, 70–71; of Poland, 46; of Russia, 
5, 18, 26, 29, 83–84, 118–119; of 
Ukraine, 46; virtual economy, 84
EESA. See East European Security 
Architecture
Egypt, U.S. intervention in, 23
Erdogan, Recep Tayyip, 58
Estonia: NATO forces in, 76–77, 79; 
NATO membership of, 18, 57–58, 
101; Russia and, 8, 67
Eurasian Economic Union, 50
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, 
106–07
European Leadership Network, 99
European Reassurance Initiative, 5–6, 
57, 60, 101, 111
European Union (EU): Georgia and, 
44; membership in, 4, 70–71; 
migration and, 71; Moldova and, 49; 
Russia and, 71, 116; security pledge 
of, 38, 71, 91–92; Serbia and, 55–56
Finland: alternative security 
architecture and, 95–96; EU 
membership of, 38; EU security and, 
92; maritime exercises in, 107–08; 
national security politics in, 37–41; 
NATO membership and, 40–41, 66, 
94–95; population of, 36–37; Russia 
and, 39–41; Sweden, ties to, 39–40
Founding Act (1997), 13, 79–80
France, poll on NATO use of force, 
58–61
Freedom Agenda of Bush administra-
tion, 19, 81
G-7 (Group of 7), 77
G-8 (Group of 8), 79
Gaddy, Clifford, 20, 26, 84, 118
Georgia: alternative security 
architecture and, 93, 96–100; EU, 
Association Agreement with, 44; 
internal conflict in, 21–22; military 
size in, 37; national security politics 
in, 41–44; NATO Membership 
Action Plan for, 22, 66; NATO 
membership and, 2–3, 9, 19–20, 
68–69, 87, 96; peacekeeping 
operations of, 107; population of, 36; 
Rose Revolution (2003), 17, 43, 104; 
Russia and, 2–3, 22, 42–44, 66, 
68–69, 85
Germany: NATO troops from, 79; poll 
on NATO use of force, 58–61; 
reunification of, 80–81; Russian 
views on, 80–81
Global financial crisis (2008), 26–27
Gorbachev, Mikhail: German 
reunification and, 80; NATO 
expansion and, 81; Russian 
economy and, 26; U.S.-Russian 
relations and, 10, 77
Great Recession (2008), 26–27
Greece, Cyprus conflict and, 75–76
Helsinki Final Act (1975), 70
Hill, Fiona, 20, 26
Holland, neutrality of, 4, 73
Hungary: NATO membership of, 13, 
18; Romania and, 76; Russia and, 14; 




Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
treaty (1987), 67
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 26
International Republican Institute, 43, 
104
International Security Assistance 
Force, 107
Iran: nuclear weapons and, 89, 103; 
sanctions on, 22, 88, 100; threat of, 
17, 109–110
Iraq: U.S. conflict with, 16–18; 
weapons of mass destruction in, 
18–19
07-3257-0 idx.indd   149 6/21/17   11:12 PM
150 Index
ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and  
Syria), 58
Islamist extremism, 16, 58, 118.  
See also Terrorist attacks
Italy: NATO summit in (2002), 17–18; 
poll on NATO use of force, 58–61
Ivashov, Leonid, 14
Jackson, Michael, 14–15
Japan, U.S. defense of, 72–73
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(2016), 100
Kagan, Bob, 79
Kazakhstan: Collective Security 
Treaty Organization and, 50; 
Eurasian Economic Union and, 50
Kennan, George, 72–73, 85





Kosovo: alternative security 
architecture and, 93–95; conflict in, 
13–15, 54; independence of, 21, 53, 
55; national security politics in, 
53–56; peacekeeping operations in, 
14–15, 107; population of, 54; Russia 
and, 13–15, 54
Kosovo peacekeeping force (KFOR), 
14–15, 107
Kozyrev, Andrei, 81
Kyrgyzstan: Collective Security Treaty 
Organization and, 50; Tulip 
Revolution (2005), 17, 104
Latvia: NATO forces in, 76–77, 79; 
NATO membership of, 18, 57–58, 
101; Russia and, 67
Lavrov, Sergey, 23–24
Libya: NATO intervention in, 23; U.S. 
conflict with, 16–17
Lisbon Treaty (2009), 91–92
Lithuania: NATO forces in, 76–77, 79; 
NATO membership of, 18, 57–58, 
101
Little green men of Russia, 32, 60, 67
Lukashenko, Alexander, 48–49
Macedonia: national security politics 
in, 53–56; NATO Membership 
Action Plan for, 53, 94; population 
of, 54
Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 crash 
(2014), 25
Maritime exercises, 107–08
Maskirovka policies of Russia, 113
Maydan Revolution (Ukraine, 
2013–14), 17, 24, 46, 104
Medvedev, Dmitry, 22, 81
Membership Action Plans (MAPs) of 
NATO: alternative security 
architecture and, 94; for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 53; defined, 94; for 
Georgia, 22, 66; for Macedonia, 53; 
for Montenegro, 94; for Ukraine, 22, 
66
Middle East: Arab Spring in, 23, 25; 
Arab Winter in, 25; NATO 
Mediterranean initiatives and, 
108–09; Russian collaboration in, 
88, 89; U.S. defense of, 72–73; U.S. 
intervention in, 16–19, 23
Migration: European Union and, 71; 
NATO’s Mediterranean initiatives 
and, 108–09; refugee crisis and, 57
Military exercises: cold-water 
maritime exercises, 107–08; of 
NATO and neutral states, 107–08; of 
Russia, 8, 66–67
Military expenditures: of Armenia, 51; 
of Azerbaijan, 36, 51; of NATO 
countries, 75, 83; poll on, 64; of 
Sweden, 36; of Ukraine, 36–37; of 
United States, 75
Military incidents, 8, 25, 66–67, 99
Milosevic, Slobodan, 14, 54–55
Minsk I and II, 48, 90, 93, 97
Missile defense systems, 17, 22, 77, 83, 
103–04; Russian anti-aircraft 
missiles, 25
Moldova: alternative security 
architecture and, 93; EU, 
Association Agreement with, 49; 
national security politics in, 41–42, 
48–49; population of, 36; Russia 
and, 66, 85
Montenegro: national security politics 
in, 53–56; NATO and, 53; NATO 
Membership Action Plan for, 94; 
population of, 53–54
Munich Security Conference  
(2007), 20
07-3257-0 idx.indd   150 6/21/17   11:12 PM
 Index 151
Mutual defense commitment of EU 
countries, 38, 71, 91–92
Mutual-defense pact of NATO.  
See NATO, Article V
National Democratic Institute, 43,  
104
Nationalism, 80, 85, 117–119
National Security Agency, 104–05
National security politics, 35–64; of 
Armenia, 49–53; of Azerbaijan, 
49–53; of Balkan states, 53–56; of 
Belarus, 41–49; of Cyprus, 53–56; 
economy and, 70; of Finland, 37–41; 
of Georgia, 41–49; of Moldova, 
41–49; of Serbia, 53–56; of Sweden, 
37–41; of Ukraine, 41–49
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization): achievements of, 1, 
4–5, 75–76, 86–87; Article V, 57–59, 
62–63, 65–66, 68–69, 73, 92; Article 
X, 74–75; Bosnian membership and, 
53; Bucharest summit (2008), 2, 20, 
43; burden sharing within, 74–75; 
creation of, 1; democracy promotion 
of, 76, 78; economy and collective 
population of, 5, 26, 83; expansion 
in 1990s, 10–13, 76, 81–83; 
expansion in early 2000s, 18–22, 
85–87; Georgian membership and, 
2–3, 9, 19–20, 22, 66, 68–69, 96; 
German reunification and, 80–81; 
Macedonian membership and, 53; 
Mediterranean initiatives of, 
108–09; membership right, 71–75; 
military expenditures of member 
countries, 75, 83; Montenegro 
membership and, 53; Operation 
Atlantic Resolve, 5–6, 60, 76–77, 
101; overextension of, 65–66, 73; 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
program, 5, 10, 77, 106–08; poll on 
popularity of, 64; poll on use of 
force by, 58–61; purpose of, 63; 
Rome summit (2002), 17–18; 
Russian deterrence of membership 
in, 66, 68–69; slander against, 67; 
troop locations of, 5, 20, 76–77, 
79–80, 101–02; Ukraine member-
ship and, 2–3, 9, 22, 61, 66, 68–69, 
82, 96, 98; Very High Readiness 
Joint Task Force, 102; Wales summit 
(2014), 102. See also Alternative 
security architecture; Membership 
Action Plans; NATO-Russian 
relations; Peacekeeping operations; 
specific countries and interventions
NATO Response Force (NRF), 102
NATO-Russia Council, 5, 17–18, 79, 
89–90
NATO-Russian Founding Act on 
Mutual Relations (1997), 13, 79–80
NATO-Russian relations: alternative 
security architecture and, 98–99, 
116–118; breakdown of, 25; 
Founding Act and, 13, 79–80; 
mechanisms for peace, 77, 118; 
military exercises and, 8; NATO 
expansion and, 10–11, 18–22, 81–83, 
86, 98–99; NATO-Russia Council, 5, 
17–18, 79, 89–90; nuclear weapons 
and, 8, 67–68, 79, 118; oil embargo 
and, 114; troop locations and, 5, 
76–77, 79–80, 101–02; Western vs. 
Russian view on, 5
Netherlands, neutrality of, 4, 73
Neutrality of states: defined, 74; 
Eastern European states and, 73; EU 
security pledge and, 92; Finland and 
Sweden and, 40–41; NATO 
cooperation and, 106–110; as 
security architecture, 4, 73. See also 
Alternative security architecture
New security architecture. See 
Alternative security architecture
New START Treaty (2010), 22
9/11 terrorist attacks, 1, 16, 81
North Atlantic Cooperation Council, 
5, 77
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
See NATO
Northern Distribution Network, 
22–23
North Korea: sanctions on, 22, 88; 
threats from, countering, 17
Norway, NATO membership of,  
57–58
NRF (NATO Response Force), 102
Nuclear weapons: Iran and, 89, 103; 
missile defense systems and, 17; 
NATO-Russian relations and, 8, 
67–68, 79, 118; nonproliferation 
efforts and, 15, 79, 119; of Russia, 84; 
Russian weapons procurement plan 
07-3257-0 idx.indd   151 6/21/17   11:12 PM
152 Index
Nuclear weapons (cont.)
 and, 29, 32; threat of use, 83; 
Ukraine and, 46; U.S.-Russian 
relations and, 68
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat 
Reduction program, 15
Obama, Barack: missile defense 
system and, 103; sanctions imposed 
by, 105; Ukraine and, 61; 
U.S.-Russian relations and, 22–25, 
43, 77
Open Skies arrangement, 112
Operation Atlantic Resolve, 5–6, 60, 
76–77, 101
Orange Revolution (Ukraine, 
2004–05), 17, 19, 46, 104
Organization for Security and 




Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, 
5, 10, 77, 106–08
Partnership Training and Education 
Center, 107
Peacekeeping operations: in 
Afghanistan, 107; of Georgia, 107; in 
Kosovo, 14–15, 106–7; of NATO, 
106–07; in Ukraine, 107
Perry, William, 81
Pew Research Center poll on NATO 
use of force against Russia, 58–61, 
63–64
PfP program. See Partnership for 
Peace
Pifer, Steven, 44, 46
Poland: economy of, 46; NATO forces 
in, 5, 76–77, 79; NATO membership 
of, 13, 18, 57–58; poll on NATO use 
of force, 58–61; Visegrad Group, 102
Poroshenko, Petro, 3
Putin, Vladimir: alternative security 
architecture and, 87–88, 98; on 
Chechnya intervention, 15–16; 
internal popularity of, 4–5, 23, 61, 
117; on Kosovo conflict, 13–14; 
NATO actions, anger toward, 
80–81; NATO expansion and, 2–3, 
20–21, 81; rise to power, 15; Russian 
economy and, 26, 29, 84; on U.S. 
international policy, 16–19, 24–25; 
U.S.-Russian relations and, 2, 68, 77; 
weapons procurement plan of, 29, 
32; worldview of, 32–33, 77–78, 87
RAND Corporation, 79
Rapid Trident (2016), 107
Reagan, Ronald, 17, 110
Refugee crisis, 57, 108–09
Resolute Support mission in 
Afghanistan, 107
Rogozin, Dmitry, 119
Romania: Hungary and, 76; NATO 
membership of, 18; NATO summit 
in (2008), 20; Russia and, 14
Rome NATO summit (2002), 17–18
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 69
Rose Revolution (Georgia, 2003), 17, 
43, 104
Russia: alternative security architec-
ture and, 3–6, 9–10, 65–69, 86–87, 
98–100, 110–112, 116–120; anger 
toward NATO actions, 80–83; 
Bolshevik Revolution (1917), 39, 45, 
52; Collective Security Treaty 
Organization and, 50, 93–94; 
Crimea conflict and, 33–34, 66–67, 
92–93; cyberattacks of, 8, 25, 66, 
111; democracy in, 78; economy of, 
5, 18, 26, 29, 83–84, 118–119; 
Eurasian Economic Union and, 50; 
G-8 and, 77, 79; hypothetical threat 
of, 114–115; internal dissent in, 23; 
Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 crash 
and, 25; Maskirovka policies of, 113; 
Middle East-U.S. conflict and, 
16–19, 23, 88, 89; military exercises 
of, 8, 66–67; military reforms of, 29, 
32; nationalism and pride in, 80, 85, 
117–119; navy of, 39, 45; negative 
western views in, 5, 32–33, 83–85; 
opposing NATO membership, 
66–69; poll on NATO use of force 
against, 58–61; population of, 5, 83; 
post–WWII security order and, 69; 
public perception of NATO, 77–78; 
recent offenses of, 66–67, 83–85; as 
revisionist power, 110–111; 
sanctions imposed on, 6, 26, 29, 48, 
61, 87, 100, 105; terrorist attacks in, 
16, 19; as threat to U.S., 7–8; U.S. 
2016 elections and, 2, 9, 34, 67–68, 
07-3257-0 idx.indd   152 6/21/17   11:12 PM
 Index 153
104; weapons modernization and, 7, 
17, 29, 32, 83. See also Cold War; 
NATO-Russian relations; 
Ukraine-Russian conflict; United 
States-Russian relations; names of 
other countries for relations with 
Russia
Saakashvili, Mikheil, 19, 22, 43–44
Sanctions: alternative security 
architecture and, 99–100; on Iran, 
22, 88, 100; on North Korea, 22, 88; 
on Russia, 6, 26, 29, 48, 61, 87, 100, 
105; targeted, 105
Sargsian, Serzh, 51
Security architecture. See Alternative 
security architecture; East 
European Security Architecture 
(EESA)
Security Council, 62–63
Self-defense, 59, 62, 76. See also United 
Nations
Self-determination. See Sovereignty 
and self-determination
Self-reliance, 41, 95
Serbia: EU membership and, 55–56; 
Kosovo conflict and, 13–15, 54; 
national security politics in, 53–56; 
population of, 36, 53
Serdyukov, Anatoliy, 29
Sergei Magnitsky Act (2012), 23
Shevardnadze, Eduard, 42–43
Shirreff, Richard, 79
Slovakia: Hungaria and, 76; NATO 
membership of, 18; Visegrad Group, 
102
Slovenia, NATO membership of, 18
Sobchak, Anatoly, 10
Sochi Winter Olympics (2014), 60
Sovereignty and self-determination: 
alternative security architecture 
and, 3, 69–75, 90; of Eastern 
European nations, 37; Helsinki 
Final Act and, 70; neutrality and, 4, 
73; of Ukraine, 44, 47
Soviet Union: Armenia and, 52; 
Azerbaijan and, 52; Crimea and, 45; 
former states joining NATO, 1–2, 
18, 82; German reunification and, 
80; Helsinki Final Act and, 70; 
Ukraine and, 42, 45–46; Winter 
War with Finland, 39–40
Spain, poll on NATO use of force, 
58–61
Stalin, Joseph, 42, 45, 69
Star Wars program, 17
Stent, Angela, 82
Strategic Defense Initiative, 17
Sweden: alternative security 
architecture and, 95–96; EU 
membership of, 38; EU security and, 
92; Finland, ties to, 39–40; maritime 
exercises in, 107–08; military 
expenditures of, 36; national 
security politics in, 37–41; NATO 
membership and, 40–41, 66, 94–95; 
population of, 36–37; Russia and, 
40; weapons sales to, 108
Switzerland, neutrality of, 4, 73
Syria: Russian support for al-Assad, 
33–34, 89; Russian tactics in, 25; 
Turkey and, 58; U.S. intervention in, 
23; U.S.-Russian collaboration on, 
109
Taiwan, U.S. weapons sales to, 110
Tajikistan, Collective Security Treaty 
Organization and, 50
Terrorist attacks: NATO’s response  
to, 1; in Russia, 16, 19; in United 
States, 1, 16, 81. See also 
Counterterrorism
Tito, Josip Broz, 54
Treaty on the European Union (1992), 
91–92
Trump, Donald: 2016 elections and 
Russia, 2, 9, 34, 67–68, 104; 
European Reassurance Initiative 
and, 5–6; on NATO, 63; 
U.S.-Russian relations and, 2, 8,  
34, 68
Tulip Revolution (Kyrgyzstan, 2005), 
17, 104
Turkey: Armenia and, 52–53; 
Azerbaijan and, 50–51; Cyprus 
conflict and, 75–76; NATO and, 58; 
Russia and, 58; Syria and, 58
Ukraine: alternative security 
architecture and, 93, 96–100, 
114–115; Crimea and, 45; economy 
of, 46; history of, 45; identity and 
nationalism of, 47; Maydan 
Revolution (2013–14), 17, 24, 46, 104;
07-3257-0 idx.indd   153 6/21/17   11:12 PM
154 Index
Ukraine (cont.)
 migration and, 71; military size 
and expenditures of, 36–37; 
national security politics in, 41–42, 
44–48; NATO Membership Action 
Plan for, 22, 66; NATO member-
ship and, 2–3, 9, 61, 68–69, 82, 87, 
96, 98; Orange Revolution 
(2004–05), 17, 19, 46, 104; OSCE in, 
112; poll on international aid to, 61; 
population of, 36; public support 
for NATO membership, 47; Rapid 
Trident peacekeeping operation, 
107; Russia and, 2–3, 44–46; 
sovereignty of, 44; United Kingdom 
and, 8, 46, 79–80; weapons for, 61, 
105–06, 108; weapons monitoring 
in, 112–113. See also Donbas 
aggressions
Ukraine-Russian conflict: alternative 
security architecture and, 85, 93, 
99–100; Budapest Memorandum 
and, 8, 46, 79–80, 83–84, 96–97; 
casualties of, 25, 47, 66; to deter 
NATO membership, 66, 68–69; 
equipment monitoring during, 
112–113; EU assistance in, 47–48; 
G-8 status for Russia and, 77; NATO 
assistance in, 25, 47–48, 61; Putin’s 
worldview and, 32–34; sanctions 
resulting from, 6, 26, 29, 48, 87; 
U.S.-Russian relations and, 8; 
weapons for, 61, 105–06, 108
United Kingdom: Kosovo conflict and, 
14–15, 54; NATO summit in (2014), 
102; NATO troops from, 79; poll on 
NATO use of force, 58–61; Ukraine 
and, 8, 46, 79–80; U.S. defense of, 
72–73
United Nations (UN): Charter, 
Article 51 (right to self-defense), 
59, 62, 70, 83–84, 92; Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action, 
100; Kosovo conflict and, 13–14; 
Libya conflict and, 23; Russian 
violation of Charter, 83–84; 
Security Council, 62–63; on 
sovereignty and independence, 70
United States: alternative security 
architecture and, 3–6, 101; Arab 
spring and, 23; Arctic travel and, 
103; cybersecurity of, 104–05; 
defense alliances of, 72–73; 
democracy promotion efforts of, 17, 
19–20, 23–25, 81–82; Eastern 
European revolutions and, 17, 19, 
24–25, 81, 104; European 
Reassurance Initiative of, 5–6, 57, 
60, 101; Kosovo independence and, 
55; Libya and, 16–17; Middle East 
counterterrorism conflict, 16–19, 
23; military expenditures of, 75; 
missile defense systems of, 17, 22, 
77, 103; NATO troops from, 79, 
101–02; neutral states, defense of, 
106; poll on NATO use of force, 
58–61, 63; Russia as major threat to, 
7–8; Syrian conflict and, 109; 
terrorist attacks in, 1, 16, 81; 
Ukraine and, 8, 25, 32, 46, 79–80, 
82; weapons modernization and, 7, 
17, 83; weapons monitoring of, 
112–113; weapons sales of, 108, 110
United States-Russian relations: in 
1980s and 1990s, 10–13, 77–78; 
2016 U.S. elections and, 2, 9, 34, 
67–68, 104; alternative security 
architecture and, 116–117; Arctic 
travel and, 103; color revolutions in 
Eastern Europe and, 17, 19, 24–25, 
81, 104; counterterrorism and, 
15–17; future vision for, 116–120; 
NATO troop locations and, 101–2; 
nuclear weapons and, 68; Obama 
and, 22–25, 43, 77; Putin and, 2, 68, 
77; Trump and, 8, 34; weapons 
modernization and, 7, 17. See also 
Cold War
Uzbekistan, weapons sales to, 108
Very High Readiness Joint Task Force 
of NATO, 102
Vienna Document (1990), 67
Visegrad Group, 102
Wales summit (2014), 102
Warsaw Initiative Funds, 106–07
Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw 
Pact), 10–11, 77, 96–97
Washington Treaty (1949), 59
Weapons: inspections of, 112–113; of 
Iraq, 18–19; modernization of, 7, 
17, 29, 32, 82–83, 102; monitoring 
in Ukraine, 112–113; Russian 
07-3257-0 idx.indd   154 6/21/17   11:12 PM
 Index 155
military exercises, 8, 66–67; 
Russian reforms and, 29, 32; for 
Ukraine, 61, 105–06, 108. See also 
Arms sales; Missile defense 
systems; Nuclear weapons
Weapons of mass destruction  
(WMD) and Saddam Hussein, 
18–19
World War I: Armenians and, 52; 
Balkan region and, 54
World War II: Finland and, 39–40; 
neutrality of states and, 4; postwar 
security order, 69; Ukraine and, 45
Yalta Conference (1945), 69
Yanukovych, Viktor, 32, 60
Yeltsin, Boris, 10–11, 13, 26, 77, 84
Yugoslavia: dissolution of, 55; 
formation of, 54; Kosovo conflict 
and, 13–15
07-3257-0 idx.indd   155 6/21/17   11:12 PM
N AT O  E X PA N S I O N  H A S  G O N E  FA R  E N O U G H 
Western nations should negotiate a new security architecture for eastern Europe 
to stabilize the region and reduce the risks of war with Russia. This new security 
approach would revolve around permanent neutrality for Finland and Sweden; 
Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus; Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan; and finally 
Cyprus plus Serbia, as well as possibly several other Balkan states. These countries 
could still join economic and political groups as desired. Russia would have to 
settle “frozen” and “simmering” conflicts as part of the arrangement. Discussion 
on the new framework should begin within NATO, followed by deliberation with the 
neutral countries themselves, and then formal negotiations with Russia. 
Advance praise for B E Y O N D  N AT O
“Mike O’Hanlon’s book addresses one of the most consequential security issues 
of our day––the increasing hostility between the United States and Russia. 
Indeed, if we do not address it successfully, we may very well blunder into a 
military conflict with Russia, one that could all too easily escalate into a nuclear 
conflict that would threaten our very civilization. And he argues, correctly 
I believe, that the conflict over what Russia calls the “near abroad” is one 
fundamental cause of that hostility. He proposes a concrete step to lower the 
tensions that continue to stoke that hostility; basically setting up those nations 
as neutral nations, not aligned with either Russia or the West; and in particular, 
excluded from NATO membership. This is a controversial proposal, and one 
with real drawbacks for the nations involved. But the problem has eluded 
other solutions, and the consequences of not solving it could be catastrophic. 
O’Hanlon makes a thoughtful and well-argued case for his proposal and it 
deserves serious consideration.”      
—W I L L I A M  J .  P E R R Y, 19th U.S. Secretary of Defense
M I C H A E L  E .  O ’ H A N L O N  is senior fellow and research director for 
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